Weltpolitik: Calculated Policy or Haphazard Folly? A paper examining the question, “Was Germany’s Weltpolitik a violation of the unwritten rules of European Diplomacy? I. Thesis Germany’s Weltpolitik was a clear violation of the status quo and thus the unwritten rules of European diplomacy as Kaiser Wilhelm II ruined Anglo-German relations, spent more than the German economy could handle, and aggressively tested international alliances. II. Bismarck’s Decline The start of Weltpolitik began when Otto von Bismarck ended his absolutist reign as German Chancellor in 1890 . Bismarck’s break with Kaiser Wilhelm II came after a prosperous and powerful term as Chancellor under Kaiser Wilhelm I. In fact, Kaiser Wilhelm II was only on the throne for two years before Bismarck realized their differences were too great and submitted his resignation . After establishing a unified Germany after several continental crises, Bismarck retreated to conservatism and preservation of the established order . Bismarck had isolated a revolutionary France, pinned Russian interests against British policy in the deteriorated Ottoman Empire, and propped up the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the refortified Dual Alliance3. All of these measures were calculated and precisely timed thanks to Bismarck’s uncanny political capabilities. Wilhelm II’s forced dismissal of Bismarck signaled the end of rational negotiations with all the great world powers, but also the beginning of the pursuit to win over the British as a lasting ally3. Bismarck’s successor was a different kind of Chancellor, a man who would share the responsibility of German statesmanship with Kaiser Wilhelm II. A grandson to Queen Victoria of Great Britain, Wilhelm II was not co... ... middle of paper ... ...2003. Feuchtwanger, Edgar. Imperial Germany 1850-1918. London: Routledge, 2001. Menning, Ralph. The Art of the Possible: Documents on Great Power. 1996. Probert, Paul. Our Natural Ally: Anglo-German Relations and the Contradictory agendas of Wilhelmine Socialism, 1897-1900. New York: Berghan Books, 2003. Retallack, James N. Germany in the age of Kaiser Wilhelm II. New York: Macmillan St. Martin's Press, 1996. Rohl, John C. Wilhelm II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Strandmann, H, Geoff Eley, and James N Retallack. Wilhelmism and its legacies; German modernities, Imperialism, and the meanings of reform, 1890-1930. New York: Berghahn Books, 2003. Thackeray, Frank W. Events that changed Germany. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2004. Williamson, D.G. Bismarck and Germany 1862-1890. Essex: Longman Group Limited, 1986.
Research will be drawn from many sources including several historical studies and online articles. The sources used revolve around Bismarck's attitudes and actions toward German unification and general policy. Sources include works by historians A.J.P. Taylor and James Wycliffe Headlam. The policies of Bismarck during the interwar period were researched as well, through several scholastic journals and written works.
In the late 1800s, Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck used different strategical plans in order to gain as much power possible, the majority of the plans consisted of him taking advantage of the different political parties. Bismarck used many traditional political strategies in order to gain the power he craved for, such as creating harsh laws and prohibiting certain beliefs or ideas. Unfortunately, these strategies did not satisfy the people, so Bismarck later started to increase the welfare of the working class, apologized to the Socialists, and did much more to obtain more political strength which eventually created a new conservatism. In an effort to increase political power for the Kaiser, Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck uses liberal and traditional
Hagen W (2012). ‘German History in Modern Times: Four Lives of the Nation’. Published by Cambridge University Press (13 Feb 2012)
The biographical approach to German unification in Bruce Waller’s Bismarck leaves the reader without much information on the European political picture as a whole and by no means provides a plethora of information on many of the political power players outside of Bismarck’s Germany. For example, Waller’s approach to Bismarck’s economic foreign policy is clearly lacking an explanation of outside factors, and those factors of the European economic situat...
The historical field concerning the Weimar Republic, Germany's parliamentary government during the interwar years, is not only an extremely sophisticated area of study, but an extremely competitive one as well. In the early eighties, a much heated and unprecedented scholarly dispute arose surrounding The Collapse of the Weimar Republic, written by David Abraham - at the time, a fledgling historian and assistant professor at Princeton University. Nazi seizure of power from the Weimar Republic has long intrigued scores of historians. Various models have been constructed in an attempt to explain how an entity such as the Nazi movement came to power over such an industrially, culturally, and socially advanced society such as Germany's (Notes from Jamie van Hook 2/14).
The Songerweg emphasizes the particular model of history that Germany, unlike other Western countries, has gone through. Specifically, ‘proponents of this concept emphasize the peculiarities of German history, such as political institutions, social structures, or mentalities and experience, usually in comparison with other Western countries, to demonstrate the unique course of German history’ (Buse & Doerr, 1998, p. 934). Although initially the theory of Sonderweg viewed the characteristics of German historical development as positive, the situation has changed after the World War II. Specifically, in the 19th and early 20th centuries historians applied the Sonderweg model to stress a focus on the role of strong central state and military as the driving force of the development of the country (Buse & Doerr, 1998). In addition to this, historians regarded social reforms in Germany that were made from ‘above’ rather than being the outcomes of revolution to be a positive feature that depicted German state in a favorable way. Finally, the historical school viewed the course of German industrialization and culture as superior to similar processed in the rest of Western European
After Bismarck's dismissal the Kaiser and his advisers were convinced that the most likely wars in Europe were Germany against France of Austria-Hungary against Russia and in neither case could Russia and Germany be on the same side because of the existing alliances. This meant the rupture of the Russo-German friendship and the starting point were the two fronts that battled in the Great War started to shape up. Another example of a failed attempt of alliance was that of with Britain. Kaiser Wilhelm inherited her mother's admiration for English liberalism and the accepted view of English pre-eminence while keeping his father's strict Prussian military code of behaviour.
Many historians in the period 1970 – 2000 attempted to write a complete account of the Weimar republic and very few succeeded, however, E.J Feuchtwanger’s ‘From Weimar to Hitler’ published in 1993 is one of the most successful overviews published. Feuchtwanger excellently examines the high politics of the Weimar re...
As the final days of World War One slowly drudged through the month of November, a war torn Europe left separated and waiting to be picked up and pasted back together. An astonishing number of thirty-eight million dead between the Allied Powers and the Central Powers during a war that took over four years to come to an end. The main players during 1914 - 1918 were Britain and Germany, however this rivalry did not begin simply because of World War One and all the logistics of those four years. This essay is not to address the events of World War One, but to however explain what caused them. The lead up to the world’s first “World War” is a story of Europe’s heavyweight title fight, in one corner the English, boasting a huge naval fleet and looking to be the face of Europe. In the other corner, Germany, led by Kaiser Wilhelm II was fueled and willing to go at whatever cost necessary to back up their Triple Alliance member Austria-Hungary. This was not the first time the English and Germans had become involved with one another. England’s first diplomatic relations with Germany began with an alliance between Ethelberht of Kent and Charibert I. These marriages between the two countries were sporadic, however this is where relations began. Enlgand had been on top of Europe for quite sometime,
...to win this continental war, if it was to come to that. They also in turn had the belief that ‘France may panic, and advise peace’. This would have been a diplomatic win in the German’s books. This would have ‘split Russia from France and isolate both without war’. Although this second point was believed to be unlikely by the German’s it still was a happy, and reassuring possibility. Fischer then went on to say that Hollweg told Bulow that any war that was to occur would last at the most three to four months. Hollweg then went on to explain the possibilities of a ‘friendly relationship’ with England, and then through England, a similar friendship with France. He then stated that this would bring forth a triple alliance with England, France, and Germany all extinguishing the existence of Russia, which would easily threaten the civilization of Europe. Fischer then concludes his essay in Hollweg’s address to the Central Committee of the Reichstag at the beginning of October during the ever increasing debate on the unlimited submarine warfare. Fischer states that, “ … this outlines Germany’s real guilt, her constant over-estimation of her own powers, and her misjudgment of realities.”
Treitschke, Heinrich. “History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century and Historical and Political Writings.” The Human Record. By Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield. Vol. 2. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2011. 2 vols. 292-295.
The “German” nation, before it even became known as Germany, had undergone a period of transition from its inherited culture as a result of the French invasion and the Napoleonic wars. There was a sense that the German cultur...
Fulbrook, Mary. A Concise History of Germany. 2nd ed. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Print.
The German nation was born in January 1871 at the Palace of Versailles. Many factors have been noted by historians as to what led to the eventual unification of Germany such as; economic and industrial factors and the role of Otto Von Bismarck. A debate that has emerged over German Unification is whether it was united by ‘coal and iron’ or ‘blood and iron’; this looks at whether economic or political factors were the main driving force behind unification. In this essay I will explore these factors and gain an understanding of how these factors contributed to German Unification and come to a decision as to whether it was a nation unified by economic
After years of trying to unify as one nation and countless failures, the German people now believed that they themselves were among the superior races of the world and it was Germany’s destiny to become the greatest nation the world had ever seen. Under Bismarck’s rule the economy boomed. The German Industrial Complex, powered by its heavy war production, made many men and the nation itself very wealthy. This wealth and prosperity led to an intoxicating feeling among its people, a feeling that they were the next great world