Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region, the Argentineans attacked military objectives, while missing British centers of gravity. Because they failed to analyze the critical factors and capabilities of both the enemy and themselves, they were doomed to failure from the outset of the mission. Vego defines the center of gravity as the “source of massed strength—physical or moral—or a source of leverage whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability to accomplish a given military objective.” (Vego, 2007). On the strategic level, a nation’s strength arises from its political, military, economic, and informational power. Nations use these powers against opponents to achieve political goals. Successful campaigns leverage a nation’s strengths against enemy’s weaknesses. By the fall of 1981, the Argentinean government under the leadership of General Galtieri and the military junta was experiencing a significant decrease of power. Economical... ... middle of paper ... ... M. (2000). The Vatican Mediation if the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building. In C. C. Conflict, M. C. Greenberg, J. H. Barton, & M. E. McGuinness (Eds.), Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict (pp. 293-320). New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Laver, R. C. (2001). The Falklands/Malvinas Case: Breaking the Deadlock in the Anglo-Argentine Sovereignty Dispute. Developments in International Law , 40, 66-71. Rock, D. (1987). Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alphonsín. Berkley: University of California Press. Scheina, R. L. (1987). Latin America: A Naval History 1810–1987. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. Vego, M. (2007). Joint Operational Warfare. Newport, RI: Naval War College. William, M. D. (2005). War Policy, Public Support, and the Media. Parameters , 121-134.
Anais Nin once said that “we write to taste life twice: in the moment and in retrospection.” In his book, Seven Myths of Spanish Conquest, Matthew Restall tries to change our perception of the past in other to open our eyes to what life was really like during the colonial period. As Restall puts it, the main propose of the book is to “illustrate the degree to which the Conquest was a far more complex and protracted affair” (p.154) than what was supposed in the latters and chronicles left by the conquistadores. Each one of Restall’s chapters examines one of seven myths regarding the mystery behind the conquest. By doing so, Matthew Restall forces us to look back at the Spanish conquest and question
Wilson, T. W. (n.d.). "Fourteen Points" Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. Retrieved April 14, 2011, from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp
War is the means to many ends. The ends of ruthless dictators, of land disputes, and lives – each play its part in the reasoning for war. War is controllable. It can be avoided; however, once it begins, the bat...
"Peacekeeping and Peacemaking." Reading and Remembrance . N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Jan. 2014. . (tags: none | edit tags)
Burns, E. B., & Charlip, J. A. (2007). Latin America: an interpretive history (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall.
After the revolution of 1943 Juan Perón shared control of the Argentinean government. Under Pedro Ramirez, Perón held three cabinet positions. With that he saw an opportunity. He did many reform programs and won a lot of the support of labor unio...
The War of the Triple Alliance is regarded as the bloodiest war in the history of Latin America, taking place from 1864 to 1870. In a seemingly uneven match up, the country of Paraguay took on an alliance of three countries: Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. Paraguay started this conflict under the rule of Francisco Solano López, the country’s dictator. What would make Fransisco Solano López, dictator of Paraguay, exponentially increase his military forces and attack an alliance of three countries, two of which are much larger than Paraguay? I will use operational code to study the dictator who started the war and examine reasons as to why he made such the rash and risky decision that he did. After examining Francisco Solano López’s operational code, I will delve into the topic of prospect theory to further evaluate the reasons for mobilizing a military and starting a war, and the risks involved with doing so. The topic of militarized interstate disputes, otherwise known as MIDs, will be the last subject I discuss in relation to the causes of the war, and I will explain his motives for the dispute as well as the motives of the opposition
...es’ constitutions, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, according to Wright, “pressed for the acceptance of its rulings in Argentine courts” (166). Not only international efforts, but also domestic efforts, to apply international jurisprudence to local courts were on the rise. For example, in 1995, CELS launched its “program for the application of international law to human right in local courts” based on the amendments to the Argentine constitution (Wright 166). Just as well, human rights lawyers pushed “courts to embrace the international principle that crimes against humanity cannot be amnestied” (Wright, 167). In sum, the International human rights lobby wanted each country to mold its human rights jurisprudence around the rulings of international human rights law, and domestic actors adopted the same goal.
In a recent verbal bout with my History of the Military Art professor, I contended that the true might of a nation may be inversely proportional to the size of its military during peacetime. My thinking, though perhaps idealistic, was that the maintenance of a large military during relative international tranquility is an overt admission of weakness and increases the likelihood of unnecessarily employing that force—it is contextually irrelevant. Instead, I proposed that a strong and stable economy is the best metric of national prowess, for such an economy can resource many opportunities as they arise. On the contrary, a robust standing military has a much narrower utility. To be sure, this author is not one that intentionally seeks to take an interdisciplinary approach to academia, but the connection seems relevant given the nature of this assignment. Whereas a nation may accomplish a strategic goal through military force, a leader may accomplish a task relying upon coercive power; whereas a nation may transform and develop the world through its economic strength and versatility, a versatile leader may transform others through the employment of one or many leader development principles—both theoretically based and experientially acquired. This piece serves to describe acquired PL499 course concepts and their relevance to my project team and the West Point Leader Development System (WPLDS). Only through a...
Jorge Videla was the leader of the military-run government. At the time, it was very easy for Videla to seize power because of the highly unstable condition that Argentina was in, and had been in for decades. In September of 1955 all three branches of the military revolted and forced the president, Juan Perón, into exile. Eleven years later, in 1966, a new leader, Juan Carlos Ongania, imposed the military rule again only to have the former president, Perón, return in 1973, and ...
Origins for the cooperation amongst powers necessary to tackle international disputes can be traced back to the 19th century, however the formation of the League of Nations was eagerly prompted by the First World War. After the horrors in which the world observed, leaders merged together and rejoiced in the potential for a new international system. The League of Nations foremost objective was to secure peace through collective efforts of ‘peace-loving’ powers (Steans, Pettiford, & Diez, 2005, p. 31). President Woodrow Wilson was a lead proponent in the creation of such a body, suggesting it- within his message on the Conditions of Peace- as a means of ‘affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike’ (Wilson, 1918). The following year a detailed scheme was presented at the Versailles Peace Conference and the league was swiftly established with the addition of a permanent secretariat in Geneva. (Catterall, 1999, p. 50). The League was very much considered the ‘most daring and innovative proposal’ (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 85)
Bethell, Leslie. The Cambridge History of Latin America Vol. III. Cambridge University Press, London, England. 1985.
Amongst military theorists and practitioners who studied war, its origin and implications, Carl von Clausewitz assumes a place among the most prominent figures. With his book On War, he demonstrated his capability to provide thorough historical analysis and conclusions of the conflicts in which he was engaged, and as a philosopher he reflected about all encompassing aspects of war. Today, Western armies conduct modern warfare in a dynamic environment composed of flexible and multiple threats in which civilians form a substantial part. Studying Clausewitz provides current military and political leadership useful insights to understand twenty-first century warfare. He explains the nature of war, provides an analytical tool to understand the chaos of warfare, and he argues for well educated and adaptable leadership capable of creative thinking. Although he died before his work was complete, his writing style was ambiguous and unclear at some moments, and current technology reduced some of his tactics obsolete, his work still arouses and inspires military and political strategists and analysts.
Holsti, K. J. Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print.
Both parties believed they had a rightful, historical claim over the Falkland Islands previous to 1982 when the conflict ensued. The United Kingdom’s justification was that an English explorer had been the first to set foot on and colonize the islands in 1690. Even when Argentinian inhabitants colonized the land in 1823, the British gradually replaced them and inhabited the land for over 150 years. In contrast, the Argentine’s claim rested on continuity from Spain, and on a 1771 Anglo-Spanish agreement where the British had made no claim of sovereignty (35). The modern history of this conflict began in 1965 with the UN’s involvement on the matter, but became prominent in 1981. The UN strongly advised that the two resolve the issue peacefully; paranoid reverberations from the Cold War were still universally existent at this time. Argentina and Britain both agreed that they did not want to combat; this was especially the case for Argentina, which was undergoing changes in power regime, and suffering from economic issues and a ...