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Functionalism critacism
Functionalism strength
Functionalism strength
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Can machines think? This question, addressed by Descartes and Turing, leads to discussion of how thought is constructed and what is the mind made of. At the heart of the debate, there is a schism between Cartesian dualism and functionalism. Language is a method considered by both sides as evidence of thought and provides the test for intelligence. This essay will look at Descartes’ objections and Turing’s arguments for whether machine can ever think. This essay will argue that Turing’s, and the functionalist, view is correct. It questions whether Turing’s test provides sufficient evidence of machine intelligence, and uses Searle’s Chinese room to explain why intentionality matters.
Functionalism and Dualism
The disagreement between Descartes
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He argues that a machine engaging in conversation with a human would be incapable of providing meaningful, appropriate answers with using the correct arrangement of words (105). Machines simply cannot engage with language like humans can and no programming can overcome that. One major fault with his premise is that it assumes thought manifests itself in human language. It would mean that animals cannot think, or a human raised away from human society who cannot speak or sign can’t think. In fact it could lead to extreme solipsism, where thought can only be certain if you were the human, animal or machine whose thought is being considered …show more content…
Functionalists see the mind as a functional type with a major role of information processing, rather than the physical brain (113). Therefore computers in the future have the potential to realise this function and once they can, they can be considered to have a mind. To suggest that machines cannot think would take on a solipsist view, which could entail doubting the ability that anyone can think (113). Turing devises a version of the imitation game, where an interrogator questions one human and one machine (in separate rooms) and tries to determine which one is machine. If a machine can pass this test, then they can think (128). At the time of writing, Turing claims that future machines can have the appropriate storage capacity to match the human brain (excluding visual processing), and to pass the Turing test (140). The issue of technology lies more in programming and creating a machine that can
Andy Clark strongly argues for the theory that computers have the potential for being intelligent beings in his work “Mindware: Meat Machines.” The support Clark uses to defend his claims states the similar comparison of humans and machines using an array of symbols to perform functions. The main argument of his work can be interpreted as follows:
deep need to probe the mysterious space between human thoughts and what is a machine can
One of the key questions raised by Rupert Sheldrake in the Seven Experiments That Could Change the World, is are we more than the ghost in the machine? It is perfectly acceptable to Sheldrake that humans are more than their brain, and because of this, and in actual reality “the mind is indeed extended beyond the brain, as most people throughout most of human history have believed.” (Sheldrake, Seven Experiments 104)
The purpose of this paper is to present John Searle’s Chinese room argument in which it challenges the notions of the computational paradigm, specifically the ability of intentionality. Then I will outline two of the commentaries following, the first by Bruce Bridgeman, which is in opposition to Searle and uses the super robot to exemplify his point. Then I will discuss John Eccles’ response, which entails a general agreement with Searle with a few objections to definitions and comparisons. My own argument will take a minimalist computational approach delineating understanding and its importance to the concepts of the computational paradigm.
Human conversations are too complicated for machines to understand and interact properly without flaws. This is what separates humans from animals. Even the dumbest man will be able to form sentences and converse with other human beings, while even the smartest animals will never be able to.... ... middle of paper ... ...
John Searle’s Chinese room argument from his work “Minds, Brains, and Programs” was a thought experiment against the premises of strong Artificial Intelligence (AI). The premises of conclude that something is of the strong AI nature if it can understand and it can explain how human understanding works. I will argue that the Chinese room argument successfully disproves the conclusion of strong AI, however, it does not provide an explanation of what understanding is which becomes problematic when creating a distinction between humans and machines.
Since antiquity the human mind has been intrigued by artificial intelligence hence, such rapid growth of computer science has raised many issues concerning the isolation of the human mind.
This world of artificial intelligence has the power to produce many questions and theories because we don’t understand something that isn’t possible. “How smart’s an AI, Case? Depends. Some aren’t much smarter than dogs. Pets. Cost a fortune anyway. The real smart ones are as smart as the Turing heat is willing to let ‘em get.” (Page 95) This shows that an artificial intelligence can be programmed to only do certain ...
For thousands of years, the nature of human intelligence has been debated, discussed and examined. Descartes’ argument that it is not bodies that think, but an immaterial substance that exists non-spatially is problematic because it vies thinking from a flawed, incomplete understanding of the human brain and its functions. Descartes would defend his claim by arguing that the thinking soul connects to the body through the brain, and while influenced by the states of the brain, exists outside of our bodies, however that would still be ignoring years of study and scientific evidence exploring the brain. The argument that the soul is what thinks, and would therefore makes artificial intelligence impossible is highly flawed.
In “Can Computers Think?”, Searle argues that computers are unable to think like humans can. He argues this
In this paper I will evaluate and present A.M. Turing’s test for machine intelligence and describe how the test works. I will explain how the Turing test is a good way to answer if machines can think. I will also discuss Objection (4) the argument from Consciousness and Objection (6) Lady Lovelace’s Objection and how Turing responded to both of the objections. And lastly, I will give my opinion on about the Turing test and if the test is a good way to answer if a machine can think.
But Descartes supposed that no matter how human-like an animal or machine could be made to appear in its form or operations, it would always be possible to distinguish it from a real human being by two functional criteria. Although an animal or machine may be capable of performing any one activity as well as (or even better than) we can, he argued, each human being is capable of a greater variety of different activities than could be performed...
To commence, functionalists are preoccupied with making mental states distinct, partly on the basis of causal relations to other mental states. Functionalism involves the conviction that psychological or mental terms can be done away to a certain extent. Functionalists treat terms related to mental states as functional characterizations which differ from input and output terms. Therefore, when the theory is broken down, mental states are associated with the states of the Turing-machine, which on its own is defined as a machine table that mentions inputs and outputs that are not explored in the mind (Block, pg. 212). Additionally, functionalism empathizes that characterization of mental states ought to include descriptions of inputs and outputs in both it...
The discussion begins regarding animals as non-human machines, all of whose actions can be fully explained without the inference of a mind. Descartes declared, most human behavior, like that of animals, is susceptible to simple mechanistic explanation. Uniquely designed bodily regulations can be imitated by carefully designed machines (19). Thus, Descartes argued, it is only the general ability to adapt to widely varying circumstances—and, in particular, the capacity to respond creatively in the use of language—that provides a sure test for the presence of an immaterial soul associated with the normal human
The traditional notion that seeks to compare human minds, with all its intricacies and biochemical functions, to that of artificially programmed digital computers, is self-defeating and it should be discredited in dialogs regarding the theory of artificial intelligence. This traditional notion is akin to comparing, in crude terms, cars and aeroplanes or ice cream and cream cheese. Human mental states are caused by various behaviours of elements in the brain, and these behaviours in are adjudged by the biochemical composition of our brains, which are responsible for our thoughts and functions. When we discuss mental states of systems it is important to distinguish between human brains and that of any natural or artificial organisms which is said to have central processing systems (i.e. brains of chimpanzees, microchips etc.). Although various similarities may exist between those systems in terms of functions and behaviourism, the intrinsic intentionality within those systems differ extensively. Although it may not be possible to prove that whether or not mental states exist at all in systems other than our own, in this paper I will strive to present arguments that a machine that computes and responds to inputs does indeed have a state of mind, but one that does not necessarily result in a form of mentality. This paper will discuss how the states and intentionality of digital computers are different from the states of human brains and yet they are indeed states of a mind resulting from various functions in their central processing systems.