As modern military historians debate on the founder of military strategy, two military theorists emerge in the period after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War: the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz and the Swiss Antoine-Henri Jomini. In modern military philosophy, the theoretical traditions established by each of these military theorist has significantly impacted our military thinking and their teaching has become essential in the education of modern military leaders. Clausewitz and Jomini have become required reading for today's military professional officer. Frequently, these military theorists are often presented as opposite each other in terms of military theory; however, these two individuals are mere contemporaries who approached the study of war from two separate positions and for different ambitions: one an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of war and the other a reduction of war to a set of prescriptive techniques for the conduct of war. In this great debate, military historians suggest a schism within the annals of military theory in the use of the terms “Clausewitzian” and “Jominian.” While these unfair characterizations served little purpose in this debate, this essay will demonstrate that Carl von Clausewitz deserves the title of Father of Modern Military Strategy.
In modern military theory, the highest level is the strategic level, in which activities at the strategic level focus directly on policy objectives, both during peace and warfare. In the study of modern military strategy, there is a distinction between military strategy and national strategy, in which the former is the use of military objective to secure political objectives and the latter coordinates and concentrates all the elements of national...
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...f modern military strategy, thus establishing him as the Father of Modern Military Strategy.
Works Cited
De Jomini, Baron. The Art of War. Translated by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971.
Kuehn, John. “Jomini and The Art of War.” https://norwich.angellearning.com/section/content/ Default. asp?WCI=pgDisplay&WCU=CRSCNT&ENTRY_ID=26A395DC876D4EA18 EDDEB83D01B596F
Paret, Peter. “Clausewitz.” In Makers of Modern Strategy, From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, 186-213. Edited by Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Shy, John. “Jomini.” In Makers of Modern Strategy, From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, 143-185. Edited by Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
The comparison of German forces in France in 1943 versus 1944 provides a compelling argument that allied forces should have transitioned from defense to offense at a decisive point in Western France. Clausewitz states that, “A sudden powerful transition to the offensive - the flashing sword of vengeance - is the greatest moment for the defense” (Clausewitz, 370). Handel also emphasizes “timing is everything” in relation to the optimal transition from defense to offense (Handel, 190). The Americans and British did transition in 1943 to the offensive with the invasion of Sicily and the Italian campaign (Murray, 375). However, they did not capitalize on the opportunity in 1943 to attack the weaker German forces in France to brandish the “flashing sword of vengeance” that Clausewitz advocates.
Kagan, Donald. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. New York: Anchor Books Doubleday, 1995.
Murray, Williamson. "Germany’s Fatal Blunders." Military History 26.5 (2010): 28-35. Academic Search Complete. EBSCO. Web. 25 Apr. 2011.
War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, written by the talented author Chris Hedges, gives us provoking thoughts that are somewhat painful to read but at the same time are quite personal confessions. Chris Hedges, a talented journalist to say the least, brings nearly 15 years of being a foreign correspondent to this book and subjectively concludes how all of his world experiences tie together. Throughout his book, he unifies themes present in all wars he experienced first hand. The most important themes I was able to draw from this book were, war skews reality, dominates culture, seduces society with its heroic attributes, distorts memory, and supports a cause, and allures us by a constant battle between death and love.
...prevented conflict was important to evaluate. As well as examining solutions to the current situation he finds himself in. Using the lens of Machiavelli this loss of control could be better understood, allowing for a critical observation of why the events were unfolding.
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books, 1977.
Machiavelli discusses assertive and bold ideas in “The Prince,” revealing his radical and courageous nature. His treatise is deceptively self-soliciting, because he disguises his extreme notions behind a veil of feigned expertise. His frank approach makes him appear confident and deserving of the utmost respect; however, he cautiously humbles himself by pouring immense flattery for the ruling prince into his work and, in doing so, assures protection for himself and his notorious ideas.
In the Novel by Robert M. Epstein, his military background was identified and how he planned his attacks were broken down so that the average person could understand them. He was the individual who introduced the ideas of modern warfare to the global affairs. The de...
Maxwell, Hilary. “Warfare Plans of Countries.” Monta Vista High School, Cupertino. 26 Jan. 2014. Lecture.
Kich, Martin. "The Wars." Cyclopedia Of Literary Characters, Revised Third Edition (1998): 1. Literary Reference Center. Web. 9 Apr. 2014.
Carl von Clausewitz, “What is War?” On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 89-112. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region, the Argentineans attacked military objectives, while missing British centers of gravity. Because they failed to analyze the critical factors and capabilities of both the enemy and themselves, they were doomed to failure from the outset of the mission.
Holsti, K. J. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print.
The second chapter, The Text, of Griffith’s study focuses on the text itself. There has been debate about how many chapters were originally in “The Art of War”: Eighty-Two or Thirteen. (p. 13) Griffith gives a sound theory that the current thirteen chapters were the only writings. Based on copywriting errors, the eighty-two chapters were probably written into thirteen categories (or chapters) while trying to transcribe written work onto paper from silk or wood. Griffith also asserts that the text was used for entry-level war fighting studies in early Chinese military academies.
Strauss, Leo. Machiavelli’s Intention: The Prince . Ed. Leo Strauss. N.p., 1958. Web. 1 Dec. 2010. .