Analysis Of Iris Marion Young's Essay Throwing Like A Girl

Iris Marion Young’s essay “Throwing Like a Girl” examines the unique causes and characteristics of feminine bodily comportment. This examination requires Young to create her own applicable definition of femininity using the elements of Simone de Beauvoir’s theory of feminism and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of phenomenology that she agrees with. However, she must also alter and discard the elements of their theories that she disagrees with. The resulting definition of femininity includes both the societal constructions that define a woman’s situation as well as how women typically react to and interact with that situation.

Young praises Simone de Beauvoir’s overall theory on the experience of women, stating that she provides “an account of the situation of women with remarkable depth, clarity,

and ingenuity” (140). What Young finds particularly ingenious and useful in de Beauvoir’s writings is her concept of situatedness; as a result, the concept heavily influences Young’s definition of feminity. Young partially defines femininity as “a set of structures and conditions which delimit the typical situation of being a woman in a particular society” (140). Young’s use of terms such as “structures,” “conditions,” and “situation” originates from de Beauvoir’s theory that women’s oppression comes from a “socio-historical set of circumstances” defined by a patriarchal society (139). In short, the commonplace limitations and discriminations placed against women create a situation that affects multiple dimensions of how they live within and interact with their surroundings. Young also agrees with and expands upon de Beauvoir’s concept of the Other and the tension between immanence and transcendence. Both de Beauvoir and Young argue that “the culture and society in which the female person dwells defines woman as Other” which condemns women to live “as mere object and immanence” (141). These limits placed on women are part of the ‘structures and conditions’ that Young refers to in her definition of femininity. Young expands de Beauvoir’s concepts to include the “feminine bodily comportment, motility, and spatiality” (cite). She argues that these “have their source in the particular situation of women as conditioned by their sexist oppression,” as in the limits placed on women through their denotation as Other, “in contemporary society”(152). A woman’s situation, created by the attitudes and oppressive structures in the society in which she lives, causes her to act in a way that physically disables her. The idea of situatedness is the base of Young’s ideas on what femininity is, as a woman’s situation defines multiple aspects of her life.
Although Young heavily praises de Beauvoir’s concepts and applies them heavily to her definition of femininity, she does level some criticism against her. Young disagrees most with de Beauvoir’s views on the female body itself. Specifically, Young takes issue with how de Beauvoir “discusses how women experience the body as a burden,” and her claim that phenomena such as puberty and childbirth “weigh down a woman’s existence by tying her to nature, immanence, and the requirements of the species at the expense of her own individuality” (139). Young also argues that de Beauvoir “fails to give a place to the status and orientation of the woman’s body as relating to its surroundings in living action” (139). Young’s main issue with de Beauvoir comes from her disagreement with the idea that the oppression women experience originates from their bodies themselves. She instead argues that women’s “unfree status” is the result of society’s expectations affecting how they view their own bodies in interaction with the world around them (139). Young goes on to analyze this concept in-depth using Merleau-Ponty’s theories of phenomenology.
Using de Beauvoir’s ideas as a starting point, Young applies Merleau-Ponty’s concepts to her definition of femininity. Young praises how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology diverges from previous philosophers’’ ideas of human experience and that he “reorients the entire tradition of that questioning by locating subjectivity not in the mind or consciousness, but in the body” (145). Merleau Ponty believes that subjective experience comes not from an incorporeal soul or mind, but rather the way one’s body interacts with the world. Young takes this idea of the lived body and applies it to the second part of her definition of femininity; in addition to femininity being situation of women in a society, it is also “the typical way in which this situation is lived by the women themselves” (140). Young uses this phenomenology-influenced element of femininity’s definition and applies it to female bodily comportment. She agrees with Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that “the body is the first locus of intentionality, as pure presence to the world and openness upon its possibilities,” but argues that due to a sexist society, women’s openness to the world is inhibited by “immanence” (145). Women do not use their full bodily potential while moving; one part of their body completes the task “while the rest remains rooted in immanence” (146). Young also utilizes Merleau-Ponty’s concept of intentionality while discussing women’s physicality. Merleau-Ponty argues that one’s potential depends on the bodily “I can” (146). Young agrees with this, using it to create the concept of femininity’s “inhibited intentionality” in which a woman’s “I can” during bodily movement is tainted by “a self-imposed ‘I cannot’” (146). Finally, Young agrees with Merleau-Ponty’s idea of how the “body’s movement and orientation organizes the surrounding space as a continuous extension of its own being” (147). She adapts this concept to feminine bodily comportment, arguing that women experience “discontinuous unity” between their bodies and their surroundings (147). Instead of viewing themselves as subjects interacting with and being a part of their surroundings, women see themselves as objects of motion. A woman “experiences herself as rooted and enclosed,” an attitude which limits her physical ability (152). This limitation is a result of various sexist cultural norms and attitudes that define women’s situation. By using Merleau-ponty’s concepts of phenomenology and the lived body, Young can more specifically define femininity and analyze female bodily comportment.
Although Young strongly agrees with and uses Merleau-Ponty’s principles of phenomenology in her definition of femininity and its applications, she argues certain characteristics of his theory need adjustment.

Her principal complaint about Merleau-Ponty’s claims concerns his lack of specificity. She states that Merleau’s account of “the relation between the lived body to its world…applies to any human existence in a general way” (141). Simply using phenomenology to explain and provide and account of general human experience, however, is not effective enough for what Young wishes to argue in her essay. Instead of simply using Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of phenomenology in a general sense, Young uses it to specifically aid in defining femininity and the application of that definition. She explains this by stating “there is a particular style of bodily comportment which is typical of feminine existence, and this style consists of particular modalities of the structures and conditions of the body’s existence in the world” (141). Young takes it upon herself to use phenomenology in order to specifically examine and analyze female bodily comportment in a way in which Merleau-Ponty never

did.
In order to effectively analyze the characteristics and elements of female bodily comportment, Iris Merion Young must construct a definition of femininity for her own use. She achieves this using the elements of Simone de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty’s theories that she agrees with while discarding those she does not. In the end, she determines that femininity is the societal constructions that create a woman’s situation, as females’ reaction to and interaction with these situations.