Abizaid Essay

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During the first post-war summer and continuing until late 2006, General John Abizaid, new CENTCOM commander, also failed to reframe the Iraqi problem correctly. Abizaid, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, believed transition from American forces to Iraqi forces and the implementation of democratic elections provided the best chance for Iraqi stability. This incorrect problem identification led to an increasingly shrinking U.S. ground force size and the removal of U.S. Soldiers from the Iraqi public as they increasingly hid on their FOBs and limited their contact with the Iraqi populace. This isolated the Iraqi people and made them vulnerable to Sunni Insurgence and Shia Militia. By the end of 2006, thousands of Iraqi citizens were dying at the hands of either Sunni insurgence or Shia militia. This flawed operational approach proved to be counterproductive the U.S. strategic objectives in Iraq. After more than three years of …show more content…

Military learned several lessons. The Army’s new Counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, provided many of the TTP(s) General Petraeus utilized in the Surge. But the biggest (and most painful) lessons came in response to Cobra’s very poor Phase IV planning. The U.S.’s absolute failure to properly position its ways and means to meet the POTUS ends led to the abandonment of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). In 2011, JP 5-0 replaced the JOPES with JOPP occurring within the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) . APEX creates a more interactive planning process that ensures integration between SECDEF and CCDR. This integration reduces the potential for gaps between civilian and military end-states. JOPP, unlike JOPES, promotes operational art that facilitates staff understanding and integration “of other agencies and multinational partners toward the achievement of strategic and operational

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