Sufficiently Less Than Enough: Consent, Sex, and Moral Behaviour

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Sufficiently Less Than Enough: Consent, Sex, and Moral Behaviour

Consent is uniquely argued position within philosophical analysis of moral and immoral behaviours, especially in regards to positions refuting consents ability to be sufficient enough to legitimize moral behaviour. We must remain critical in our analysis of consent, and ways that it may, or may not legitimize moral behaviours. At first glance, one might assume that; the consent of two people is enough to constitute moral behaviour. Upon further investigation, we become aware of another’s ability to consciously consent and engage in acts that will degrade and cause some form of harm to the other, usually for their own mental or physical pleasure, inducing the fact that consent is not sufficient for ensuring moral behaviour. Consent is certainly a necessary part of contextualizing and legitimizing moral, sexual behaviours, however, consent is not implicitly sufficient for moral behaviour on its own. Consent is not sufficient legitimizing certain behaviours.

One most take into consideration that consent is necessary, however, although a necessary requirement, it does not, by default, qualify as sufficient. I will argue this by using Seiriol Morgan’s views on the nature of human desires, and his discussions of Kant’s moral theories opposing arguments failed to completely analyze in their views of consent as necessary and sufficient. Consent does not, by default, illicit moral behaviour. Moral behaviour is often legitimized through consent; however, immoral behaviour may benefit or even be validated through consent. In our evaluation of consent and ways in which consent is considered morally transformative, we must understand the diverse nature that consent is situ...

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...alls us to be more aware of certain sexual impulses that we have an obligation to refrain from, even if consent is given and no one objects to these types of desires.

In conclusion I hope this paper has shown why consent does not constitute moral behaviour, although it does produce a necessary process of ensuring external notions used to protect an individuals free choice to engage and participate in various actions. Moral behaviours rest in our abilities to engage in various duties of virtue that take into account the happiness, respect, and well-being of others around us. Although they may have consented to, or actively engaged in free choice that led to positions of unhappiness and suffering, we must reflect on our ability to ease the discomfort of others and remain critical of stark, legitimate theories of morality that limit the emotional value of humanity.

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