Close Air Support Impact

Running Head: Close Air Support

Close Air Support 8

Assessing the Impact that Close Air Support (CAS) has on the Battlefield

by

Mike S. Jackson

A Research Project

Submitted to the Worldwide Campus

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

Of Course ASCI 490, The Aeronautical Science Capstone Course,

For the Bachelor of Science in Aeronautics Degree

Embry Riddle Aeronautical University

September 2015

Abstract

This research paper will briefly examine the inception, timeline, training, and results Close Air Support (CAS) has on the battlefield. Opinions and facts will be provided to justify the continued need for and outstanding results of CAS through research of various sources to include books, regulations, videos,

personal experience, and the web. CAS was developed before the First World War and has gone on to become one of the most consistent methods of conducting warfare for any modern military force in the world. The paper will examine the intricacies involving the practice and the doctrinal development of the practice over the years. It will focus on the historical relationships between ground forces and the air wings that offer CAS during combat. The paper will be developed to reflect the progression from its inception to the current day: examining the major facets of CAS in relation to the changing realities of the battlefield.

Assessing the Impact that Close Air Support (CAS) has on the Battlefield
Close Air Support (CAS) refers to a military strategy that involves air action from rotary or fixed wing aircraft against enemy combatants that are in close proximity to friendly naval or ground forces. Action of these aircraft must require precise synchronization with fire and movements of friendly naval or ground forces. ?The first time aircraft were utilized in warfare dates back to the Italian-Turkish War of 1911-1912. It was to get a bigger stage later during the First World War?. (Buss, 2015) That would also be the beginning of collaboration between Army and Air Force units in actual combat; thus the beginning of CAS. Light aircraft bombs and rifle caliber machine gun used at the time did not have as great an impact as they do now. However they did have a great psychological impact on enemy troops. Early CAS operations were limited by undeveloped ground to air communications. Radio communication between handlers on the ground and pilots in the air was not effective and made coordinating CAS operations difficult. Fragility of aircraft also played a major role in the limited effectiveness of this strategy early on.
Proponents of air attacks felt air power and bombing operations would be just as successful if not more without the need of ground forces. This thought process put them at odds with Army commanders who felt ground troops were integral to any military campaign. Friction within the military made it harder to achieve synchronization during attacks especially during the early stages of CAS. Things would change during the First World War as the importance of air support was recognized and by 1916 initial protocols for CAS were initiated. ?From this time onwards, an elaborate air support doctrine was implemented with dedicated air fighting units coming into service?. (Doughty, 2015) Effects of these new air warfare techniques were immediately recognized due to the impact on enemy soldiers in the trenches.
Great Britain used the first ever ground attack aircraft during the First World War in 1917 following the second battle of Aisne. Aircraft were modified versions of the F.E 2Bfighters and were equipped to carry bombs in addition to mounted machine guns. Other aircraft were modified to support this rapidly expanding air support role during World War 1 due to continued success. The first recorded integrated plan involving aircraft support on a large scale was at the Battle of Cambrai. By this time the enemy was employing their own counter measures with ever increasing success. Despite counter measures by the enemy CAS was still an effective battle strategy that played an important role in this battle. ?The battle of Cambrai also witnessed the first time that the Germans deployed their own air support aircraft in the war?. (Buss, 2015) Air support aircraft used by the British during this war were mostly for trench strafing and attack sorties on strategic enemy infrastructure away from main battlefronts. ?The 1918 Sinai and Palestinian campaign was the first time that Close Air Support played a most prominent role in ensuring total victory. (Johnson, 2014) From that point on CAS has been an integral part of military campaigns and developing strategies to utilize it have grown. The Banana wars in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua saw the use of US Air Force assets in support of the ground forces. ?Air support teams developed strategies such as dive-bombing to employee in conjunction with ground force actions to achieve success against the enemy?. (Buss, 2015)
Debates continued as to the most effective use of air power in combat.

Many in the winged forces believed that participating in combat, as synchronized support for ground forces was both inefficient and very hard to accomplish. They argued that an independent use of aircraft to fight the enemy would be more productive and easier to achieve success with. It was their opinion that tying them down to synchronicity with ground forces limited their destructive potential and made use of aircraft in wars an unnecessarily complicated affair. The Air Force advocated for an institutional independence from the Army and the adoption of an interdiction policy for their fighting units. According to proponents of institutional independence, CAS served to duplicate the role of the artillery and was therefore not as effective. The Air Force saw their shackling to the Army as a refusal to admit the unique capabilities and strengths of air

warfare.
On the other side, Army officers countered that air support provided a big psychological boost for friendly troops and greatly demoralized enemy forces. The Army pointed out the ability of airplanes to accurately deliver bombs on select targets unlike the case with indiscriminate use of artillery fire. Indiscriminate use of artillery proved to make the terrain unfavorable for movement; a fact, which was blamed for slowing the advance of the Army. Therefore the Army advocated for air support to reduce the need for artillery. Army officers argued for CAS since aircraft were more flexible and could be relied upon for providing massive firepower at critical junctures of combat, which could ensure victory. During combat, movement of artillery is cumbersome and makes it harder to have sufficient artillery when it would be most beneficial. ?During the Second World War, the German forces kicked off their war with a combined use of air support (The Luftwaffe) and ground forces with a high degree of success. By the end of the war, all the major players in the conflict had adopted efficient tactics for the combined use of air support and conventional Army forces?. (Buss, 2015)
CAS has considerably improved over the years but challenges affecting its practice have not been fully eliminated. Problems arise from failure to achieve a smooth relationship between the Army and the Air Force. For CAS to be effective there must be a seamless collaboration and better communication between the Army and the Air Force. This means doctrine, training, and interaction between the two forces need to be done with minimal friction. The effective combination of their strengths and the flawless execution of their combat synchronization could help save the lives of many soldiers. Instances of poor coordination are common between units of CAS and friendly Army counterparts. This has lead to ineffectiveness and sometimes-fatal repercussions during operations. To date the debate on the most effective use of air support in battle still rages on with the two forces sharply divided on the issue.
CAS works by using aerial forces to support objectives set by ground force commanders. Aerial forces are in many instances crucial to the achievement of these goals and do not change for Major Theaters of War. During the application of CAS, the Air Force component is used strategically to help surface forces achieve an overall objective through careful application. ?Aerial forces employ rotary or fixed wing aircraft against enemy combatants and machinery that is in close proximity to the friendly surface forces; in close coordination with the ground forces commander?. (Hill, 2012)
To achieve success, at times air forces must work and fire within close proximity of friendly forces while also considering actions of enemy forces. Many times ground forces rely heavily on firepower from air support assets to survive. Cases of friendly fire are possible in instances where coordination between movements of friendly forces and actions of air support are not perfect. Application of CAS allows for the use of concentrated air power that can be pivotal in combat. It can also be utilized to create openings, which can then be exploited by ground forces to gain an advantage over the enemy. All of this requires proper coordination to achieve success and minimize chances of friendly fire incidents.
The divergent views do not however appear to be present within the Marine Corps CAS system. Aviators in the Marine Corps are trained to be marines first and aviators second. ?That means they understand their first objective and reason for existence as aviators is to offer support to their marine brothers?. (Buss, 2015). This has helped to entirely eliminate any feelings of animosity between aviators and their surface counterparts. ?This manner of thinking is a good example of what unified doctrine, intent and training can achieve?. (Doughty, 2015) CAS is an invaluable part of the military operations now and will continue to be of critical importance into the future. Therefore, problems that continue to plague its execution should be resolved sooner rather than later. It is true the aviation segment of the military has developed into a fearsome entity with great capabilities. This is the main reason why its continued use as support for surface troops continues to evoke such sentiment. The feeling that the air power could be used in a more decisive manner is hard to expunge due to this feeling by the airmen. They therefore favor the use of the air resources in strategic bombardment, interdiction and air superiority. Their continued subordination to the ground troops makes little sense to most of the airmen.
CAS operates in a number of ways. One is a massive concentration of firepower on a particular breakthrough point in enemy ranks. Senior officers minutely plan these missions before they can be executed on the battlefield. This is typically employed during major combat operations or war efforts. ?Another type of CAS is used when the army wishes to support a unit over an extended period of time?. (Hill, 2012) This can be done as cover for ground troops from enemy forces every time the enemy is seen trying to attack from a particular direction. This method is used to deter enemy forces from attempting an attack from a particular flank. Finally, there are many smaller scale skirmishes where ground troop commanders call in air support to assist in fulfilling the mission. These missions may have pre-scheduled arrangements for CAS or the ground commander may make the request in real time as needed.
The development of CAS in the US military as in other nations was slow after the First World War and during the inter war periods due to a number of factors. To begin with, the interwar period witnessed little investment in the area of CAS. That meant that there was little innovation in doctrine, strategy development or technology. The result as can be expected was to slow down the pace at which CAS could have developed at that time. At the same time, the senior officers at the Air Force also tended to concentrate on promoting policy and structures that promoted the concept of strategic air power. That concept was therefore more in tandem with the separation of the Air Force from the army. They wanted to create institutional independence from the Army and this meant watering down the development of Close Air Support (Buss, 2015).
The continuation of CAS and the development of Close Air Support doctrinal codes in many countries occurred after 1939(Doughty, 2015).

This was after the countries had witnessed the effectiveness of air support for ground forces in Spain, China and the European war. At this time, there was new technology and proper strategy that enabled the development of the doctrine on CAS (Doughty, 2015). This point marked the beginning of a long engagement between the air support teams and ground forces that is still enduring despite the difficulties and lack of total support. The undeniable effectiveness of CAS has won the practice a place in the military that would be hard to overturn. None of the proponents of institutional independence for the air corps would deny the effectiveness of CAS in particular settings. The nature of combat over the years has also witnessed changes in the types of engagements that the military has to engage in. There has been a decrease in the occurrence of all out large scale wars and an increase in the Small Scale contingencies (SSC). The execution of such small scale combat missions requires more flexibility in the manner that the military responds to the threat. This is the case since the smaller enemy forces are also more flexible in terms of adjusting their strategies and in movement. The flexibility of aircraft and the slow mobility of heavy artillery mean that the application of airpower is the best alternative where heavy firepower is required. That

makes the application of CAS vital to most SSC missions that the army has to fight. The nature of fighting in the recent past has necessitated the use of SSC plans to achieve the military objectives and as such speed and precision have gained in importance over the past few decades. That is a factor that has made it necessary to include the CAS in combat missions out of necessity as the aircraft provide the best results in terms of speed and precision (Buss, 2015).
The influence and impact of CAS on the battle field is immense. There are many instances that show the influence that CAS has had in battle over the past ten decades. Close Air Support has created such a big impact that it now influences the way wars and other combat missions are approached. The army has over this period come to rely on CAS in accomplishing their objectives. The army considers CAS to be vital part of their operations and their plans whether in SSC or in major theaters of war have grown to almost always involve some form of air support. That is the case at present where majority of combat missions involve an aspect of CAS to ensure success and the best outcomes (Hill, 2012). CAS helps to reduce casualties and to increase the effectiveness of attacks which has made it central to the army planning.
The current situation all across military forces the world over indicate an acceptance of CAS, better training, evolving military strategy and better capability both in terms of technology and equipment. That shows that future battles would entail tougher opponents and increasingly difficult fighting conditions (Hill, 2012). That calls for an examination of any weaknesses in the operations of the military and quick remedial actions to rectify noted failures. The battlefields get increasingly complex as the years go by and this calls for a need to produce units and officers that posses necessary expertise, are tenacious, agile, adaptable and can easily delegate to equally capable subordinates. That would allow for the army and the CAS personnel to conduct swift Air-Ground Integration (AGI). The units should then be able to take advantage of the agile assets and a maximized responsiveness across the whole set up. The CAS crew should as a result of the better integration be able to rapidly create novel interventions and strategies that can effectively tackle the more elusive and organized enemy forces while also minimizing the collateral damage. The integration would also create a cohesive military unit that would be able to work together to create better doctrine and strategy (Doughty, 2015). That is needed so as to come up with a capacity that would allow the army create an agile, responsive and agile Army force that could be rapidly deployed on need while also rapidly integrating and executing on difficult combat battlefields.
The nature of the threat to the US over the present time and into the future is not projected to change. That means that the nature of combat engagements for the foreseeable future will also not change much for the US. It is necessary to recognize the type of engagements that the US will have to face in the future so as to strategically plan for the training and deployment of assets and other military logistics. This means that the possibility of engaging in very large wars like the two World Wars is lower at the moment than it was in the past. The possibility of increasing US involvement in other smaller scale conflicts is always on the rise on the other hand (Martin, 2012). The numbers of possible enemy engagements are constantly increasing with a rise in terrorism and other similar threats that are not driven by major state actors (Buss, 2015). This scenario is therefore indicative of a continued engagement of the US Army in SSC engagements into the near future (Hill, 2012). This analysis paints a picture where the Air force can not be too effective in using large scale bombing and interdiction of the enemy units. This is the case due to the nature of the complicated battlefield of today.
The battlefield has changed rapidly for the US enemy since it is no longer controlled by a singular enemy entity. The enemy is usually located on a battleground embedded within other actors including hostile elements, neutral elements, state actors and non state actors. At the same time, there are rules of engagement that need to be headed especially on the use of force. This means that the enemy may be located in an area where the indiscriminate use of superior airpower would not only lead to the loss of enemy lives but could also result in the killing of neutral actors and civilians. The complex battle ground is therefore one area that small units of ground troops and aerial support aircraft working in tandem would have the best result. That shows that the nature of the battlefield is a major reason why CAS will continue to be integral in the US Army into the future. it will be necessary to emphasize on closer collaboration between the air crew and the ground forces so as to overcome the challenges of the more complicated Operation Environment (OE) that the army could be called to act in across the globe. The more complicated the battle ground, the heightened need there is for closer cooperation between the air crew and the surface forces. The failure to make a fluid, easily deployable and flexible unit could lead to increased collateral losses and loss of initiative on the battlefield (Martin, 2012). Rapid deployment and execution presents the best chances for success in the complicated battlefields of the future and in the present theatres of conflict where the Army is constantly called into action.
The complex nature of the battlefield is exemplified by the current number of actors who could be acting on a single area of battle. For instance, there could be terrorists, insurgents, non-governmental actors, coalition forces, government actors, tribes, criminal networks, media, ethnic groups, private security groups and clans all within the same battlefield or theater of war. The result is a very complex engagement area where multiple entities have differing objectives that may be similar or different from those of the US. That is to say that the actions of the army and the objectives of the battle action must be tailor-made for every single point of engagement and carefully planned and executed to avoid unnecessarily alienating formerly neutral or allied actors. The evolving nature of the battlefield therefore necessitates the CAS and the army on the ground to equally respond or adjust quickly; according to the circumstances on the battlefield. Adaptability is therefore a core requirement for the CAS operations to succeed (Buss, 2015). The failure to integrate properly would make it hard to make uniform conclusions and decisions on a particular situation and adapt to react to the prevailing conditions in a swift and organized manner. That is the reason why the doctrine needs to ensure that the separate entities of the Army and the Air force find a simple and effective balance where each finds it easy to work and collaborate with the other side without much conflict (Doughty, 2015).
In the current world, it is necessary to understand all the aspects of the war and the territory that the battleground is located. For instance, many private security firms will have personnel on the ground carrying weapons and are dressed in fatigues that could resemble those of insurgents. The media organizations and the civilian population also carry cameras and mobile phones that have the capacity to record everything unfolding before them and broadcast it to the world through the internet. This is to say that any acts that could have passed off by the military in the past are now harder to conceal. The levels of connectivity for the world are at an all time high and any actions on one side of the world can be instantly viewed and analyzed on the opposite end of the globe. The actions of the army have to take into consideration the political implications from allies on the other side of the world which was not an issue several decades ago. This in itself is an indicator of the reasons why the use of indiscriminate air power in bombings and interdiction would not be practical in most battlefields currently. The international laws on the use of force are in place to prevent the indiscriminate loss of life in conflict areas where responsible powers may be involved in battles (Martin, 2012). The complex battleground is also made harder to operate in by the presence of other actors like criminal organizations, terrorist groups and insurgents who may be working together or against each other. These groups in most cases operate using the innocent civilians as cover for their activities which further complicates any combat engagements with the groups. The battlefield is therefore not similar to the early times when CAS was initiated and the battleground consisted of the friendly forces on the ground and the enemy forces. The battle fields in where the US army finds itself today and in the near future is much harder for the aviators on CAS missions (Hill, 2012). They need to be extra alert and despite having much better technologies than before, the specter of causing collateral damage or killing civilians is ever present.
Cooperating with other states in coalition efforts is now commonplace with the US having multiple partner states around the world. That can at times call for the US forces to collaborate with partner militaries on the battlefield. Doing this has helped to reduce conflicts and also in achieving particular objectives with minimum military resources. As the number of actors on the battlefield; (both internal and external actors) increase, the battlefield will become even more complex. The reason for this is that the motives for all the actors may not be easily definable and as such the commander?s objectives in the battlefield may become harder to achieve (Buss, 2015). Taking into consideration all the intentions of the multiple actors may not be possible and that will lead to over and covert opposition from actors who feel the actions of the US army go contrary to their own. It is however undeniable that in such a complex battlefield, the best chances of achieving success are in the use of a very responsive and agile force that can adapt in an instance to changing circumstances. That is why the flexibility and adaptability of the air crews is so vital for success. These characteristics of air operations therefore guarantee the involvement of CAS in future combat in the battlefield.
The importance of international law can not be understated in the world today. History is replete with cases of international conflict that could have been avoided had there been some adherence to some international code of conduct for countries (Smith, 2011). As a result of these laws, the CAS procedures have had to adapt to a more restricted operational space in which they must act in a very strict manner. The CAS operations crews not only have to contend with the enemy fire and avoiding events of friendly fire. They also have to ensure that they do not hit civilians or creating situations that could aggravate formerly neutral forces. One of the most enduring memories of conflict the world has seen is the two world wars witnessed in the former part of the last century. Such senseless loss of million of lives emphasizes the need for a structured interaction between the countries in all areas of engagement to prevent such occurrences (Hill, 2012). However when there is no recourse but war, the international rules dictate that there has to be an extent to which firepower is used and on which targets. By establishing a structured way of engaging beach other, the world countries are more likely to avoid falling into such conflicts. International law has helped to create a platform through which countries can constructively engage with neutral arbiters to modulate their engagements (Buss, 2015). Through such established international engagement platforms such as the United Nations and its bodies, they minimize the likelihood of conflict between countries.
In the same way, that the rules to maintain peace are set up, the international community has established laws to govern actions during war time. With the current connectivity around the world, identifying forces that do not follow these rules is very easy and can create political difficulties for the US as has been seen in some areas where the US Army has been engaged in combat. The US has been accused in Afghanistan of using drones to bomb civilian populations where the enemy target is hidden (Martin, 2012). The nature of the battlefield is now more complex as demonstrated by this scenario. The Taliban targets are known to hide within civilian villages where they continue to conduct their activities hoping to use the innocent civilians as human cover. This makes it very hard to use superior airpower against them due to the number of non combatants that would get killed. This makes the use of targeted attacks using a combined aerial and ground force the best alterative to deal with such an enemy. That way, it would be possible to use rotary and in some cases fixed wing aircraft to offer cover for the ground troops. The ground troops care then able to enter such villages and selectively eliminate the enemy combatants while minimizing the loss of civilian lives.
The threat of terrorism since the September eleven attacks have also created a need for the US to further increase its involvement all over the world in its efforts to fight the Terror threats as they arise. With this scenario unfolding, the importance of CAS in many SSC engagements all across the world will continue to increase. That means that there will be an ever increasing need for creation of new protocols, doctrines and strategies to help CAS operations in ever changing battlefields. The army?s engagements in battle will continue to evolve as the OE in each new battlefield differs from those witnessed earlier (Buss, 2015). While the increased engagement in world affairs has guaranteed a steady market for US produce as well as strategic military presence around the world, it has also brought about unwanted problems for the country (David et al. 2014). The increased presence and military interventions in some regions by the US has created resentment against the US and even the proliferation of terror groups eager to attack the US within her boarders and her interests around the world (Freedman, 2013). At the same time, the ever changing battlefield creates a situation where the Army is forced to become more innovative both in strategy and in developing new technology suitable for the new battle fronts. This fact has over time led to the development of better aircraft to handle the situations that arise during air support missions.
The control of information and the use of the media is a key part of winning perception and support for war efforts. The current use of the internet and the almost universal access to cell phones and smartphones has made it easier to control and alter perceptions (Smith, 2011). That means that with an easy access to a system of disseminating information, a capacity to easily record events on the ground and the capacity to edit and alter video and audio clips as well as pictures, any person in the OE can now easily play a part in altering perceptions. This can turn out to create problems for the commander in the OE making it much harder to achieve their objectives. Through such manipulation, the individual or group can use such media to turn public perceptions, raise the profile of a formerly insignificant event into an issue of strategic importance and even mobilize huge protests (Buss, 2015). All that can happen within a very short time interfering with the operations and making it much harder to use CAS or even to carry out the actions needed to achieve the goa