Bernard Williams's Critique Of Kantian Moral Theory

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In this paper, I will argue that Kant provides us with a plausible account of morality. To demonstrate that, I will initially offer a main criticism of Kantian moral theory, through explaining Bernard Williams’ charge against it. I will look at his indulgent of the Kantian theory, and then clarify whether I find it objectionable. The second part, I will try to defend Kant’s theory.
Criticism
Critiques of Kantian moralist theory such as Williams believe that Kant’s moral theory is characterized by Impartiality and unresponsiveness to any picky associations to picky person. Abstraction from specific characteristics of an agent is what is believed by the critiques as to be a qualification for a universal moral principle that can apply to similar …show more content…

This is quite difficult. What is more, the less extreme case, in which there is no conflict between moral requirement and what is one’s projects, is not less difficult. That is, even if there were no conflict, the agent would still have to conceptual from her projects and assume a neutral observation of the situation. With the central role that is attributed to individual’s commitments, Kant’s moral theory can be deemed objectionable. That one’s attachment to a person may influence his or her moral reaction when need arise differently than when it is a case of an individual who has no attachment to any of the person’s that should lend a helping hand. This may seem convincing enough to object Kant’s theory and stand on …show more content…

Any rational human being will act only in accordance to reflectivity, which is binding to all humans who identify themselves as being human beings. Therefore, there is a collective identity that defines basic boundaries for the type of decisions we construct, which encompasses the other types of identities we accept. For instance, since it would be hostile to our dedication to humanity to torment small babies, in that case, it would be immoral to torment kids. Since I have to obligate to being a human being prior to obligating myself to any other identity, I cannot just do whatever thing that identity needs of me. This is because my identity as a human being, that is, a reflective agent, obliges of me to value all human beings above all other contemplation, and that means abstaining from a monstrous act like tormenting little

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