Advertising Case Summary

Statement of Facts
Friends since college, Mr. Slater and Mr. Morris are top salespersons at a car dealership; both were recently in competition for a promotion to Assistant Sales Manager along with a third top salesperson, Kelly Kapowski. On Monday August 25, sales manager Brett Belding informed Mr. Slater that his interview was cancelled citing that Mr. Slater was not “manager material,” and referenced Mr. Slater’s behavior via Facebook as irresponsible.
Mr. Slater often used Facebook for marketing his car sales but never connected with Mr. Belding. Mr. Morris and Mr. Slater often logged into each other’s Facebook accounts to play pranks on each other. When Mr. Slater confronted Mr. Morris on the issue of a “friend request” sent to Mr. Belding, Mr. Morris admitted to sending the request the previous Saturday

Slater’s case likely satisfies the other subelement of use to “harm the reputation, property, person, or estate of the individual.” WIS. STAT. § 943.201 (2) (c). As discussed in the section on subelement (A), the court has ruled that the word “harm” here refers to the “intent to harm” that “may be inferred from conduct.” State v. Peck, 315 Wis.2d 769 ¶ 12-13. Mr. Morris’s use of Mr. Slater’s information, his “friend request” to Mr. Belding with full knowledge of the risks to Mr. Slater’s reputation and employment opportunities (i.e., due to inappropriate photos on his Facebook account that would be visible to Mr. Belding), shows that Mr. Morris possessed the “intent to harm” Mr. Slater’s reputation. A counter to this intent claim could arise from the past use of each other’s Facebook access to play pranks. However, in this specific case of Mr. Morris engaging Mr. Slater’s boss via Facebook from Mr. Slater’s account, a reasonable person could assume his intent to harm Mr. Slater given the potential for Mr. Morris benefitting from the harmed reputation. Because of this, the second subelement, and, therefore, the second element as a whole is likely