Address To The Nation On The War In Vietnam Summary

After President Johnson intensified violence in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon took on the role of presidency with the impending pressure of recalibrating American foreign policy. In particular, Nixon implemented Vietnamization which was the process in which Americans transferred battle tactics and strategies to Vietnamese soldiers so that they would be able to fight the war on their own. He wanted to make the Vietnamese fight their own battles in order to relieve the pressures on American soldiers. While this was a theoretically digestible idea, Nixon still upheld ideas of deception and imperialism.
In his speech “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam” delivered on November 3rd, 1969, Nixon tactfully marries the idea of increased

violence, masked as Vietnamization, with the idea of the silent majority in order to vilify antiwar protesters whilst invigorating apolitical Americans. In particular, Nixon challenges antiwar demonstrators head-on in his speech sharing,
“Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.” (Nixon 1969)

After this statement, Nixon then proceeds to call on “the great silent majority of my fellow Americans” to subscribe to his war ideology and not give in to antiwar demonstrates who are threatening the American nation as a whole (Nixon 1969).

In one fell swoop, Nixon effectively upholds Western imperialism, denounces antiwar protesters, and capitalizes on apolitical Americans in order to center his war tactics. In that sense, this speech was effective in covering up the numerous acts of havoc throughout Southeast Asia, with stints in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam (Morgan 159). Although the American media was coddled by Vietnamization, there would be sudden episodes of various bombings, calling into question the idea of American heroism juxtaposed with mindless violence. On one hand, America’s involvement in Vietnam is rooted in protection, but this idea is nullified by the warfare enacted on other Southeast Asian countries. In addition, these episodes were quickly repressed by the American government, reinforcing the disparity between rhetoric and

reality.
ORIENTAL ANTAGONISM
By analyzing the presidential rhetoric from the lens of Edward Said’s Orientalism theory, it is evident that Vietnam falls squarely into Said’s definition of the Orient. Said defines Orient as an exotic and bizarre space that needs to be domesticated, disciplined, and normalized by those in the West who are far more advanced and superior (Said 2014). This framing of the Other as uncultured, helpless, and violent demonstrates the United States capacity to vilify others for personal gains while passing it off as morality and heroism.
For the population of Asian American soldiers who were drafted into the Vietnam War, their conflicting identities played a huge role in their livelihood and safety.

As the perpetual foreigner, an unseen characterizers like nationality is less salient for Asian Americans because of lingering ideas that Americans are predominantly white Anglo-Saxon individuals. As Asian individuals, they phenotypically resemble the Vietnamese civilians that the United States were targeting. Therefore, their American patriotism was not met with the same response as white soldiers. Often, their loyalty and intentions were called into question. Some Asian American soldiers were mistakenly identified as the Viet Cong and were consequently killed by other American soldiers (Chao 1999). Stuck between their clashing identities, Asian American soldiers had to protect themselves from Viet Cong guerilla warfare while fending off racist abuse from within their home base. Between the physical, mental, and verbal abuse from all sides, Asian American soldiers had their identity questioned and their livelihoods challenged because of their similarity in phenotype with the Vietnamese, warranting Oriental

antagonism.
“And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle, Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Vietnam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom we can command. But we will use it…” (Johnson 1965)

Although Johnson makes notions regarding peace and pacifism, his language is coded in inevitable violence. With violence as the common denominator, it makes no difference what the intentions of our nation are when the impacts are felt by Asians and Americans even though that was not Johnson’s supposed intention. In addition, he conveniently ignores the existence and livelihoods of Asian American soldiers who have a different lived experience than other American soldiers. In an effort to co-opt their epithetical identity, Johnson politically groups them under American because it is more convenient to ignore the blatant racism inflicted on Asian American soldiers from our own American army. This rhetorical grouping demonstrates how politicians go about co-opting identities when it works in their favor. While grouping Asian Americans as just Americans helps to dissolve any racist faults of our own American army, doing so consequently erases the Asian American experience.