Analysis Of Barbara Geddes What Do We Know About Democratization After 20 Years

Political systems fluctuate across the world, and can range from democracies to dictatorships. In “What Do We Know About Democratization After 20 Years”, Barbara Geddes explores the changes in democracy over a period of twenty years and the likelihood of countries interchanging between democratic governments and authoritarian regimes. Geddes compares the differences between the three main types of authoritarian regimes, which are single-party, personalist, and military. She also argues that military regimes tend to have shorter life spans than the other main types of authoritarian regimes because the military regimes are more susceptible to crumbling, and are less resilient to overcoming exogenous shocks.

In her article, Geddes describes that

when one party completely dominates political offices and has influence over policies it is categorized as a single-party regime. Although, other parties can exist and are able to legally compete in elections. Geddes gives the instance of The Partido Revolucionoario Institucional in Mexico (The PRI) as a recent example of a single party regime that lasted for almost 70 years from 1929 to the early 1990’s. The PRI was known as Mexico’s “official” party and is classified as single-party because they controlled the political offices while other opposing parties posed little to no threat to the party or its control of public office. Most single-party regimes are extremely resilient, because they have good structured institutions with their elites tremendously invested in their positions, and are willing to compromise.
The main difference between personalist regimes and single party and military regimes is that once a leader has control over an office his success depends largely on his ability to avoid causing problems and revealing government controlled private information to the public.

The leader can even be an officer in the military or can create his own political party in order to support him and his campaign. Personalist regimes usually develop after rival leaders struggle to gain power and one eventually seizes an office. Rafael Trujillo’s personalist regime in the Dominican Republic (1930-1961) was an example of an occurrence where they transformed from a military to personalist regime. Personalist regimes are also relatively resistant to internal splits except when disastrous economic conditions disrupt the regime. Moreover, they are particularly vulnerable to the death of their leader, powerful overthrows, and violent

riots.
An example of military regime given to us by Geddes in her article is the Salvadoran (1948-1984), where the military manipulated and altered the elections to ensure that the candidates they had selected would win the presidency. Military regimes are classified as a small group of officers that decide who will rule, and have an influence on policies. However, they typically are more vulnerable to internal collapses therefore they usually have some sort of formula for rotating powers within the military hierarchy. Since military regimes so often end in destruction because of rivalries within the elite, there seems to be a life for officers after the regimes breakdown. The officers generally return to their military quarters, without their careers and ranks being ruined.
When a military regime is in control its foremost objectives are to maintain its hierarchy, its discipline, and for the army to remain unified as a whole.

Furthermore, the military desires to be self-run without civilian interference, and also to have a budget large enough to purchase state of the art weapons, and to recruit top military personnel. Geddes explains that military regimes have a greater chance to collapse because of relationships and rivalries within the rulers of the authoritarian government, and the cliques surrounding it. Another key factor in military rule transitioning to a different authoritarian regime is that military governments have a higher chance of stepping down before a country reaches a major crisis, and the military leaders are more likely to negotiate an obedient transition. Because negotiations play an important role in the transition from military rule than quick and hectic personalist rule, it is more probable that pacts will

form.
Geddes gives us the figures that military regimes in existence between 1946 and the present-day have lasted ordinarily about 9 years whereas personalist regimes survived on average around 15 years, and single-party lasted on average close to 23 years. Rival cliques within personalist and single party regimes generally last longer than military regimes because they have stronger incentives to collaborate within the factions. Differences in policy and rivalries within the elite are common reasons for a shift of power from a military regime to another type of authoritarian government.
In her article, Geddes argues that due rivalries, relationships and cliques surrounding the military rule they are set up for absolute destruction and are less likely to bounce back from exogenous shocks to their government. She elaborates on each of the three main types of authoritarian governments, which are military, personalist, single party regimes, and she writes about numerous examples of each type and includes how they are different from one another. Additionally, Barbara Geddes studies the variations in democracy over a period of twenty years and the probability of countries interchanging between democratic governments and authoritarian regimes.