Air Combat In Vietnam Essay

Aerial Combat over Vietnam

Introduction

The Vietnam War provided challenging and exciting times for United States (US) military aviation. Jets were still considered new technology at the beginning of the 1960’s and had not been tested thoroughly during the Korean War. As the situation in Vietnam started to escalate, US leadership recognized the importance of air superiority and the need to use and adapt newer technology. Air superiority can be achieved through multiple means, but none as romanticized and iconic as aerial combat. The general concept remains the same even to this day—defeat the other plane. However, the means to winning a dog fight had changed greatly due to the quick advancement in jet propulsion and guided weapon technology. This paper provides a summarization of the US efforts towards achieving air superiority through the means of aerial combat.

North Vietnamese buildup

Prior to 1964, the Northern Vietnamese military lacked a modern Air Force to deploy to combat. Comprised entirely of trainer aircraft, transports, and light helicopters, the ability of North Vietnam to attack or defend from the air was non-existent (Middleton et al., 1978). Shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, it was reported that the North had received about 30 older and outdated Russian Mikoyan and Gurevich (MiG) 15 and

17 aircraft from China (Momymer, 1980). By the middle of 1965, the MiG count had increased to approximately 70, however, now the newer MiG-21 was being fielded. By 1972 there were an estimated 200 MiGs present in the North with over half being the MiG-21 (Momymer, 1980). Compared to the sheer numbers of the United States, the North Vietnamese never had a strong show of aircraft. This may have been intentional, as aircraft losses were quickly replenished to keep MiG strength consistent (Momymer, 1980,).
MiG aircraft were not the only equipment appearing in North Vietnam.

Just as quickly as MiG were appearing so to were Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), early warning radar, and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). In fact, approximately 68% of all American aircraft losses were the result of AAA (Momymer, 1980). AAA was a familiar and expected system as seen in World War II and the Korean War. What was not anticipated was the threat from SAMs. After the first aircraft was lost to a SAM in 1965, the US quickly ramped up aircraft defenses with modern countermeasures. This greatly reduced the effectiveness of SAMs despite them remaining a prominent air defense

measure.
Beginning the war
As US involvement started to pick up in 1965, a strategic bombing campaign code-named Rolling Thunder began with the intent to shake the North Vietnamese both politically and psychologically (Middleton et al., 1978). The US feared the political reprisal of utilizing traditional strike bombing aircraft, so they turned to the versatile fighter-bomber such as the F-105 Thunder Chief or F-4 Phantom (Middleton et al., 1978). These aircraft were suitable for the long range flights to the north, could refuel in flight, carried a significant payload, and were fairly maneuverable against AAA and SAMs. However, due to their designation of being part fighter aircraft, they were rarely launched with escorts dedicated to aerial combat.
On 4 April 1965, the first aerial combat took place in the skies over North Vietnam. The result being that two US F-105 Thunder Chief aircraft laden with munitions for strategic bombing were shot down by two MiG-17 aircraft (Dorr, 1980). This was an unusual circumstance compared to the rest of the war, as tactics changed after this first air loss. This called for escort aircraft to always protect strike bombers crossing the northern border. They referred to this as MiG Combat Air Patrol (MIGCAP) (Middleton et al. 1978). MIGCAP would launch with a strategic strike formation, but would remain in two separate sorties with the ability to maneuver around the formation. After an incident in June 1965 where two Naval F-4B fighter-bomber aircraft shot down two MiG-17 aircraft that had engaged them, the F-4 became the primary MIGCAP aircraft and the primary aerial combat platform across all branches (Middleton et al., 1978).
With MIGCAP now in place to defend strike fighters, the US was now able to strategically bomb the north with little fear of MiG interruption. As they soon learned though, MiG aircraft operated mostly on their own terms. Starting in 1965, US aircraft were restricted by the Rules of Engagement (ROE) from engaging enemy aircraft on the ground or even known enemy airfields (Middleton et al., 1978). Once again, it was thought that an aggressive tactic such as this would escalate the conflict father than the US intended. The North Vietnamese leaders quickly adapted to this disability and launched MiGs only when most beneficial to them in order to avoid heavy losses. MiGs were even known to cross the border into China to avoid being chased by US fighter aircraft (Middleton et al., 1978). All of these restraints made it difficult for the US to secure the skies over North Vietnam and contributed to the inability to gain air supremacy.

MiG capability
Many factors led to the MiG being known as an elusive aircraft. In fact, only 500 pilots out of thousands even saw an enemy MiG during the war (Dorr, 1980). However, this does not mean the MiG never fought—it engaged when necessary and usually put up a good fight. By the time the MiG-15 entered the Vietnam War, it was an extremely outdated aircraft. Although it was nimble, the airframe was slow and its weapon capability was limited to only guns (Tillman, 1980). This aircraft posed little to no threat to the modern fighters of the US. The MiG-17 was slightly newer and had gained the respect of US pilots for its speed and maneuverability. It had a respectable 37mm cannon and had the ability to carry the heat-seeking Atoll missile, although it was rarely ever armed with them (Tillman, 1980). The MiG-17 remained the preferred airframe among North Vietnamese pilots even when equipped with the newest MiG-21. Although the MiG-21 was faster and carried more weapon capability than the MiG-17, the delta wing design decreased its maneuverability and even made it unstable at high speeds (Tillman, 1980). Thus, the favorite and most lethal fighter aircraft of the north remained the MiG-17.
How did the MiG fair against the might of the modern US F-4 Phantom aircraft? The truth of the matter was that it was always outperformed and outgunned. US fighter aircraft never left the ground without the heat-seeking AIM-9 Sidewinder missile or its radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow missile (Middleton et al., 1978). This new type of weaponry forever changed the iconic dog fights remembered from World War II (WWII) In fact, the newer F-4 utilized by the USAF in Vietnam was not even equipped with guns (Tillman, 1980). Using radar, the F-4 could engage a MiG with the AIM-7 Sparrow from almost 20 miles away (Middleton et al., 1978). To show the skill and adaptability of North Vietnamese fighter pilots though, the majority of MiGs were actually shot down with heat-seeking AIM-9 Sidewinders, which required the US pilots to chase and fire from behind the MiG with a positive lock. This shows that aerial combat, although much more technologically advanced, still remained an extremely personal experience and relied greatly on pilot skill.
US strategy
Even though the MiG was inferior to the F-4 Phantom, the US still suffered from unexpectedly high losses. For a time in 1965, the shoot down rate was 1:1 (Middleton et al., 1978). As the US changed tactics and starting utilizing the F-4 Phantom, the rate changed to 2.5:1 in favor of the US. The surprising performance by the North Vietnamese can be attributed to only attacking targets of opportunity (Momymer, 1980). As mentioned earlier, the North would not launch pilots if the odds were against them. Having a fairly sophisticated radar system, the North had the ability to see the amount of aircraft in a flight and could guess the type of aircraft based on formation (Momymer, 1980). Utilizing this resource, in combination with quick strikes in highly maneuverable aircraft, they were able to create a formidable aerial combat opposition.
Forming MIGCAP to reduce enemy air threats to US aircraft greatly reduced casualties to support and strike aircraft. However, it did not address the MiG directly and they always remained a threat—striking only targets of opportunity. To face the MiG on their own terms, the US devised a plan to draw them into the skies where ROE allowed them to engage. This idea, later called Operation Bolo, was a deception plan exploiting North Korean radar (Middleton et al., 1978). The US launched F-4 fighters in the same formation and timeline that a normal ground strike force would. The F-4 fighters even carried fuel pods on each wing to look like bombs as to further delay the realization that the MiGs had launched into a trap. As MiGs approached the formation thinking they were about to attack strike aircraft burdened with munitions, the F-4 fighters jettisoned their extra fuel pods and retaliated against the MiGs. The operation was considered a great success with 7 enemy aircraft being destroyed with no casualties of their own (Middleton et al., 1978).
Conclusion
The war in Vietnam was long and difficult. This not only applied to ground forces, but to the skies also. After years of battling in the airspace above Vietnam, the US managed to shoot down only 195 MiGs while losing a surprising 89 fighters in aerial combat (Dorr.1988, p.8). Although higher success ratios existed depending on the year, the final outcome was just higher than a 2:1 kill ratio. As years passed by, the North Vietnamese supply of MiGs had also not decreased due to funding from China and Russia. Both sides fought hard and continuously adapted to each other’s tactics, but in the end it was the US who controlled the skies. Shoot-down ratios may not support a decisive victory for the US, but the security and support fighter aircraft provided to units was invaluable to conducting operations in Vietnam. (Tillman, 1980)