A Defense of David Hume's Moral Sense Theory

2350 Words5 Pages

In this paper I will defend David Hume’s Moral Sense Theory, which states that like sight and hearing, morals are a perceptive sense derived from our emotional responses. Since morals are derived from our emotional responses rather than reason, morals are not objective. Moreover, the emotional basis of morality is empirically proven in recent studies in psychology, areas in the brain associated with emotion are the most active while making a moral judgment. My argument will be in two parts, first that morals are response-dependent, meaning that while reason is still a contributing factor to our moral judgments, they are produced primarily by our emotional responses, and finally that each individual has a moral sense. Morals are not objective because morals are response-dependent—derived from our emotions, or passions, rather than reason. In his argument on the basis of morals in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume states, “Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, ‘tis supposed to influence our passions and actions.” He later argues, “Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from reason[…]Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions” (Hume 1978). At the root of every one of our actions, we find that we will always trace it back to a feeling that caused it. For example, I chose not to lie to my parents about my spending a lot of money because I knew that it would be wrong. It would not only be wrong because my parents have raised me to believe that lying is wrong, but also because I would feel guilty for disrespecting them. Thus, we judge as wrong or bad a... ... middle of paper ... ... 2006. “Doing the Right Thing: A Common Neural Circuit for Appropriate Violent or Compassionate Behavior.” Neuroimage 30: 1069-76. Moll, J., de Oliviera-Souza, R., Eslinger, P.J., Bramati, I.E., Mourao-Miranda, J., Andreiuolo, P.A., and Pessoa, L. 2002. “The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions.” Journal of Neuroscience 22: 2730–36. Plato. "504a-519e." Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2004. 1125-137. Prinz, J. J. “Can Moral Obligations Be Empirically Discovered?” Midwest Studies In Philosophy 31 (2007): 271–291. doi: 10.1111/j.1475- 4975.2007.00148.x Raphael, David Daiches. British Moralists, 1650-1800. Oxford: Clarendon, 1969. Valdesolo, P., and DeSteno, D. 2006. “Manipulations of Emotional Context Shape Moral Judgment.” Psychological Science 17: 476–77.

Open Document