Predicting Behavior

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I argue that the behavior of other agents is insufficiently described in current debates as a dichotomy between tacit theory (attributing beliefs and desires to predict behavior) and simulation theory (imagining what one would do in similar circumstances in order to predict behavior). I introduce two questions about the foundation and development of our ability both to attribute belief and to simulate it. I then propose that there is one additional method used to predict behavior, namely, an inductive strategy.

Our ability to predict and explain the behavior of other humans has long been of interest for both philosophers and psychologists. Initially, it was taken for granted that this competence is based on an ability to attribute beliefs and desires to other humans. For example, Daniel Dennett's (1987) intentional stance, which requires that intentional behavior is best predicted via belief attributions, rests on this assumption. Premack and Woodruff (1978) also rely on this view in stating that if a chimpanzee can predict intentional behavior, then he has a theory of mind (ToM); that is, he can attribute beliefs and desires to others. These assumptions as to the nature of our predictive ability have developed into a general theory of the mind. It is thought that if we make use of beliefs and desires to predict behavior, then we must have a tacit-theory of the psychological influences on behavior (Stich and Nichols 1996, Fodor 1987, Wellman 1990). In contrast to this tacit-theory view, it has been suggested (e.g. Harris 1990, Goldman 1995, Gordon 1995) that we need not appeal to others' beliefs and desires in order to predict behavior, and instead we simulate by, roughly, putting ourselves in the position of another. I argue ...

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...uropean Society for Philosophy and Psychology Annual Meeting, Padova Italy.

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