Seth Ross
Professor Depersis
Business Law 2
Griffith vs. Mellon Bank NA Case Summary
The case at hand takes place under commercial paper law. Commercial paper is a written instrument or document such as a check, promissory note, or a certificate of deposit, that represents a duty of one individual to pay money to another. A standout amongst the most critical parts of commercial paper is that it is negotiable, which implies that it might be unreservedly exchanged starting with one party then onto the next, usually through indorsement. Since commercial paper constitutes personal paper, it is transferable by deal—and could be credited, lost, stolen, and burdened. A promissory note is a two-party paper that consists of the maker (the person who
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guarantees to pay while the payee or holder is the individual to whom installment is guaranteed(book). The payee might be either a particularly named individual or simply the bearer of the instrument who has it in his or her physical ownership when he or she looks to be paid as indicated by its terms. A note payable to "bearer" could be paid to the individual who presents it for compensation. Such an instrument is said to be bearer paper. Commercial paper is a particular sort of property basically administered by article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code(book). The case of discussion is the Griffith v. Mellon Bank N.A. This case was created over the validity of an old negotiable instrument, and whether or not Kim Griffith was a holder in due course or not. Mr. Griffith had stumbled upon a certificate of deposit issued by Mellon Bank for the amount of $530,000. In addition to discovering the certificate, it was entitled “Negotiable Certificate of Deposit, No.1-48346 (book).” Griffith found the negotiable instrument inside an old book he had purchased while he and his wife cleaned out there storage unit in Largo, Florida. Griffith was unable to verify the price he paid for the book, or the name of the seller, and proceeded to take the instrument to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to claim the money as a holder in due course. When Griffith presented the instrument to the Mellon Bank, they denied the repayment of the instrument. As a result, charges were brought against Mellon Bank for the repayment of the certificate of deposit in the amount of $2.5 million after interest. The repayment of the instrument was denied to Griffith on grounds that Griffith did not qualify as a holder in due course.
To be a holder in due course, there are certain requirements that must be met. First, Griffith must be a holder of the instrument. Griffith also needed to take the negotiable instrument in good faith, and have no notice that the instrument is overdue or dishonored. The instrument must also be free of all real defenses. Coincidentally, there is one very important requirement that Griffith failed to meet. To be a holder in due course, Griffith must have given value for the instrument. Griffith only paid value for the book that contained the instrument—while he was unaware that the instrument was inside the book. Griffith also could not establish his entitlement to enforce the instrument. Pennsylvania also declared that the certificate of deposit matured for more than 20 years, and that the certificate was paid by the debtor to the creditor. Griffith’s proof that the instrument had not been paid was not substantial enough to overcome the court’s …show more content…
assumption. Though Griffith’s case seemed positive, there were many factors that prevent him from redeeming the $2.5 million.
An important factor is the status of the instrument. Griffith showed evidence displaying that the instrument had not yet been paid. Mellon bank stated that instrument has in fact been paid. When Griffith sought proof the certificate had been paid, the records could not be located. The law of Pennsylvania states: “After the lapse of twenty years, all debts ... not within the orbit of the Statute of Limitations are presumed to have been paid.... Until the passage of twenty years it is the burden of the debtor to prove payment; after the passage of twenty years, it is the burden of the creditor to establish nonpayment and for the satisfaction of such burden the evidence must be clear and convincing and must consist of proof other than the specialty itself (leagle).” Griffith points to the facts that he holds the certificate of deposit which has not been checked, paid, or surrendered, and that it is Mellon's strategy to stamp certificates of deposit as paid or interest its surrender when certificates of deposit are reclaimed. Because a bank acts at its own risk in paying a certificate of deposit without obliging that it be surrendered, Griffith asks the court to draw the induction that the certificate has not been
paid. On the other hand, Griffith has different thoughts on whether Mellon bank fulfilled their duties to the certificate or not. As evidence Griffith produced that the certificate’s face was not marked paid. Griffith also mentioned Mellon’s policy, which is “to mark certificates as paid or to destroy them when redeemed (leagle).” This fact really affected Mellon bank—especially since Mellon was short 8 pages in their “1987 computer conversion report.” Once again, Pennsylvania law ruled that Griffith did not provide evidence valid enough to prove Mellon’s fault. Griffith then suggested as a possibility that the certificate of deposit may have presented itself as outstanding on Mellon's records or in the lost data of the conversion report. Mellon has not created these records in this prosecution—possibly inferring that discovery of the lost data may lose the case for Mellon. Mellon, then again, contends that the records are missing because of the lapse of almost three decades from the issuance of the certificate, restricted storage space, and a record maintenance arrangement of seven years (leagle). This case is clearly a loss for Griffith. Mellon bank and the state of Pennsylvania opened a lot of eyes with this case. First of all, being a holder in due course must meet all requirements under the Uniform Commercial Code. The results of this case also may have increased awareness of other state’s laws and statutes on commercial paper .This case also displayed how difficult it can be to redeem certificates of deposit that have matured over decades or verify entitlement of the negotiable instrument. Even as the negotiable instrument was not marked paid, the bearer of the instrument must possess more than just the instrument for redemption. Evidence of the value given for the instrument must be shown, as well as proof of the former holder of the instrument. These pieces of evidence are crucial to gaining proper entitlement of the instrument. In Griffith’s case Pennsylvania needed more evidence than the instrument itself, which Griffith could not produce. The case also shed some light on who got the benefit of the doubt. Mellon could not furnish the records that stated whether the certificate of deposit had been paid or not. Despite the reason that Mellon had for the missing data of the certificate, Pennsylvania’s ruling on instrument maturity prevailed. It is odd that Mellon’s failure to produce evidence, was not substantial enough to side with Griffith’s investigation of whether or not the instrument was actually paid or not. In any case, Griffith did not receive the actual instrument in good faith or pay value for the instrument itself. Griffith was in his right the law of commercial paper and the UCC both protected the rights of Mellon bank and set the bar for future commercial paper cases dealing holders in due course and matured and possibly unpaid negotiable instruments. In the end Kim Griffith was ruled as not having any entitlement to the certificate or a holder in due course. Mellon bank won the case based on the court’s decision, and Griffith’s instrument became obsolete.
Doris Reed bought a house for $76,000.00 from Robert King. Mr. King and his real estate agent failed to disclose to Mrs. Reed that a murder had taken place in the home ten years ago. Neighbors told Mrs. Reed about the murders and the stigma associated with the house after she moved in. The property appraised in the amount of $65,000.00 with reference to the history of the house. Reed sued King on allegations of misrepresentation for the purchase of the home seeking rescission and damages to terminate the contact.
While the widely exposed and discussed trials of WorldCom's and Tyco's top executives were all over the media, one of the most interesting cases of securities fraud was happening without any public acknowledgement.
Defining Issue: In order to make an agreement binding one element that must be used is consideration. Without consideration an agreement may not be enforceable, even if there has been an offer and acceptance. What a promiser demands and receives is the price for the promise, which is consideration. A person who makes the promise is called the promisor, while the person to whom the promise is made to is called the promisee. However, the promisor is not entitled to consideration.
Maria had spoken with Eva over the phone concerning the correct total amount of $60,000 for rendering decorating services provided by Eva. Maria had sent a letter of the telephone conversation stating that Eva agreed to take $60,000 in full satisfaction obligation under the contract. Although Eva, changed her mind when depositing the check in the bank, she legally entered a mutual agreement over the telephone where it resulted in a unliquidated debt, payment is lower than actual.
A forty-six-year-old man named Lawrence M. Bradford had filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in Syracuse, New York. Bradford claimed that police officers Chad D. Frederick and Shane M. Ryan entered his residence without a warrant, although his roommate Shara Bixby, let the officers into the house. Mr. Bradford said that the officers forced Shara Bixby into letting them into the residence after she had told police that he was not home. The two officers were there to arrest Mr. Bradford for his part in the assault of another man. Bradford pleaded guilty in Jefferson County Court in August 2013 to second-degree assault. Mr. Bradford and another man was accused of stealing money and property from Jeffrey Jewett in Watertown, New York, while striking him on the head and body, causing a cut above the victim’s
The facts surrounding this case were obtained from both Reilly, and Zisko. It should be noted that Reilly failed to explain in his complaint how he was connected to the probate matter for which Zisko subpoenaed his employment records. The underlying matter that this complaint is related to is the “post-divorce case Elaine C. Menice vs. Jeffrey L. Menice, Plymouth Probate & Family Court Docket No. PL11D2044JP.”
Palgo Holdings Pty Ltd carried on a business of making small secured loans. Each borrower would sign a two-part document. The first part of the document, titled “Secured Loan Agreement”, recorded the amount of the loan and the date on which the principal and interest was due. The second part of the document, titled “Bill of Sale/Goods Mortgage”, was made as a deed between the borrower as mortgagor and the lender as mortgagee. It also recorded that the terms of the bill of sale were set out in the schedule of terms attached.
McLaughlin v. Heikkila is a case that involves Wilbert Heikklia and David Mc Laughlin who entered into an agreement involving eight parcels to be sold to Mr. Mc Laughlin by Mr. Heikklia. According to Cheeseman (2013), the facts of the case indicate that Mr. Mc Laughlin submitted offers to Mr. Heikklia for the purchase of three parcels and afterwards, McLaughlin submitted earnest-money checks and three printed purchase agreements to Heikklia. According to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, McLaughlin himself never signed any of the agreements. However, his wife did sign two of the agreements and she initiated the third agreement on September 14, 2003. Then, two days later on September 16, 2003 Heikklia made changes to two of the agreements by increasing the cost of the parcels, and he changed the closing dates on all three agreements, including add a reservation of mineral rights to all three (Minnesota Court of Appeals, 2005).
Procedural History: Claim was filed against decedent 's (Jack Tallas) estate to recover on written agreement to make the claimant (Peter Dementas) an heir for the amount of $50,000. The Third District Court of Salt Lake County held in favor for the estate. Dementas challenged the initial verdict in Utah’s Court of Appeals, Orme, J.. In this appeal, the court held that agreement was not an enforceable contract in that it constituted a promise for past services performed gratuitously.
Walker, Takem’s has the statutory law of contracts in his favor. In a contract, the seller and the purchaser have certain rights and obligations. Four basics must be met for a contract to be created (Chrisman, 2014). First, the offer has to be made. In the case at hand, the door-to-door salesperson made an offer of a computer to Ms. Walker. Second, the consideration has to be accepted. Ms. Walker accepted the offer to purchase a computer. The third step is capacity. The purchaser must be legally capable of entering into a contract; minors and the mentally incompetent are excluded in this case. Takem’s has given Ms. Walker the computer in exchange for her payments on her store account. Finally, the intention to enter into a contract has to be present. Ms. Walker signed a bill of sale, a security agreement, and a negotiable promissory note- which is an unconditional promise to pay a certain sum of money at a certain time in the future. Though Takem’s has the advantage to combat her claims, Tommy needs to ensure that his salespeople have not made any false statements or misrepresentations to Ms. Walker as this could have legal implications for the store and against the contract (Vaccaro, 1987). Ms. Walker is legally bound by the contract she agreed to in exchange for the computer; however if there has been any misrepresentations or false statements Ms. Walker may be able, with legal assistance, to call the contract into question
Additionally, registration papers were not to be released until Herring paid in full. These provisions gave the Bowmans the ability to recover the horse in case of default on the payments. Thus providing a security interest for the seller until there was no risk of loss. Even though Herring was not in full possession of the horse, the provisions established that Herring owned the horse.
Clayton Anti-Trust Law and how they all impacted the United States entrance into World War I.
Question Presented: Petitioner Giridar C. Sekhar was convicted of extortion under the federal law for potentially exposing an extramarital affair unless the general counsel for the state comptroller recommended that the state pension fund invest in a fund managed by Sekhar’s company. The meaning of the word “property” would be determined by the courts under the federal extortion law. They would also decide whether the General Counsel had recommended the “property” and if it could be subject to extortion by the federal law. The petitioner had argued for a narrow of the meaning or definition of the word “Property”. He wished that it were brought to the meaning of something that is of value and that is transferable.
My father started, owned and operated a tire business there for 45 years. During the latter years, he depended strictly on out of town business, because the locals prevented county vehicles, school vehicles, and any other county business to be done there. Nevertheless, the business did very well. In 1993, my father had double knee replacement surgery. The business fell behind a few payments on a mortgage loan from a local bank. My father had done business with that bank since 1951. After very few months, the bank began foreclosure proceedings. My father immediately sold a large inventory of tires, raised $10,000. He offered the bank the $10,000 to pay the arrearage plus a few payments in advance to show good faith. Every possible attempt was made to satisfy the bank, but everything was turned down except the $50,000 required to pay the loan off in full.
...duties. Additionally, recovery of $18,000 from the clerk should be done and dismiss the accounts payable clerk at the earliest.