Analysis Of Dena S. Davis's Choosing For Disability

In the “Choosing for Disability” by Dena S. Davis, the main thesis is centered on the moral implications of parents purposefully wanting the genetic makeup of their children to reflect their own disability through the use of genetic medicine. I will proceed to summarize the arguments of the thesis in respect to genetic ethics and then critique it on the basis of autonomy.
Firstly, Davis analyzes the condition of Deafness and whether it constitutes a disability (harm) or a cultural identity. Davis outlines several viewpoints from the perspective of Deaf advocates who defend the Deaf culture movement. This perspective regards medical interventions, such as the use of cochlear implants and surgical hearing aids, as unethical and detrimental

to the Deaf community. Accordingly, Davis mentions that the abortion of Deaf fetuses would be no different than genocide. Since over 90 percent of Deaf children are born to Hearing parents, the implementation of cochlear implants (most likely favored by Hearing parents) would drastically lessen the number of Deaf people in America and thus, annihilating Deaf culture as a whole. Davis lists examples of positive gains from having a Deaf membership ranging from ASL, artistic traditions, cohesive Deaf community with a rich cultural heritage, residential schools, to solidarity that is shared among Deaf people. Many Deaf parents who are interested in bearing children with similar hearing status as themselves say that they would not choose to be Hearing if they were given a chance.
Davis also takes into account the opposing viewpoint that considers being Deaf as a harmful condition in need of medical intervention and should be prevented if possible. Despite the perception of Deaf people as non-disabled members of a linguistic and cultural minority, it has been shown that their incomes falls 30 to 40 percent below the national average. Furthermore, Deaf education renders Deaf graduates less academically competent than those in other minority groups and could potentially result in limitations in the workforce. Davis also points out that raising Deaf children using sign language is not as beneficial as it is believed to be, since it requires the parents to learn as well further risking their child “window” for language development and acquisition.
In her thesis, Davis deems that there is a moral harm associated with Deafness regardless of it being a culture or a disability. Moral harm is defined as any actions and future decisions that will limit a person’s right to an open future. If Deafness is a culture by standard, then intentionally passing down the inability to hear to children ultimately forces them to take up memberships in the Deaf community, which limit their choices and ability to deviate from the cultural circle. If Deafness is a disability by standard, then intentionally creating a Deaf child is also a moral harm because the inability to hear directly narrows their career choices, life opportunities, and cultural options. Davis regards deliberateness as a crucial component in determining whether it is ethical to produce Deaf children based on the preference of their Deaf parents. In the case of “Deaf of Deaf’ culture where Deaf children are naturally born to Deaf parents (without the use of genetic manipulations), there are no moral or ethical implications in question here because the parents did not intend to give birth to children who are Deaf. According to Davis, intentionally producing children who are unable to hear, regardless of the culture-versus-disability debate, is unethical and constitutes as a moral harm because the choice made by the parents ultimately violates the child’s ability to self-determinate and lead a life free of avoidable restraints. Therefore, any decision and action made preceding birth that hinders a child’s right to an open future is ethically discouraged in respect of the child’s autonomy. As for the parental deliberation over the use of cochlear implant, Davis supports its use stating that parents are morally obligated “to have their children implanted”. Davis ends her thesis with a proposal that “Parents ought not deliberately to substantively constrain the ability of their children to make a wide variety of life choices when they become adults.”
Critiques of Davis’ argument can be made in respect to autonomy.

In her argument, the author uses autonomy as the basis for the concept of moral harm. The preservation of autonomy here is specifically for the possible child in that a decision made by the parents is recognized to be a moral harm when it violates the child’s right to liberty and ability to self-determine. In making an argument that defends and preserves a child’s autonomy, Davis does not adequately take into account the autonomy of parents to determine how they choose to bring their own children into the world. It is natural for parents to want their offspring to resemble themselves and Davis severely discredits Deaf parents for deliberately wanting to produce a Deaf child, since Deafness is considered to be a significant harm. Davis’ construction of how Deafness is a significant harm is overwhelmingly unpersuasive and generalized, with overemphasis on Deaf children’s “dismal” reading skills. There are plenty of cases of Deaf individuals successfully earning master and doctorate degrees, occupying a variety of respectable occupations, and doing work within the dominant Hearing social sphere. Being Deaf does not always lead to a lesser reading proficiency, limited employment opportunities, and inabilities to cross cultural boundaries like the causal relationship that Davis is desperately trying to establish. Based on her construction of moral harm, would it also be morally unacceptable for Hearing parents to deliberately wanting to produce a Hearing offspring through the use of genetic manipulations when the child is predisposed to be Deaf? Davis’ stance on moral harms as violations to a person’s right to an open future is biased in that the standard is not equally applicable both ways and tends to be in favor of the Hearing community. In addition, the author’s argument in favor of autonomy for the possible child does not address the “rational persons” aspect of autonomy for cases can made against

the “possible” child for not being of age to meet the standard of rationality to make an informed decision (limited autonomy). Moreover, Davis’ main thesis is build upon a person’s right to an open future as a determining factor, but this criterion requires the knowledge of what is yet to come and happen, so one can never precisely conclude that the life of the possible Deaf child and his future will be diminished and unsatisfactory.