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The main events in the rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union
US - Soviet rivalry during the Cold War
The main events in the rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union
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The concepts coercive diplomacy the India-Pakistan Context was, articulated with the superpower rivalry or situations involving a superpower and a minor power in mind.It couldnot be applied wholesale to the India-Pakistan context. The circumstances are quite different in the India-Pakistan context. The United States and the former Soviet Union did not share a common border and, more importantly, did not dispute territories that the other possessed. Their rivalry was more geopolitical in nature and the world at large was the stage on which it played itself out. As a result, they had greater freedom for manoeuvre and a more elaborate menu of options. Compromise was also easier given that the contest was invariably over third countries.Where a superpower confronted a weaker adversary, the menu of options available to the former was even larger. Relative strength was in favour of the superpower across the military-diplomatic spectrum. This, of course, did not always result in the successful exercise of coercive diplomacy, especially where motivation levels were skewed in favour of the weaker party. A good example is the U.S. failure to coerce North Vietnam into ceasing support for the Vietcong. But the point being emphasised here is the unequal nature of the contest and the weaker power's lack …show more content…
In contrast, India and Pakistan are not all that mismatched at the conventional level.
India and Pakistan not only share a common border but are also parties to a territorial dispute. Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir is tied to the contending conceptions of nationhood and identity articulated by the two countries. This enmeshing of national identity with national interest makes their.conflict that much more intense and limits the scope for compromise. The motivation levels of both parties are thus quite high and each perceives the conflict as a zero-sum
“The distinct differences in the political systems of the two countries often prevented them from reaching a mutual understanding on key policy issues and even, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, brought them to the brink of war” (Library of Congress). The Soviet Union and The United States were complete opposites, The United States was a democracy whereas The Soviet Union was a dictatorship. This only began their differences though, their economies, beliefs, goals, and even their fears, everything about them made them different except for their enemy. The
Clausewitz’s thoughts on war termination effectively summarize the situation for the Japanese and Russian Empires preceding peace negotiations, “Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost.” (Clausewitz, 91). The Japanese effectively identified their culminating point of victory and predicted that continued success would be highly improbable. The Russian Empire had the means to eventually turn the tide of the war, but the cost to do this was unacceptable. As a result, both chose to negotiate peace while continuing to take steps to improve their negotiating position. The Russo-Japanese War highlights the Japanese Empire’s ability to effectively plan, execute and negotiate the termination of a war, despite being considered a vastly inferior power at the onset of war.
The alliance formed between the US and USSR during the second world war was not strong enough to overcome the decades of uneasiness which existed between the two ideologically polar opposite countries. With their German enemy defeated, the two emerging nuclear superpowers no longer had any common ground on which to base a political, economical, or any other type of relationship. Tensions ran high as the USSR sought to expand Soviet influence throughout Europe while the US and other Western European nations made their opposition to such actions well known. The Eastern countries already under Soviet rule yearned for their independence, while the Western countries were willing to go to great lengths to limit Soviet expansion. "Containment of 'world revolution' became the watchword of American foreign policy throughout the 1950s a...
Brinkmanship was effective in preventing war because neither the United States or the Soviet Union was really prepared to fight yet another war. Through the policies of containment, McCarthyism, and brinkmanship the United States was able to successfully remain a democratic nation. Although some of its policies were corrupt, the U.S. perused its goals and eventually stopped the spread of communism.
The foreign and domestic policies during the Cold War lead to both the separation of world powers and the fear of political and social systems throughout the world. After World War 2 had ended, tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union heighted. The agreements made at the Yalta Conference between Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt , were not being followed by the Soviets. The Soviet Union kept the land they reconquered in Eastern Europe and did not enforce a democratic government in those countries, as they promised. Instead, the Soviet Union decided to continue spreading communism in their reconquered lands. The United States’ feared the spread of communism and attempted to do anything in its power to stop it. Before the United
Failure of the Détente Between the Superpowers The French word ‘détente’, which the Oxford English Dictionary describes as “the easing of strained relations, especially in a political situation” (www.oed.com), first appeared in this context when a German newspaper used it to describe the visit of a British monarch at the beginning of the 20th century (Froman, 1991). In this essay, I will attempt to explain the cold war détente between the superpowers of the USA and the USSR in the 1970’s, concentrating first on its positive developments between 1971 and 1973 and then on the events that lead to its ultimate failure, symbolised by the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The first real steps of relaxation of tensions were taken with the Moscow summit and the signing of the SALT 1 (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) agreement in May 1972. The SALT agreement was a staring point for attempts to control nuclear arms, to restrict the impact and spread of nuclear weapons and to secure a balance due to ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ (the notion that a nuclear attack from one side would lead to a retaliation from the other and therefore both sides would be greatly damaged) between the two superpowers and were to be followed up by further arms limitations talks within the next five years (Kent and Young, 2004). Also, agreements were reached on lowering the risk of accidental confrontation and on cooperation in science, health and environmental issues.
Coercion can be defined as forcing someone to do something they do not want to do. In order to determine if coercion will be successful or not one has to look at four key principles: communication, capability, credibility and compliance or “target will.” While the peace settlements after World War I could have been considered coercive, they probably had very little chance of success based on these four stated principles. France communicated that it wanted unreasonable demands including unlimited reparations for the war. Without Great Britain and the United States, France had little capability in enforcing the settlements. In addition, it had little to no past reputation of being able to support its decision in upholding the settlements. Finally,
"When a power vacuum separates great powers, as one did the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, they are unlikely to fill it without bumping up against and bruising each other" (Gaddis). This 'bumping' and 'bruising' caused the tensions and hostilities that surfaced in the years following WWII.
In his 1959 study, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, the well-known historian William Appleton Williams wrote, that in spite of its best intentions, American foreign policy was based on a one-dimensional American belief that Americans and the American government had all the answers to their problems. I strongly agree, for the most part, with that statement. The only aspect of American foreign policy that I disagreement is the firmness in which our government stands true to their decisions and re often inflexible enough to change them. The administrators in charge of our government dating back to the 19th century have always been too inflexible to tweak their application on foreign policy in the least bit. It has made way to a century of failure in foreign relations. America began building up its outdated navy ships in the early 1880's in preparation for what would be an American attempt at expansion. They wanted to become the premiere naval world power. They were already being acknowledged as whole of the great world strengths by other powerful countries. It didn't take long, by 1900; the U.S. began flexing its muscles. The Caribbean and Pacific Islands became a national interest. A classic example of which started the poor American foreign policy was in 1891 in Chile. Secretary of State James G. Blaine became involved in a border dispute between Mexico and Guatemala, tried settling a war between Peru, Bolivia and Chile. Chile held a riot against American troops. Blaine threatened Chile with war, and they were forced to apologize to America and pay an indemnity of $75,000. This established America as a world power, but also tarnished their role in foreign policy before it even got off the ground. Many more incidents like this occurred after the event with Chile, the biggest being the pursuit of the Panama Canal. America continued moving into to foreign land, and when problems arose, America began implementing an American model of government in these areas, believing that was the only way to solve the problems.
In this case, it led to more hostility and created the conflict because the states were antithetical in nature to each other. This drove the conflict, not material matters. Bibliography Nye, Jr., Joseph S. “Hard and Soft Power in American Foreign Policy.” In Paradox of American Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
..., since it reinforce the perception of the surrounding states to be dealing with a country characterized by a high level of resolution and risk-taking attitude, despite its inability to confront other major power military.
The modern state was sovereign; therefore, internally, it exerted itself its authority, within a territorial boundaries which was clearly defined and acknowledged internationally, there was no authorities higher than the state. Externally, state sovereignty indicated that other states recognized its authority within its borders, and agreed that it could represent its citizens in international affairs. (Graeme Gill) The modern state was centralized, and bureaucratically organized. Its legal administration as well as its administrative staffs were controlled by regulations. Its offices were structured with a definite line of direction. Through their organization, the modern state projected its power into the society, exerted direct control upon their populace, and controlled their territory. Even though, its structure while comparing it with our states structures today, was not well equilibrated; however, it was ready during this period to operate changes that diplomacy brought into their structure which would affect their upward within 1648 to 1815.
“The period of ‘peaceful coexistence’ is receding into the past, giving way to a period of imperialist attacks...” “ Our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the coexistence of the two opposing systems is possible. Practice has fully confirmed this.” One view on the use of ‘peaceful coexistence’ was that it was a tactic used by the USSR to keep the United States off guard. The United States accused the USSR of seeking to expand communism throughout the world. The USSR however, accused the United States of practicing Imperialism and with attempting to stop revolutionary activity. Even when denying the accusation of spreading communism throughout the world, the USSR was supporting insurgent revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. After the devastation of World War 2, many western European countries became susceptible against communism. To help prevent this, the United States proposed a program called the Marshall Plan to help rebuild the distraught economies. During 1945 and early 1946, the USSR made efforts to cut off contact with th...
The United State’s expansion into its western continental territories, fueled by the idea of manifest destiny, began the US experiment with empire. Under the threat of the dominant pro-haole interests, King Kalakaua involuntarily signed a new constitution that replaced the treaty of friendship that had governed US and Hawaiian interests in 1887. This Bayonet constitution reduced the power of the Hawaiian monarchy and expanded political representation to anyone who was literate and who owned more than three thousand dollars worth of land. Since an insufficient number of native Hawaiians fulfilled these standards, the constitution essentially put the Americans in control of the Hawaiian government and people. The Political Instability of Reciprocal
International negotiations may comprise a number of different channels during a peace process. Negotiations between states may take place in public front channels or they may be veiled to maintain secrecy of the bargaining process. This essay will look at the later and examine whether the beneficial effects of secret diplomacy can also yield negative consequences. This essay will be divided into three sections. The first section will define secret diplomacy, referred to as back channel diplomacy (BCD), and outline some of its characteristics. The discussion will outline why parties use BCD and convey the benefits and disadvantages. The second section will outline the function of BCD in two negotiation case studies. The first will look at Israel and Palestinian negotiations leading up to the Oslo Accords in 1993. The second case study will examine British negotiations with the IRA and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland leading up to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The third and final section will evaluate the use of BCD in both cases and convey some lessons for policymakers. This essay argues that whilst BCD can be helpful in facilitating a peace process, it can be damaging if it is not managed with front channel diplomacy (FCD).