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Comparison of Plato and Aristotle philosophy
Comparison of Plato and Aristotle philosophy
Aristotle contribution to philosophy
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Hylomorphism and the Causes of Things All western philosophers lend their intellectual origin to Aristotle. Being an intellectual maverick, Aristotle pioneered many fields ranging from logic to biology to politics. And in working with natural philosophy, Aristotle defined four separate type of causes: material, formal, efficient, and final cause. Interestingly, causation in this case refers to how things came to be (in other words, the causes explain how the objects exist.) Thus, in this context, causation is not limited to an event; it can also be applied to both physical and metaphysical objects in this context. This essay shall discuss the definition of these causes along with their relation to the concept of hylomorphism, the duality of …show more content…
This is because the Aristotelian concept of hylomorphism is an evolution of the Platonist concept. The concept of Form is significantly more nuanced than the common English definition of form. Commonly, one would understand Platonist Form as the shape or appearance of an object. However, the idea behind the Theory of Forms is that everything we see is not the true form in of itself, but rather mimicry of the Form (this concept is conveniently explained in the Allegory of the Cave.) The Aristotelian Form, on the other hand, incorporates this idea with several adjustments. Form can be think of as a generalization or “genera” of an object. Formal cause then explain the existence of an object by which set it is to be in. For example, the formal cause of a clay pot is that it’s form is that of a pot (e.g. shaped like a pot, looks like a pot, and smell like a …show more content…
These have little to do with the topic of matter and form dualism. The efficient cause has to do with the agency, which caused the object to came to be. For example, a living people might change into a dead person due to a bullet. The bullet would be the efficient cause as the bullet kills the person. In a sense, efficient cause is the most familiar form of cause that we, as English speakers, understand. Lastly, the final cause refers to the aim of the causation. It refers to purpose in which the change is to fulfill. The essay will not go into further detail on the definition of these two causes, as they are fairly irrelevant to the discussion of Matter and
In what follows, I shall consider Aristotle's’ argument of the polis, or the city-state, as presented in his Politics I.2, and expound on the philosophical implications of this particular thesis; namely, a thesis which claims that the city-state exists by nature, and correspondingly, that a human being is ‘by nature a political animal’. Along the way, I shall present two objections leveled against each claim. The first pertains to the invalidity of the argument on ends; specifically, I shall protest that when a thing’s process of coming to be is completed, even if we regard this as an end, this does not necessarily confer that such an end is a natural end, for artificial processes too, like natural processes, share the potential to arrive at ends. The second pertains to the ‘part-whole’ argument, which in a sense takes from the argument of function. Here, I shall discuss that it is not quite clear whether the claim that human beings - as parts of the whole - are necessarily political animals, and so the view that the state is ‘prior by nature’ is uncertain. After that, I will present two Aristotelian responses against these objections; and judge whether or not these appear succeed. I conclude that he is correct in asserting that the city-state exists by nature, and correspondingly, that a human being is a political animal.
In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument from Physics Book 2, chapter 8, 199a9. Aristotle in this chapter tries to make an analogy between nature and action to establish that both, nature and action, have an end.
In the Stoic account of physics, all things identified, debated, discussed and pondered fall strictly into certain categories in the Stoic ontological structure. Of the three branches of the very broad category of ‘somethings,’ the two most relevant to this paper are bodies and incorporeals. The rigid conception of Physics as articulated by the Stoics seems to use the incorporeal somethings as a means to categorize, locate, and evaluate those things which are bodily. In their incorporeals, the Stoics include lekta (which I will discuss later, as it is an integral part of their causality), void, place and time. Stoic causality, a largely deterministic discussion of events in a fated world, discusses the alteration of bodies without defining any bodies as effects. In characterizing the effects of causation as only lekta, I believe the Stoics have left themselves with an incomplete discussion of causality. By showing that an effect of a particular cause may incorporate both incorporeal and bodily aspects, I hope to provide a more acceptable account of causation while demonstrating various holes in the Stoic account.
In support of this claims, he issues in a physical cause and effect concept that ideally relates to the human agents. Therefore, it can be deduced that necessity based causation arises from the uniformity observable operations of an individual, where one’s minds is jointly determined by a moral obligation. Further, the philosopher offers two dispositions to help explain the notion of Compatibilism. The first part supposes that there is a constant combination of two similar events, whereas the second one presumes that human’s consequence can be inferred from one to the other. On the contrary, he argues that still his concept is universally accepted as an abstract knowledge among beings though people may not see a necessity combination between a cause and effect
In the critique of pure reason, Kant states, “All alternations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect.”1 This statement is interpreted in two different ways: weak readings and strong readings. Weaker readings basically suggest that Kant's statement only refers to “All events have a cause”; however, the strong readings suggest that “the Second Analogy is committed not just to causes, but to causal laws as well.”2 To understand the difference between the readings, it is helpful to notice Kant's distinction between empirical laws of nature and universal transcendental principles. Empirical laws have an empirical element that universal transcendental principles cannot imply. On the other hand, empirical experiences require necessity to become a law, accordingly, “the transcendental laws “ground” the empirical laws by supplying them with their necessity.”3In this paper, according to this distinction, I first, argue that the second analogy supports the weak reading, second, show how in Prolegomena he uses the concept of causation in a way that is compatible to the strong reading, and third, investigate whether this incongruity is solvable.
This paper is an initial attempt to develop a dynamic conception of being which is not anarchic. It does this by returning to Aristotle in order to begin the process of reinterpreting the meaning of ousia, the concept according to which western ontology has been determined. Such a reinterpretation opens up the possibility of understanding the dynamic nature of ontological identity and the principles according to which this identity is established. The development of the notions of energeia, dynamis and entelecheia in the middle books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics will be discussed in order to suggest that there is a dynamic ontological framework at work in Aristotle’s later writing. This framework lends insight into the dynamic structure of being itself, a structure which does justice as much to the concern for continuity through change as it does to the moment of difference. The name for this conception of identity which affirms both continuity and novelty is "legacy." This paper attempts to apprehend the meaning of being as legacy.
In this essay, I plan to defend Descartes ' theory of Substance Dualism against the objection made by Princess Elizabeth. Substance Dualism is theory which states that there are two fundamental substances, mind and body. Princess Elizabeth 's objection against Substance Dualism is based off of her idea of how the mind and body interact in order for mental causation to occur. I defend Descartes 's theory by offering my own objection against Princess Elizabeth 's idea of what causation is.
ABSTRACT: One much discussed issue in contemporary philosophy is the relation between consciousness and intentionality. Philosophers debate whether consciousness and intentionality are somehow ‘connected’; whether we have reason to be more optimistic about an ‘objective,’ ‘scientific’ or ‘third person’ ‘account’ of intentionality than about an analogous account of consciousness. This paper is intended as a limited contribution to that debate. I shall be concerned only with the intentionality of action. Not everything which is true of intentionality of action is true of intentionality of other phenomena, such as beliefs. I shall discuss the question, ‘What is the intentionality of action?’ More specifically, I shall discuss one partial answer to this question: that a necessary condition of an agent performing a certain intentional action is that the agent is conscious of performing that action. This answer is fairly unpopular in contemporary philosophy. In this paper, I shall try to say something about the ground for the rather wide-spread philosophical resistance to the answer, and I shall also outline the kind of considerations that I think are required to judge whether a wedge can or cannot be driven between consciousness and intentionality of action.
.... Recent developments in quantum physics, biology and information science have put us in a position where we question the uniqueness of the causal-mechanical model of science. But these developments, even though sciences based on non-causal concepts might dominate in the culture, would not eradicate the causal way people have viewed the world and themselves, but only relegate the concept of cause to the realm of metaphor, a rhetorical way of putting things. The concept of cause then would no longer be a scientific concept, but would still be alive in the culture. What brings a change in the general worldview then? This would be the question I still have to ask.
In this paper I will present an argument I have found in the Second Analogy for the necessity of presupposing the causal determination of each event. I will begin by briefly describing Robert Paul W...
The. The "Aristotle". Home Page English 112 VCCS Litonline. Web. The Web.
3. All things and events in the world of phenomena, i.e. in the field of empirical reality are interdependent; that means that they are relative. And what is more, natural phenomena are not only interdependent, but also they depend on the special essences, because they are appearance of these essences. Relativity of the world of phenomena is well-founded in the modern natural science and in the philosophy of natural sciences. Not only the world of phenomena is relative, but also the world of special essences. They are special essences, i.e. essences of the definite field of the reality.
Rather, Aristotle attempts to tackle some of the most fundamental questions of human experience, and at the crux of this inquiry is his argument for the existence of an unmoved mover. For Aristotle, all things are caused to move by other things, but the unreasonableness of this going on ad infinitum means that there must eventually be an ultimate mover who is himself unmoved. Not only does he put forth this argument successfully, but he also implies why it must hold true for anyone who believes in the ability to find truth through philosophy. Book XII of the Metaphysics opens with a clear statement of its goal in the first line of Chapter One: to explore substances as well as their causes and principles. With this idea in mind, Chapter One delineates the three different kinds of substances: eternal, sensible substances; perishable, sensible substances; and immovable substances.
Meanwhile, Aristotle's hylomorphism is necessary here, however, in that he would like to be able to explain how living things are generated and change and grow. “For Aristotle this is the matter. Matter can take on new forms some of which are accidental while some our essential”. It is clear from this quote that Aristotle means something very different by his use of Forms. While Plato believed Forms were universal truths that can only be truly known to the immortal soul, Aristotle believed the Forms to be fully knowable through investigation unlike Plato's theory, “which sees individual things in this world as somehow participating in the unchanging world of the Forms, has difficult with explaining how thing...
Both Plato and Aristotle are among the most influential philosophers in the history. Socrates was another famous philosopher who greatly influenced Plato. Plato was the pupil of Socrates and later Plato became the teacher of Aristotle. Although Aristotle followed his teachings for a long time, he found many questionable facts in his teachings and later on became a great critic of Plato’s teachings. Since Aristotle found faults in Plato, hence their work is easily comparable as it is based on the common aspects of philosophy. In this paper I will first explain some similarities and then I shall explain the differences between the theories of Plato and Aristotle.