Bracero Program Pros And Cons

The global agricultural industry has experienced massive turnover following the passing of neoliberal legislation. Developed countries have been heavily reliant on outsourced labour from developing nations to supply labour shortages in given countries. The United States saw the foreclosure of the Bracero program in 1966 for numerous factors including pressure put onto domestic farmers along with the illegal immigration the program created. Although the Canadian Seasonal Agriculture Worker Program demonstrates a model temporary migrant worker program, many flaws regarding the protection these temporary workers receive regardless of the legislation put forth has been brought to question. Other developed countries such as Australia have experienced

the pressures of globalization and neoliberalism that pressures the government as well as the employers and labourers involved in the agriculture industry. The oligarchy that one, developed countries hold over migrant-sending nations, along with multinational corporations hold over governments to compete for their business, ultimately creates marginalized reserve armies of labour which cannot escape exploitation within a globalized neoliberal economy. This paper will observe issues within past and present temporary worker programs in the agriculture sector, discuss global economic trends which contribute to the exploitation of these workers, as well as some potential solutions to reduce this exploitation.
First, global scale economic trends have shaped the conditions of domestic agriculture workers in a variety of fashions. The pattern of globalization in the global economy has created many corporations operating in multiple states and continents. Moreover, the implementation of neoliberal legislation amongst federal governments has facilitated trade between countries more efficiently. With free trade agreements allowing for countries to exchange goods with reduced or no tariffs or deductions, corporations have been able to separate their production processes with ease geographically. Looking towards agriculture, a particularly labour-intensive industry, developed countries have relied heavily on migrant labour for agriculture cultivation. Notably, the introduction of temporary migrant worker programs (TMWPs) has allowed the ability for developed countries to account for labour shortages in agriculture (Preibisch, 2010, p. 405). With this policy instrument becoming popular following WWII, these programs were introduced in the US with the Bracero Program in 1942, along with Germany’s Gastarbeiter program in 1955. At there peaks, there was close to half a million migrant workers in the US program and approximately a million migrant workers in Germany (Preibisch, 2010, p. 407). With the size demonstrating the reliance of migrant workers to supplement labour shortages, the intricacies of each countries TMWP’s vary between states, however the majority of TMWP’s share the same interests and objectives.
Furthermore, by exploring past TMWP programs and their unique qualities will facilitate better knowledge of the pressures faced by seasonal migrant workers today.

The US Bracero Program, which was operational from 1942 to 1964, allowed for the importation of workers from Mexico to work on farms in the US. Although the objective of the program was to replace illegal labour with guest workers, critics argue that the program contributed to further illegal migration (Basok, 2000, p. 217). Critics say that the Bracero Program added to undocumented immigration via providing braceros with sufficient knowledge for permanent migration, establish contacts and relationships with Mexican-American communities in the US, as well as allowing braceros to improve their living standards, raising their overall expectations (Basok, 2000, p. 217-218). During the tenure of the Bracero program, five million Mexican workers were deported from the US; these workers included rejected Bracero program candidates and former braceros who failed to return to Mexico (Basok, 2000, p. 217). An important factor that contributed to the Bracero program based illegal migration was the nature of the recruitment process. With neoliberal ideology concerned with extrapolating the highest potential of profit, the US government preferred to recruit workers at the border for logistical reasons such as a reduction in transportation and fewer delays in hiring workers (Basok, 2000, p. 223). Even with the Mexican government recommending placing recruitment centres in impoverished states in the central regions of Mexico, the US still recruited workers at the border, ultimately leading to large numbers of unselected Mexican workers to cross the border illegally (Basok, 2000, p. 222-223). The US earned criticism from organized labour and social reform and human rights organizations. Many of these organizations outlined critical issues of the Bracero program such as growers not making an effort to recruit domestic

workers; the Mexican workers returned their earnings to Mexico rather than consuming and spending their revenues in the US. Critics say “they were underpaid for work done, were overcharged by the company store, experienced racial discrimination and summary dismissals, and their family life was disrupted and harmed” (Basok, 2000, p. 219). These temporary workers were subject to exploitation due to the nature of the Bracero program focusing on the needs and interests of the growers rather than the migrant workers. With the growers holding a unilateral control over wages, employers implemented the dominant system amongst western agriculture, the piece rate system (Basok, 2000, p. 225). With this system, employers typically hired an oversupply of workers, which reduced individual workers incomes (Basok, 2000, p. 225). The Bracero program and its eventual foreclosure demonstrate the effects of migration when a temporary workers program is implemented in a developed country. Other developed countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, and Belgium, along with Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria implemented forms of TMWPs beginning in the 1940s (Preibisch, 2010, p. 407). Canada introduced the Canadian Seasonal Agriculture Worker Program (SAWP) and is still functioning contemporarily.
Consequently, the perceived success of the SAWP has led to the identification of the program as a model for TMWPs. The SAWP has unique characteristics that shape its structure. The SAWP program has a citizens-first policy, which ensures that domestic workers are not displaced, forcing employers to prove they were unable to attract Canadian residents through a labour market test (Preibisch, 2010, p. 413). Workers have a temporary visa issued with a maximum length of 8 months, and to remain eligible for future contracts, migrants must return to their country of origin to fulfil the ‘forced rotation’ system (Preibisch, 2010, p. 412). The program also ensures that visas are granted to single applicants without provisions for family reunification, which enables the migrant workers to work extended hours relative to domestic workers due to the lack of social responsibilities in Canada (Preibisch, 2010, p. 413). Temporary migrants aren’t entitled to vote, run for political office, along with not being able to access to the full range of social benefits that are available to citizens and permanent residents (Preibisch, 2010, p. 413-414). In many aspects migrant workers within the SAWP lack proper legal protection. Moreover, language barriers, fear of retribution from their employers, along with ignorance of the Canadian legal system and modest financial resources contribute to the lack of attempts made by migrants to use the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or international human law (Basok & Carasco, 2010, p. 356). Interestingly, when the Ontario government introduced the Collective Bargaining Act (CBA) in 1943, workers employed in the agricultural industry were excluded (Walchuk, 2009, p. 152). The provincial government then implemented the Labour Relations Act (LRA) in 1948, yet again excluding agricultural workers from the agreement. The rationale stems from agriculture being a seasonal industry, the perishable nature of food products, and the added costs that unionization would add to the sector (Walchuk, 2009, p. 152). Following tribes and tribulations in the mid-1990s between the NDP and provincial Conservative parties introducing and repealing policy brought forth to protect agricultural workers, the Agricultural Employees Protection Act (AEPA) passed in 2002, allowing agricultural workers to join an association (Walchuk, 2009, p. 154). The AEPA encountered substantial criticism, and rightfully so, as the rights guaranteed under the AEPA were already protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Walchuk, 2009, p. 154). Following the Fraser decision in 2007, the Ontario Court of Appeal found the AEPA to be unconstitutional, as it impaired agricultural workers to bargain collectively (Walchuk, 2009, p. 155). Although legislation finally enabled collective bargaining, attaining the proper protection has proven difficult for migrant workers in the SAWP.