Furthermore, the realist holds that the existence of universals follows that that words such as ‘red’ have a particular meaning, and the meaning itself will be a universal of a sort. This is refuted by Quine holding that the use of predicates can be adequately accounted for without supposing that universals or meanings exist (Loux 2006: 36). He reasons that meaningfulness of sentences do not possess an abstract universal of ‘meaning’. The rejection of the attempt to introduce universals as ‘meanings’ is an unconvincing argument by Quine. This is because he objects to the realist argument simply by refusing to admit meanings. This can be seen as an evasion of the problem by providing a poor response. Quine uses the word ‘meaningful’ in his analysis …show more content…
He defends the view that Quine’s ostrich nominalism is the best answer nominalists can offer to defeat the One Over Many argument. This is done by offering a solution to the problems of ostrich nominalist. However, Imaguire recognises that Quine would avoid arguing in terms of facts necessitating truths so labels this a new form of thinking, presenting a theory entitled ‘New Ostrich Nominalism’. Using the notion of ontological grounding, he furthers his argument by demonstrating that one does not have to show that the realist assumption of existence of universals is false, but only that it is not necessary (2014: 192). For an ostrich nominalist, the realist’s explanation of universals is derivate. It is not necessary for ‘a is F’ to be similar to another instance of ‘F’ or to anything else. From this reasoning, it is clear that the ostrich nominalist does take predicates with ontological seriousness. In order to assure substantiality, the realist must accept some additional principle for deciding whether a predicate commits us to a universal (Imaguire 2014: 197). An ostrich nominalist believes only predicates we quantify commit us to universals. The idea that we should avoid unnecessary commitments attempts to dissolve the One Over Many
In this book, many fallacious quotations were used to support Skousen’s viewpoints. These quotations were blindly accepted due to the attached name without proper insight into the context of the quotation. It seemed as if Skousen frequently misinterpreted his sources purposely to authenticate his argument, often without proper justification or a well-reasoned argument. The audience was ultimately misled to believe flimsy assertions with unproven conclusions; Skousen achieved this by supporting axioms that will be widely accepted and by jumping to conclusions with which we have
In this paper I shall consider Spinoza’s argument offered in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, which argues for the impossibility of two substances sharing the same nature. I shall first begin by explaining, in detail, the two-step structure of the argument and proceed accordingly by offering a structured account of its relation to the main claim. Consequently I shall point out what I reasonably judge to be a mistake in Spinoza’s line of reasoning; that is, that the definition of a thing does not express a fixed number of individuals under that definition. By contrast, I hope to motivate the claim that a true definition of a thing does in fact express a fixed number of individuals that fall under that definition. I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken.
The Ontological Argument, which argues from a definition of God’s being to his existence, is the first type of argument we are going to examine. Since this argument was founded by Saint Anslem, we will be examining his writings. Saint Anslem starts by defining God as an all-perfect being, or rather as a being containing all conceivable perfections. Now if in addition of possessing all conceivable perfections t...
The great feminist theorist once said “‘Sometimes people try to destroy you, precisely because they don’t see it, but because they see it and don’t want it to exist’” (Mook 195). Support becomes very important for transgender people at the time they transition. Many families support their transgender family members, but society rejects their transition. Many people want transgender people out of their communities. The resource of knowledge seems important to transgenders because it lets them tolerate the ignorance of people. Money plays an important role when the time comes to pay medical bills. In the book Redefining Realness by Janet Mock, She relates the importance of resources. Resources should be important for transgender people because
There is perhaps no idea in the history of western ontology with a more powerful legacy than Aristotle’s conception of ousia. Traditionally construed, "ousia" stands for the primary, foundational principle of being. It can be said that ontology has historically been ousiology – the search for ultimate foundations. In this quest for ultimates, the ousia names the absolute arche, the foundational principle that reigns over and orders all being. The political tone of this formulation is intentional; it is designed to frame the ontological question concerning the meaning of ousia in ethico-political terms. The impetus behind this strategy is to suggest that western ontology has been largely determined by an authoritarian tendency that seeks to establish a single ultimate principle in order to secure a firm and certain foundation. On the one hand, this authoritarian tendency may be traced back to Aristotle, for ousia is precisely such a hegemonic principle; on the other hand, Aristotle also suggests another conception of ousia, one that can be drawn upon in the attempt to resist this authoritarian tendency. In what follows, I trace both the authoritarian and this resistant conception ousia in Aristotle.
One of Rene Descartes’ major culminations in Meditations on First Philosophy is “I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind” (Descartes:17). This statement can be explicated by examining Descartes’ Cartesian method of doubt and his subsequent discovery of basic truths. Even though I do believe that Descartes concludes with a statement that is accurate: cogito ergo sum, there are areas of his proof that are susceptible to defamation. These objections discover serious error with Descartes’ method used in determining the aforementioned conclusion.
Some kinds of utterances which have an indicative grammatical form seem, for different reasons, to be unable to say something true of the world. Logical contradictions are only the prime example of something the author baptizes impossible descriptions. So-called performative contradictions (e.g., "I do not exist") make up another kind, but there are at least two more such kinds: negating affirmations and performatives which cannot be explained within the philosophy of language. Only philosophical anthropology can explain their feature of "impossibleness," and a distinction between unreflective and reflective consciousness is central to the explanation. Particularly important here is G. H. Mead's distinction between two aspects of the self: the "I" and the "me." Each of the four kinds of impossible descriptions distinguished has its own contrary opposite. These are, in turn, logical tautologies, performative tautologies, affirming negations, and omissive performatives. The last three types as types have not received the philosophical recognition that they deserve. All four fit a general characterization which is given as a definition of the concept of superfluous description.
Redefining Realness, as a whole, is an extremely powerful piece of literature– but I think that (at least for me, personally) the sixteenth chapter of Janet Mock’s novel is the most poignant. The passage opens with Mock’s discussion of how her “decisions are [her] decisions, [her] choices [her] choices, and [she] must stand by the bad ones as much as [she applauds her] good ones. Collectively, they’re an active archive of [her] strength and vulnerability” (Mock 221). There is something incredibly admirable about such a raw admittance, a realization. It forced me to recognize how my own mistakes have shaped who I am today. In order to finance her sex reassignment surgery in Thailand, Mock partook in a pornographic shoot in order to earn the
This paper will attempt to state and explain the Cartesian Ontological Argument, its most promising lines of objection and some of the replies to these objections. Before studying the argument, it is important to notice that this type argument, unlike causal or teleological arguments, tries to be based on reason alone, not observation. Descartes considers that his a priori claims can derive the existence of God from the very concept of God.
Togelius, J. (2011). A procedural critique of deontological reasoning. Paper presented at the Proceedings of DiGRA.
Donnellen (1966) criticized the Russell and Strawson’s view. He claimed that there are attributive and referential uses of definite description. The former is about attributively using definite description in an assertion which stating something about “A is B”. The latter is about speaker using the description to let the audience to know what is “A is B” about. Donnellen claimed that Russell focus on former and Strawson focus on latter.
Russell’s Theory of Definite Description has totally changed the way we view definite descriptions by solving the three logical paradoxes. It is undeniable that the theory itself is not yet perfect and there can be objections on this theory. Still, until now, Russell’s theory is the most logical explanation of definite description’s role.
Robinson, R. R. (1994). Some methodological approaches to the unexplained points. Philosophy 2B/3B (pp. 27-34). Melbourne: La Trobe University.
W. V. O. Quine (1908-2000) did not conceive of philosophy as an activity separate from the general province of empirical science. His interest in science is not best described as a philosophy of science but as a set of reflections on the nature of science that is pursued with the same empirical spirit that animates scientific inquiry. Quine’s philosophy should then be seen as a systematic attempt to understand science from within the resources of science itself. This project investigates both the epistemological and ontological dimensions of scientific theorizing. Quine’s epistemological concern is to examine our successful acquisition of scientific theories, while his ontological interests focus on the further logical regimentation of that theory. He thus advocates what is more famously known as ‘naturalized epistemology’, which consists of his attempt to provide an improved scientific explanation of how we have developed elaborate scientific theories on the basis of meager sensory input. Quine further argues that the most general features of reality can be examined through the use of formal logic by clarifying what objects we must acknowledge as real given our acceptance of an overarching systematic view of the world. In pursuing these issues, Quine reformulates and thus transforms these philosophical concerns according to those standards of clarity, empirical adequacy, and utility that he takes as central to the explanatory power of empirical science. While few
This essay will define Cartesian dualism, explain and critically evaluate Gilbert Ryle’s response to Cartesian dualism in his article, “Descartes’ Myth” and support Ryle’s argument on Descartes’ substance dualism.