In this paper I shall consider Spinoza’s argument offered in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, which argues for the impossibility of two substances sharing the same nature. I shall first begin by explaining, in detail, the two-step structure of the argument and proceed accordingly by offering a structured account of its relation to the main claim. Consequently I shall point out what I reasonably judge to be a mistake in Spinoza’s line of reasoning; that is, that the definition of a thing does not express a fixed number of individuals under that definition. By contrast, I hope to motivate the claim that a true definition of a thing does in fact express a fixed number of individuals that fall under that definition. I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken.
In the argument in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, Spinoza makes two claims which have the following form: First, there is necessarily for each individual existent thing a definite cause that accounts for its existence. Second, the definite cause for the existence of a thing must either be contained in the very nature and definition of the existent thing - in which case, existence belongs to the nature of the thing defined - or must be postulated externally from its definition and nature. If, for example, in the universe five women were to exist, or any several individuals of a kind for this matter, then there must necessarily be a definite cause for the existence of each...
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...Spinoza insists, it is nonetheless possible that two substances can be distinguished in virtue of them sharing an attribute and yet be distinct in nature by possessing an attribute not shared by the other. So, whereas substance A shares an attribute with substance B - namely, both share attribute C - the former differs in nature from the latter in terms of each one possessing an attribute not contained by the other. If the nature of Substance A is attribute C and attribute D, and if the nature of substance B is C and E, then it appears that the nature of each one, though each shares an attribute in common, is fundamentally distinct. So, it appears that Spinoza’s commitment to the thesis that no two substances share the same nature or attribute stands in error, and thus I conclude under the possibility two substances sharing an attribute while differing in nature.
The mind-body problem has kept philosophers busy ever since Descartes proposed it in the sixteenth century. The central question posed by the mind-body problem is the relationship between what we call the body and what we call the mind—one private, abstract, and the origin of all thoughts; the other public, concrete, and the executor of the mind’s commands. Paul Churchland, a proponent of the eliminative materialist view, believes that the solution to the mind-body problem lies in eliminating the single concept that allows this problem to perpetuate—the folk psychological concept of mental states. Churchland argues that the best theory of mind is a materialistic one, not a folk psychological one. Unlike other materialist views such as identity theory, Churchland wants to remove the idea of mental states from our ontology because mental states cannot be matched 1:1 with corresponding physical states. This is why Churchland’s view is called eliminative materialism—it is a materialistic account of the mind that eliminates the necessity for us to concern ourselves with mental events. At first this eliminative materialism appears to be a good solution to the mind-body problem because we need not concern ourselves with that problem if we adopt Churchland’s view. However, there is a basic flaw in his argument that raises the question of whether we should actually give up folk psychology. In this paper, we will first walk through the premises of Churchland’s argument, and then we will explore whether Churchland does a suitable job of justifying our adoption of eliminative materialism.
In this paper I will lay out the argument by both Aristotle and Aquinas on the immateriality of the mind.
American Philosophical Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1984): 227-36.
Accordingly, all that is needed for an individual to possess and maintain his personal identity are certain mental capacitates for having conscious experiences, the examples of thoughts and sensation are given, and the ability to perform intentional actions. It this portion of the theory, a departure from the traditional Aristotelian view of substances is made. The original viewpoint of Aristotelian forms can apply only to inanimate objects, which have no personal identity, in this dualist theory, if the arguments illustrating that two people can be the same person, even if the is no continuity between the physical matter of each body are correct. Consequently, for two substances to be considered the same, in this reformed view, they
Leibniz’s conception of infinitely many simple substances and denial of mind/body interaction was developed in response to Spinoza’s claim that there is only one substance and his idea of parallelism, which states that thought and extension express the sa...
He continues by saying that for any change to occur there must have been a previous cause that existed in reality and if one was to trace this line of causes and effects all the way back there must be a first cause that began the chain. But there cannot be anything worldly like that because anything natural must have an impetus already in reality to transform it from potentiality to reality. The only explanation, in Aquinas' e... ... middle of paper ... ... s a cause except God.
...rity and distinction, but we can conclude what Descartes means. He is saying that we can be sure that these primary qualities exist in bodies in the same way that they do in our ideas of bodies. This cannot be claimed for qualities such as heat, color, taste and smell, of which our ideas are so confused and vague that we must always reserve judgment. This can be seen in the wax example.
He defends the view that Quine’s ostrich nominalism is the best answer nominalists can offer to defeat the One Over Many argument. This is done by offering a solution to the problems of ostrich nominalist. However, Imaguire recognises that Quine would avoid arguing in terms of facts necessitating truths so labels this a new form of thinking, presenting a theory entitled ‘New Ostrich Nominalism’. Using the notion of ontological grounding, he furthers his argument by demonstrating that one does not have to show that the realist assumption of existence of universals is false, but only that it is not necessary (2014: 192). For an ostrich nominalist, the realist’s explanation of universals is derivate. It is not necessary for ‘a is F’ to be similar to another instance of ‘F’ or to anything else. From this reasoning, it is clear that the ostrich nominalist does take predicates with ontological seriousness. In order to assure substantiality, the realist must accept some additional principle for deciding whether a predicate commits us to a universal (Imaguire 2014: 197). An ostrich nominalist believes only predicates we quantify commit us to universals. The idea that we should avoid unnecessary commitments attempts to dissolve the One Over Many
Before Spinoza can explain the liberations from these passions he had to explain the strengths of the passions and what one can do to at least litigate the effects of being governed by passions. This lead to the detail discussions of virtue and what it really is and Spinoza’s new concept of what constitutes morality. This was coming out of the seventh century when virtue was defined as in acting in according to duties opposed on one by either a super natural source, for example God or a church. Or from even a modern stand point that if one has free will they must act in accordance’s ...
He elaborated this to mean that a substance does not require a sense of anything else to exist, which also seem to coincide with Aristotle's interpretations of how a substance exists, that it is independent of all other things. (1). The fundamental feature of substance, as expressed by Spinoza, is its independence. Spinoza defines God as a substance that is completely unbounded, or a substance "comprising of infinity of attributes", of which every one of them illustrates an in... ...
Spinoza simply believes that there are flaws in the way people interpret religion and Scripture. Spinoza claims that individuals can not interpret the Scripture through translation. Spinoza argues that due to the fact that no language is translated completely correct, translations have alterations. “We must take especial care, when we are in search of the meaning of a text, not to be led away by our reason in so far as it is founded on principles of natural knowledge (to say nothing of prejudices): in order not to confound the meaning of a passage with its truth, we must examine it solely by means of the signification of the words, or by a reason acknowledging no foundation but Scripture.” (Spinoza ch. 7) He argues that you must treat Scripture the way natural scientists treat nature. When interpreting Scripture, the interpretations must be limited to what is in the Bible. This is similar to how natural scientists look at nature and make inquires based on
Berkeley’s Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous is an argument between the Cartesian thinker Hylas and the Berkelean Philonous. In the first of these dialogues, Berkley argues that the Cartesian notion of substance is incoherent and that the word "matter" as Descartes uses it is meaningless.
One of the problems facing those who theorize about the independence and irreducibility of consciousness is the fact that it is difficult to conceptualize the essence of consciousness, as distinct from the sensations, feelings, etc. that are often associated with consciousness. Here we are definitely getting into abstract metaphysics. Medieval philosophers such as Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Suarez faced up to this challenge with a little help from Christian revelation, by speculating about the characteristics and functions of angels or "separate substances," who would presumably exemplify consciousness in its "pure" state, without any distracting admixtures. In this paper, I would like to take a look in particular at Aquinas' theory of separate substances. With this theory, we bypass the old question of the reducibility or irreducibility of consciousness to its material conditions, and we also find, in my opinion, some interesting analogies to contemporary computer technology. It would be too much to hope that these analogies, even if substantial, would instigate a revival of interest in Angelology among technophiles. But those interested in the metaphysics of the mind-body problem may find them suggestive:
This essay will define Cartesian dualism, explain and critically evaluate Gilbert Ryle’s response to Cartesian dualism in his article, “Descartes’ Myth” and support Ryle’s argument on Descartes’ substance dualism.
...ranscendence of God, and ascription of free will to human beings and to God. According to Spinoza, this features made the world unintelligible.