In this short paper I will examine the positions of foundationalism and coherentism, and argue that a form of weak foundationalism is the most satisfactory option as a valid theory of justification for knowledge and is therefore a viable way of avoiding any sort of vicious regress problem and skepticism.
Foundationalism addresses the infinite regress problem in the following way: if person O is to be justified in having belief X, X must be justified by a further belief Y, which must inferentially justify belief X. Furthermore, Y must be justified by another belief, Z. Instead of following this line infinitely, the foundationalist argues that eventually there must be a foundational belief that is self-justified and capable of justifying any belief that relies on it in turn for its own justification. Accordingly, as an example, belief Z must be able to justify itself without a belief Z1, and be able to justify belief Y at the same time. Thus, inferential justification must be possible for non-foundational beliefs; noninferential justification must also be possible as well. How one arrives at noninferentially justified beliefs is one of the biggest problems for the foundationalist.
In my opinion, it is hard to accept that there can be foundational beliefs that are self-justified because, as has been pointed out, if a belief is to be self-justified, person O must “know” in some sense what characteristic of that belief makes it self-justified, otherwise the belief is arbitrary. So, supposing that characteristic Q is what makes belief P justified, person O would then have to know that belief P has characteristic Q. Thus, belief P is no longer noninferentially justified because it relies on person O’s knowledge of characteristic Q. I...
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...re some foundational beliefs that possess some degree of intrinsic justification, but as it was noted, accepting these beliefs as completely self-justifying is difficult to accept. Therefore, these foundational beliefs that possess a low degree of justification can rely on other minimally-justified beliefs for support, consequently creating a coherent foundation of sorts.
In the end, the pursuit of an unproblematic theory of justification seems like a Sisyphean task. All of the major theories have glaring weaknesses and it appears that a compromise between certain elements of the different views will be necessary to move closer to a more acceptable view. In this paper I have tried to show some of the principal weaknesses with the two chief theories of justification and to look for an alternate, weak foundationalism, which seems to me to be a legitimate way forward.
It is crucial that every belief must be thoroughly explored and justified to avoid any future repercussions. Clifford provides two examples in which, regardless of the outcome, the party that creates a belief without comprehensive justification ends up at fault. It is possible to apply the situations in The Ethics of Belief to any cases of belief and end up with the conclusion that justification is of utmost importance. Justifying beliefs is so important because even the smallest beliefs affect others in the community, add to the global belief system, and alter the believer moral compass in future decisions.
In this book, many fallacious quotations were used to support Skousen’s viewpoints. These quotations were blindly accepted due to the attached name without proper insight into the context of the quotation. It seemed as if Skousen frequently misinterpreted his sources purposely to authenticate his argument, often without proper justification or a well-reasoned argument. The audience was ultimately misled to believe flimsy assertions with unproven conclusions; Skousen achieved this by supporting axioms that will be widely accepted and by jumping to conclusions with which we have
The controversial topic involving the existence of God has been the pinnacle of endless discourse surrounding the concept of religion in the field of philosophy. However, two arguments proclaim themselves to be the “better” way of justifying the existence of God: The Cosmological Argument and the Mystical Argument. While both arguments attempt to enforce strict modus operandi of solidified reasoning, neither prove to be a better way of explaining the existence of God. The downfall of both these arguments rests on commitment of fallacies and lack of sufficient evidence, as a result sabotaging their validity in the field of philosophy and faith.
In “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, Thomas Kelly gives two responses to the question “How should awareness of disagreement, with those that you take to be your epistemic equal, effect the rational confidence you have in your beliefs?”. Kelly discusses two possible responses to the question. The first is Richard Foley's first person perspective argument. Adam Elga calls the second the right reasons view (Elga, 2007 pg. 485). Kelly pursues the latter, and does not go further than agreeing with Foley that we should only view these disputes with a first person perspective.
and that it can in fact be reasonable to hold a belief without sufficient evidence. Both
John Perry’s argument in “the Problem of the Essential Indexical” is very long winded. He goes through numerous points and counterpoints before coming to a conclusion about belief states. Staton begins her essay by explaining Perry’s original issue with the essential indexical. An essential indexical is a term that when replaced by other terms “destroys the force of motivation” (Staton 2017, 1). One possible solution to the problem of the essential indexical is a de re belief. Staton summarizes using an
He has the same names of two people, Smith and Jones. In this case, Smith is arguing that Jones has always, and is now, owning and driving a Ford car, when in fact he does not own a Ford. Jones picked Smith up in a Ford car and every time he has seen him driving it has been in a Ford. So, in definition (a) “P is true” (Gettier 121), Smith is driving a Ford. This is actually false, because even though Jones believes that he owns a Ford, in reality, he does not own a Ford. “S believes that P” meaning that Jones has evidence of this conclusion and he does truly believe that Smith owns a Ford. Lastly, “s is justified in believing that P”. It is not justified why Jones believes that Smith owns a Ford because he has never seen him in a car other than a Ford, but this does not make the statement true. Jones was not aware that Smith is driving a rental car, so this proves that the theory of knowledge does not work because not all three conditions are met (Gettier
In order to be considered a non-evidentialist, one must believe that actual evidence is not required for all of our beliefs. Pascal believ...
The second theory used is the faith development theory. Swanson uses Fowler’s famous work done in 1981 on faith development, which shows that faith is naturally embedded in all human beings.
This essay attempts to capitalize on Goldman 's “What is justified belief?” to form an opinion about his ideas. Goldman makes a break from traditional views of knowledge to form a theory of externalism. He gives the reader a new point of view for observing the relationship between knowledge and justification. The following passage will weed out some important aspects of his theory and how they relate to his theory as a whole.
...fore, I can conclude that my laptop will persist in the future. We can think that we justified our belief by providing these two premises as reasoning. However, we justified it though induction and Hume states that we have no reason in believing into the inductive argument. Our argument becomes a weak one, since the second premise is unsupported. The problem of induction raised by Hume is challenge to justified true belief account because it shows how our inductive argument about the future and unobserved does not provide a good support. Therefore, we cannot get a justified belief by applying inductive principle.
ABSTRACT: Both utilitarians and the deontologists are of the opinion that punishment is justifiable, but according to the utilitarian moral thinkers, punishment can be justified solely by its consequences, while the deontologists believe that punishment is justifiable purely on retributive ground. D. D. Raphael is found to reconcile both views. According to him, a punishment is justified when it is both useful and deserved. Maclagan, on the other hand, denies it to be justifiable in the sense that it is not right to punish an offender. I claim that punishment is not justifiable but not in the sense in which it is claimed by Maclagan. The aim of this paper is to prove the absurdity of the enquiry as to whether punishment can be justified. Difference results from differing interpretations of the term 'justification.' In its traditional meaning, justification can hardly be distinguished from evaluation. In this sense, to justify an act is to say that it is good or right. I differ from the traditional use and insist that no act or conduct can be justified. Infliction of punishment is a human conduct and as such it is absurd to ask for its justification. I hold the view that to justify is to give reason, and it is only a statement or an assertion behind which we can put forth reason. Infliction of pain is an act behind which the agent may have purpose or intention but not reason. So, it is not punishment, but rather statements concerning punishment that we can justify.
that the idea of a God may be questioned or less acceptable to the people, when
Some of the objections, such as the ones made by Edmund Gettier, claim that three conditions are not nearly enough to justify a true belief, and that at the very least a fourth must be added. Gettier presents a very valid criticism of the JTB theory of knowledge, and his counter examples highlight flaws in the JTB theory that make it an inadequate theory of knowledge. Gettier claims takes an issue with the third part of the JTB theory, which states that proposition P must be true. Gettier makes the interesting observation that person S may very well be justified in believing in proposition P even if P is false