Conventional Versus Irregular Warfare: Is the MAGTF the Model to Answer Both?
When asked to compare and contrast U.S. military operations and capabilities for conventional versus irregular warfare, one cannot overlook the Marine Corps’ Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTF is the Marine Corps’ force protection aboard and how it contributes to the national security of this great nation. Five unique competencies allow the Marine Corps to do this successfully; however, they all focus on conventional warfare, with the exception of mainly one, warfighting culture and dynamic decision-making. Well-coordinated conventional operations and decentralized leadership combine to form a solid foundation for success in irregular warfare, therefore, conventional warfare should take priority.
Conventional Versus Irregular Warfare
Irregular warfare is not a new tactic and has been referenced by some of the great strategists, such as, Jomini and Clausewitz. The titles may have evolved from guerrilla warfare, to insurgents, to terrorists, to the simple phase of unconventional forces; however, they are all representative of violence used to counter the conventional military forces of a nation-state. Conventional or traditional war is “waged by forces designed, trained, and equipped for major combat operations against a similar, peer enemy.” Conventional warfare, in its purest form, is a “violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states.” Irregular warfare supports indirect and asymmetric approaches and “refers to all unconventional methods of violence used to counter the traditional capabilities of a nation-state’s military forces; and to undermine the authority of a local government or in...
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...he most challenging threat to U.S. national objectives.
Conclusion
For the U.S. military, well-coordinated conventional operations and decentralized leadership combine to form a solid foundation for success in irregular warfare, therefore, conventional warfare should take priority in the preparation for future military operations. For the United States Marine Corps, this means fine-tuning the MAGTF for conventional operations. Like the great strategist Jomini highlights, when comparing the equipping of forces and battlefield success of regular forces and irregular forces, “experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate of a war may depend…it is always best to give cavalry a regular organization.”
When understanding the types Guerilla warfare tactics dates back to the earliest recorded history and continues today, as it will in the future. A formidable strategy used against the military by the Native Americans to preserve their way of life. After the Civil War in 1865, U.S. settlements exceeded ...
...in technology and tactics have made Special Forces units more reliable. For example, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and the incident with the Somali pirates of the coast of Somalia show the capabilities of today’s Special Forces. The author asserts that, in the future the United States will shift away from major combat operations. These large engagements have proven to be costly in lives and treasure. For that reason, she infers that the US Military will choose the “go small, go long” model for future engagements in the Middle East. Special operation forces are uniquely suited for this model. Their conspicuous nature and low cost make them politically and strategically ideal. The author also suggests that future large scale operations may look like the conflicts in Libya and Somalia rather than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse-tung, “Che” Guevara, Osama bin Laden and others have professed unique qualifications as innovators and practitioners of Guerrilla warfare. However, in our relatively short military history, we have periodically had to use or defend against irregular warfare. During the French and Indian Wars as well as the Revolutionary War, we were the guerrillas. In the Civil War, there were the partisan operations of Mosby, Forrest and the outlaw Quantrill, who played a key role in the Confederacy’s ability to wage effective war against the numerically and industrially superior Union for over four years. It is often forgotten, that regular forces require a ratio of ten to one to prevail against a partisan operating on their native soil3. Nevertheless, one thing remains constant: the adaptability and courage of the American Soldier under the harshest of circumstances continues to allow them to prevail.
Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully utilized mission command through leading, understanding, visualizing and assessing.
Shalikashvili, J.M. (n.d.). Shape, Respond, Prepare Now -- A Military Strategy for a New Era. National Military Strategy. Retrieved September 14, 2004, from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/index.html#Top
Sir, I am honored by the privilege to once again serve in 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). Over of the last 30 days, I had an opportunity to reconnect, and reflect on the current state of the Brigade. The 4th ABCT has a rich history of success and glory. It is my goal to put in place the systems and practices for this great organization to exceed all past and present accomplishments. As a result of my assessment, I identified three areas of focus that will improve our organization: a unit vision, a change in organizational culture and climate, and building organizational teams. I have no doubt that with the implementation of these three areas of focus, I will be the transformational leader that 4th ABCT needs as we prepare for the upcoming National Training Center (NTC) rotation and tackle the task of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) mission.
To facilitate the understanding of this essay , then I made a few parts in accordance with the relevant material . First , the meaning of victory in war . Second , the strategy and tactics of guerrilla and conventional warfare . Third , background selection and co...
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
Insurgency is defined as a rebellion against an indigenous government or a foreign occupier. In an asymmetric war there are two sides a strong and a weak side which have two strategies each. The French, who were the “stronger” side used “direct attack” which aimed at destroying the weak actor’s (Algeria) armed forces and thereby their capacity to offer violent resistance. During the seco...
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
The most effective commanders through their leadership build cohesive teams. Mutual trust, shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk serve as just a few principles for mission command. Mutual trust is the foundation of any successful professional relationship that a commander shares with his staff and subordinates. The shared understanding of an operational environment functions, as the basis for the commander to effectively accomplish the mission. While my advice for the commander on what prudent risks to take may create more opportunities rather than accepting defeat. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate.
- - -, dir. “Air Force Special Operations Command.” The Official Web Site of the United Stated Air Force. U.S. Air Force, 20 Sept. 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012. .
Thinking historically while conducting counterinsurgency in the 21st century poses questions regarding how to develop political and strategic plans. This bibliographic essay will examine the political and military aspect of fighting counterinsurgent warfare by 20th century theorists Galula’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” and Trinquier’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice”. Strategy in fighting guerilla wars will be discussed by comparing conflicts in battles and ideologies from the past to current day. Moreover, ways to avoid the one size fits all war mentality when combating modern day insurgents will be recommended.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
“The trouble is that a praise worthy quest for precision can descend into a flattering of tidy minds at the cost of a realistic grasp of the complexity and interconnectedness that is the story of strategic history.” Colin Gray warns in the opening sentences of the chapter “Irregular Warfare and Terrorism” in his book Another Bloody Century of the dangers of oversimplifying the categories of warfare. To look at warfare as either regular or irregular without being absolutely clear on the definitions of each and the context in which the terms are used is fruitless. Regular forces have been known to use irregular type tactics, just as irregular forces have used conventional warfare to reach their political goals. It is imperative, then, that the U.S. military forces are trained to fight wars falling on a spectrum of warfare and educated to distinguish the type of war they face.