Gettier And Harman's Differences Knowledge, And The Traditional Analysis Of Knowledge

The application of epistemology to practical life relies largely on a coherent set of parameters that determine whether someone has knowledge or not. While a traditional analysis at first glance seems to provide these parameters, this definition allows for cases to be considered knowledge though they are actually contrary to an intuitive definition of knowledge. In this paper, I will outline the traditional analysis of knowledge, present Gettier and Harman’s objections, analyze Harman’s proposed solutions in principles P and Q; and critique the necessity and consequences of Principle Q.

Traditional Analysis of Knowledge

In the traditional analysis of knowledge, knowledge is defined as a justified true belief. The presence of these three requirements (i.e., justification,

Moreover, simply having a justification is not enough for a belief to be considered justified. Consider a scenario in which Diane believes that her sister recently moved to the Bay area. Diane was specifically told by their sister that she was moving there, but she didn’t trust their sister’s word. Instead, she only believed that her sister had moved when their mother posted images of the sister’s apartment on Facebook. In this event, Diane had two available justifications: the sister’s claim and the mother’s photos, but her belief that the sister had moved was only grounded on the latter. Consequently, the belief was not justified by her sister’s claim even though that justification was available. Similarly, the relationship between justification and truth value is essential because the if the justification has no correlation to the truth, then it cannot genuinely be regarded as legitimate justification, as we will see