Analysis Of Spinoza Solves The Mind-Body Concept

1372 Words3 Pages

Spinoza believes that the only way to differentiate two or more things is through the recognition of the modes which are different between them. It is not possible to distinguish between two apples by examining how they are both red and round, these attributes are similar, and you are therefore required to find a difference between them in order to draw any sort of distinction. Proposition five is the first major argument he presents, and that is the argument that two substances cannot share an attribute. In the process of trying to find a distinction between two objects we examine their modes which are sensible qualities about the object. However, because these sensible qualities are products of attributes there is in fact no real difference …show more content…

The mind-body problem which results from Descartes philosophy is solved by Spinoza monism, however the resulting implications and criticisms result in a theory which is no more solid than the one it attempted to replace. The problem of the missing link between extended and thinking substance has been solved, for Spinoza does provide a logical account of the relation between mind and body through his monism. It must be noted that the solution he has provided in monism may solve the mind-body problem specifically; however it carries a number of implications and subsequent criticisms that deeply question the validity of monism itself, and defeat his argument. Dualism has the problem of connection between mind and body, versus monism which has the problem of connection between mind and body, but also every other attribute. Spinoza’s monism posits that God is the only substance and that extension and though are attributes of God, amongst his many other infinite attributes. Spinoza makes a connection between thought and extension in that they are parallel in their modes resulting in a crossing over between the two, which gives the mind the perception that it has a body, as well as perceiving the rest of the modes of extension. The problem with this is that God is a being with infinite attributes, extension and thought being only two of them. Spinoza focuses on these two attributes alone, yet they only represent two of an infinite series of attributes. The problem that this raises then is if God has infinite attributes, and thought can create the idea of a supposedly extended human body with thought, why is it that the thought does not perceive any other attribute? It stands to reason that if thought can impose itself in the attribute of extension, then it should therefore be able to encompass any other number of attributes. This carries two implications that are problematic for Spinoza: first, if

Open Document