According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the discussion of definite and indefinite descriptions has been at the center of heated debates of analytic philosophy for over a century. There have been many compelling arguments and interesting views by many philosophers on this topic and it is hard to yet conclude whose argument is more correct. In this essay, I will first briefly explain Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions, then present both Strawson’s and Donnellan’s views of descriptions in opposition to Russell’s, then I will conclude the essay by showing why I find the analysis of definite descriptions by Donnellan more persuasive than the others’. To put it simply, Russell believes that the statement, ‘the F is G’ has three components: existence (∃xFx), uniqueness (∀x∀y((Fx∧Fy)→y=x)), and predication (∀x(Fx→Gx)). In other words, for a statement, ‘the F is G,’ to be true, there must exist at least one thing which is F, there must exist at most one thing which is F, and whatever is F must be G. To expand on this, a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ states, ‘There is one and only one F and it is G’ and the difference between ‘The F is G’ and ‘An F is G’ is that the latter is just stating there is a (G) F, whereas the use of the definite article, ‘the,’ emphasizes extra uniqueness. For example, it is true to speak of “the son of Eric” even when Eric has several sons, but it would be more correct to say “a son of Eric.” Russell further argues that if there is no unique F, an assertion of “the F is G” is false. Strawson thinks otherwise. Strawson claims that Russell confuses properties of a sentence with properties of a use of that sentence. To explain, while Russell thinks truth-value belongs to sentence meanings... ... middle of paper ... ...rase ‘the F’ to refer to something, thus it does not completely embrace the definite descriptions as actually used in a natural language. For example, when I say, “the leaves are red,” I am referring to the object, leaves, that I am trying to communicate across, but with Russell’s theory, this may not be the case. Using Strawson’s theory, we must ascertain what object is being identified or referred to and what is being ascribed to it even before we evaluate for truth or falsity. For instance, when I say, “Smith’s murderer is insane,” and it turns out that Smith was not actually murdered at all, then his theory fails as the description, ‘Smith’s murderer,’ does not apply to anyone. Contrastingly, to me at least, Donnellan’s theory encompasses the weaknesses of the theories by the other two, which is why I believe it is the more persuasive argument over the others’.
On Bloodsworth’s appeal he argued several points. First he argued that there was not sufficient evidence to tie Bloodsworth to the crime. The courts ruled that the ruling stand on the grounds that the witness evidence was enough for reasonable doubt that the c...
In determining which crime theory is most applicable to the Andrea Yates murder case, one must establish a position on her guilt or innocence. If one agrees that the original 2001 verdict of guilty is correct then the Classical theory would best apply. Beccaria’s Classical theory asserts that people think before they proceed with criminal acts. When one commits a crime, it is because the individual decided it would be advantageous to do so, when one acts without benefit of effective punishment (Pratt, 2008). However, if one agrees with the 2006 verdict of not guilty by reason o...
Any hypothesis, Gould says, begins with the collection of facts. In this early stage of a theory development bad science leads nowhere, since it contains either little or contradicting evidence. On the other hand, Gould suggests, testable proposals are accepted temporarily, furthermore, new collected facts confirm a hypothesis. That is how good science works. It is self-correcting and self-developing with the flow of time: new information improves a good theory and makes it more precise. Finally, good hypotheses create logical relations to other subjects and contribute to their expansion.
The problem I hope to expose in this paper is the lack of evidence in The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds supporting that A, a thought or feeling, is the only cause of B. Russell believes that there are other minds because he can see actions in others that are analogous to his own without thinking about them. He believes that all actions are caused by thoughts, but what happens when we have a reaction resulting as an action of something forced upon one’s self? Such as when a doctor hits your patellar tendon with a reflex hammer to test your knee-jerk reflex. Russell does not answer this question. He is only “highly probable” that we are to know other minds exist through his A is the cause of B postulate.
...mewhat dogmatic view. Paley has much stronger support for his specific views than Russell does when it comes to the design argument.
In any instance, anything that confirms one confirms the other. Confirmation Theory of Instance says if while testing a hypothesis in the form “All Fs are G”, a particular F (for some instance) is discovered to also be G, then this evidence is enough (at least to some degree) to favor the hypothesis. So, the hypothesis that “all non-black things are non-ravens” applies because it amounts to a hypothesis which also rules out one possibility: a non-black thing that is a raven. The hypotheses are equivalent to the same hypothesis of there being no non-black ravens (which verifies they must also therefore be equivalent to each other).
In Peirce’s defense, an idea may be clear without being true in rare and extreme cases but if this is how we lived by when thinking, no one would have a clear and distinct idea because it would always be “untrue”. The diamond on the faraway planet with the evidence of the characteristics of other diamonds would be hard just like the rest, therefore, having a clear and distinct idea of the properties of a diamond, being able to avoid his view that it will never be tested for hardness.
In this paper I intend to analyze logically this proposition, trying to focus the question of contradiction.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
But Kant also made a less familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, according to the information conveyed as their content. Analytic judgments are those whose predicates are entirely contained in their subjects; since they add nothing to our concept of the subject, such judgments are purely explicative and can be deduced from the principle of non-contradiction. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, are those whose predicates are altogether distinct from their subjects, to which they must be shown to relate because of some real connection external to the concepts themselves. Hence, synthetic judgments are genuinely informative but require justification by reference to some outside principle.
An issue that comes up is that not every sentence that states the “truth of themselves are paradoxical” (Bernecker). For example, “This sentence is true,” where “this sentence is addressing the sentence “UCI is located in Irvine, Ca.” This sentence is true; it refers to the truth of another sentence at the same level (Bernecker). The first sentence refers to another sentence, and both are at the same level. In this example, “true” applies to a sentence at the same level, which does not follow Tarski’s belief that “true” and “false” should actually apply to “sentences at a different level” (Bernecker). I do agree with Professor Bernecker, that Tarski’s idea of separating object and meta-language is a bit extreme, however it is an interesting approach and I believe that using this approach and bettering it will be the answer to the paradox. I think a flaw of Tarski’s solution is the belief that “true,” and “false” apply to “sentences at a different level” as proven above, but I think the issue of the paradox is the use of “true,” and “false,” which Tarski’s solution tries to resolve (Bernecker). Not only does Tarski separate object and meta-language, but also misinterprets the intuitive way people actually understand the truth value of sentences at the same level (Bernecker). So his solution does stir confusion, but I do believe that this is one of the better solutions out there, due to the fact that it addresses the use of “true,” and
...es is the only truly “competitor” of Russell’s theory and it is reasonable for Russell to only mention this view in his argument.
I believe what he meant was if we just accept things as they appear to us without ever questioning anything, then we will live meaningless and miserable lives. In the article, Russell writes, “The life of the instinctive man is shut up within the circle of his private interests: family and friends may be included, but the outer world is not regarded except as it may help or hinder what comes within the circle of instinctive wishes,” I think this is his representation of the unexamined life. He also wrote, “In such a life there is no peace, but a constant strife between the insistence of desire and the powerlessness of will. In one way or another, if our life is to be great and free, we must escape this prison and this strife” I think that what he meant by this is that if we want our lives to be meaningful and pleasant, then we must study philosophy. The only way that our lives can be “great and free” is to question everything and accept nothing
Robinson, R. R. (1994). Some methodological approaches to the unexplained points. Philosophy 2B/3B (pp. 27-34). Melbourne: La Trobe University.
Those who know Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy, or the shorter Wisdom of the West, will remember his great difficulty in focusing on (French) Existentialism as a form of philosophy at all.