Cicero's Letter To Brutus Analysis

Marcus Tullius Cicero can be noted as many things; orator, statesman, lawyer, and writer

to name a few. Through friendships, that were both personal and strategic, and even disdain, Cicero’s role and his position in Roman society were neither static nor steady. The correspondence Cicero shared with some of Rome’s more prominent figures between 68 and 43 B.C serve as evidence of Rome’s political climate and the key leaders involved. Cicero’s letters are more than simple social interactions among comrades. Rather there is a strategy in whom, how and why these letters are addressed and written the way they are.

In writing to some of the most prominent Roman leaders of the time, including all three members of the First Triumvirate, the polite manner in which these men address one another is not surprising. For example, Cicero conveniently ends his letter to Lentulus Spinther complimenting both him and his son (#6). Some of most outward examples of politeness are found in Cicero’s writings to Brutus and Brutus’ responses thereof, in which they both refer to one other frequently as “my dear.” Their exchanges also end with a compliments of one anther’s children. Cicero writes that there is “no better training in manly excellence” than the imitation of Brutus himself (#2, #3). But

these compliments can be taken as more than comrades and acquaintances stroking each other’s inflated egos. There is a twofold purpose in this exaggeration of politeness, which can be regarded as a strategy in itself, both for gaining and solidifying friends in the correct places and then using these people to one’s individual
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advantage.

In a letter to Cassius, this dual purpose is stated very clearly by Cicero, who keeps Cassius public standing in mind “both for the sake of the commonwealth, which has always been dearer to [him] than anything else in the world, and for that of [their] mutual affection” (#5). This, though written to Cassius specifically, speaks to the general advantageous nature of a relationship of the sort. Further, Cicero’s letter to Crassus, to which he regards as no ordinary letter but as a “covenant,” is another example which proves that these letters are much social works as they are political negotiations, which include both an exchange of information and influence aimed at an agenda

(#8).
As noted earlier, these letters address some of the most prominent men of the late Republic, including the two outright, most powerful men of the time, Gaius Julius Caesar and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus. Among some of the letters exchanged, there is a focus on the allegiance of Cicero, especially at the off set of the Civil War and intensifying competition for power between Caesar and Pompey. Seen as early as 62 B.C, Cicero makes a case for a political allegiance and private friendship between him and Pompey, comparing himself to Laelius and Pompey to that of Africanus (#7). Though he openly condemned the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators, Caesar solicited the allegiance of Cicero come war time. In response to Cicero’s decision to side with Pompey, Caesar regards it as “the severest blow you could inflict on [him].” no doubt classifying Cicero’s decision as a betrayal, and that of a friend (#11). This was not the first time Cicero declined a proposition to ally with Caesar, specifically due to his republican principles. Though alliances reveal a two-sided struggle between left and right, with Pompey turning toward the optimates, Cicero’s letters also suggest that there exists a more complex relationship with those involved. It is not as simple as one side or the other. For one,
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both Caesar and Pompey were first and foremost interested in power. Pompey, for example, only turns toward the optimates when it seems the most beneficial for his rise to power. In many ways, these two sides were pawns in their game of power. Further, even after siding with his enemy, Cicero wrote to Caesar as late as 45 B.C, showing a mutual respect between the two men and their personal opinions and judgements (#12, #13). They reached across the aisle so to speak. Though it is evident that Cicero, Caesar and Pompey used each other for political gain, there is also evidence pointing to more than just diplomatic relations.
Cicero’s letters non only offer a glimpse into the strategic aims and structure of alliances, but also into the demise of both Cicero and the Republic itself. Evidenced in the letter to Octavian, as well as the letter from Brutus to Cicero on the subject, there is a disparity in Cicero’s position. Brutus dares him “to deny that these are the pleadings of a subject to his king” (#4). The fact that Cicero is receiving backlash for supporting a 20 year old despot is especially ironic given that fact that in 44 B.C, Cicero pointed to despotism as a problem unchanged by the death of Caesar, but necessary to be fixed by Cassius (#5). Cicero’s tone is noticeably different in his own letter to Octavian, blasting him for his deceitful, cruel and criminal treatment of Rome (#14). This difference in the two letters is a matter of timing; when Cicero once saw a useful ally in Octavian and that when he became both Cicero and the commonwealth’s worst enemy. Brutus’ letter more so lends itself to the argument that Cicero was opportunistic, apt to change his position based on the political climate. Whether he was attempting to save his own skin, direct the republic, or both, Cicero attempted to use both the people and timing at hand for his own game, though in the end, this would lead to his failure.
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Ironically, in both the letters noted above regarding Octavian, there is also mention of the Catilinarian Conspriary. Cicero would later be exiled and his own political power sidelined with his decision to execute five leading conspirators without due process. As mentioned earlier, many condemned this decision, including Caesar. Cicero himself though describes his action as that which is responsible for saving Rome (#14). Brutus also speaks to Cicero’s actions as Consul, praising him on one hand for putting “down such atrocious crimes.” Brutus goes on though to assert the fear though that “in suppressing them [Cicero had] only delayed the disaster for a short time” (#4). While acting for what he believed was the freedom and future of Rome, the argument can be made that Cicero only prolonged the inevitable. And what to show for it? Exile, a Civil War, a dictator on the rise and a proscription with Cicero’s name at the top.
Cicero’s correspondence nevertheless provides an exchange of information and influence. In advising the most powerful men of the time, Cicero became one of the most prominent and perceived as such; his prominence though useful was also threatening to others. Though removed, in some cases, forcibly, from Rome’s political game, Cicero remained a major player. The letters both in context and strategy are examples of the political interactions and negotiations occurring during the late Republic, of which Cicero remained at the center until his death.