R. J. Godlewski: Asymmetrical Warfare

Asymmetrical warfare has become a commonality throughout 20th and 21st century warfare; often, smaller groups use erratic, scattered, and non-linear methods to fight larger and much better equipped adversaries as a way to level out the playing field. Within these often non-linear, yet partially collective entities; to remain successful, it is necessary for each group align itself with a wide array of global funding and supply mechanisms. The three sources utilized: R.J. Godlewski’s journal article, “Financial Counterintelligence: Fractioning the Lifeblood of Asymmetrical Warfare”, the National Anti-Money Laundering report of Tanzania, and the African Poaching Crisis & America’s Responsibility and will present the idea that modern insurgent-based

Much like attempting to define the concept of intelligence; attempts to create a readily available asymmetric warfare doctrine as utilized in conventional warfare, would turn into a never ending process. R.J. Godlewski does however define asymmetrical warfare in its simplest form “as a concept that leverages weaknesses against an often-superior enemy within conflict without rules, and fights combat without structure

As the old saying goes, “Don’t keep all of your eggs in one basket,” this holds true for asymmetrical warfare practitioners. This concept alone accounts for the main cause, and perpetual struggle as to why disrupting terrorist and TCO financial networks are so difficult. North African and Middle Eastern terror networks often use trusted key persons that perform secretive financial transactions are referred to as a Hawala (4). What is also surprising, is the sheer amount of funds these groups receive via donations, and through allies. Al Qaida and Hamas have both received tens of millions of dollars from the bin Mahfouz and al- Rajhi families and Saudi Arabian/Iranian governments through charitable institutions, and other means (5). Again, if financial counterintelligence networks can isolate, and or freeze identifiable assets; the insurgent’s capacity to operate efficiently becomes greatly