Faithful and Fruitful Logic
Appropriate for a conference relating philosophy and education, we seek ways more faithful than the truth-functional (TF) hook to understand and represent that ordinary-language conditional which we use in, e.g., modus ponens, and that conditional’s remote and counterfactual counterparts, and also the proper negations of all three. Such a logic might obviate the paradoxes caused by T-F representation, and be educationally fruitful. William and Martha Kneale and Gilbert Ryle assist us: "In the hypothetical case in which p, it is inferable, on the basis that p and at least in the given context, that q." "Inferable" is explained. This paraphrase is the foundation of the logic of hypothetical inferability ("HI logic").
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–q’ comes out even more clearly in relation to Lemmon’s claim (Beginning Logic, p.61) that it is a logical truth that either if it is raining then it is snowing or if it is snowing then it is raining. Again the negation is crucial; deny the symbolic representation of that supposed logical truth and you doubly contradict yourself, with p . –q . q . –p. But will any educated person (not already imbued with symbolic logic) who is aware how few of the infinite range of imaginable conditionals are true accept that, as a matter of logic, at least one of any pair of statements representable by ‘If p then q’ and ‘If q then p’ must be true? No: for such persons will agree that conditionals are not properly asserted merely on the strength of knowledge, or of belief, that –p, or that q, nor properly denied by categorical statements of the form ‘p . …show more content…
Consider the simplest case of hypothetical syllogism. Let us number the premises after a capital P, write ‘Con’ and ‘NCon’ for the conclusion and its negation, C for ‘Compatible with’ and I for ‘Incompatible with’. Let us also write S for ‘Subjunct’ for anything we can join on underneath because we could infer it if we supposed to be true both the NCon and a premise, or both that conjunction and a further premise, and so on (we can number subjuncts if we have more than one). Thus we
The argument posited by Sider (S1) can be seen as an argument by elimination, where the premises if accepted, reject the possibility of S2 and S3. As such, the argument suffers from whether the re...
ABSTRACT: In what follows, I give (following Burton Dreben) a dialectical reading of his dismissal of metaphysics and of Wittgenstein's objections to Russell in 1913. I argue that Wittgenstein must be read as advocating no particular theory or doctrine — that is, philosophy is an activity and not a body of truths. Furthermore, this insistence is thoroughgoing. Put differently, a dialectical reading must be applied to one's own thought and talk. Characteristically, this sort of dialectical philosophy begins with the question, Is there any definiteness to what I am doing in my own thinking and speaking? Such a question undercuts the easy assumption that what we are doing may be expressed in a body of meaningful statements. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein does not advocate any particular theory of language. A common reading of Wittgenstein is that he aims to prevent us from misusing language. This view assumes that, for Wittgenstein, the notion of a correct, acceptable or meaningful use of language may be taken for granted. In my view, Wittgenstein does not take the notions of use of language and grammar and its misuse for granted. For Wittgenstein grammar underdetermines what it is to use or misuse language. I argue that an ethical critique is implicit in Wittgenstein's objections to any attempt to speak a priori about language and thought.
During a time of great tribulations, each colonist would be forced to chose a side. Their options were either to fight for their rights and freedom or stay loyal to the royal monarchy of Britain. Both sides had support from people of great power. Two men by the names of Thomas Paine and James Chalmers wrote to defend their position and influence others to do the same with pamphlets titled Common Sense and Plain Truth, respectively. After reading, re-reading and analyzing both of the documents, it is clear that each hold debatable arguments, however, when pinned against each other and set side by side, Common Sense holds more power and influence, whereas Plain Truth highlights greater intellectual and logical arguments.
In this paper I intend to analyze logically this proposition, trying to focus the question of contradiction.
Culver, Keith Charles. Readings in the philosophy of law. 1999. Reprint. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2008. Print.
The aim of this essay is to differentiate between law and morality, and to discuss whether there is an overlap between the two concepts. I will be making reference to theorists of both positive law and natural law, namely H. L. A Hart and Lon L. Fuller respectively and compare the two views on the above question. For the purpose of understanding, I will apply the two theories to the legal system in Nazi Germany.
These statements assert that the negative ( or contradictory) of an alternative proposition is a conjunction which the conjuncts are the contradictions of the corresponding alternants. That the negative of a conjunctive is an alternative proposition in which the alternants are the contradictories of the corresponding conjuncts.
Firstly, I shall expound the verification principle. I shall then show that its condition of significant types is inexhaustible, and that this makes the principle inapplicable. In doing so, I shall have exposed serious inconsistencies in Ayer's theory of meaning, which is a necessary part of his modified verification principle.
Although most people know what homelessness is and it occurs in most societies, it is important to define because the forces of displacement vary greatly, along with the arrangement and meaning of the resulting transient state. The Stewart B McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 defined a homeless person as “an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate night-time residence or a person who resides in a shelter, welfare hotel, transitional program or place not ordinarily used as a regular sleeping accommodation, such as streets, cars, movie theaters, abandoned buildings, etc.” Resent surveys conducted in the U.S. have confirmed that the homeless population in America is extremely diverse and includes representatives from all segments of society, including: the old and young, men and women, single people and families, city dwellers and rural residents, whites and people of color, employed and unemployed, able workers and people with serious health problems. The diversity among people that are homeless reflects how difficult it is to generalize the causes of homelessness and the needs of homeless people. Robert Rosenheck M.D., the author of Special Populations of Homeless Americans, explains the importance of studying homelessness based on subgroups, “each subgroup [of homeless people] has unique service needs and identifying these needs is critical for program planning and design.” Despite these diversities, homelessness is a devastating situation for all that experience it. Not only have homeless people lost their dwelling, but they have also lost their safety, privacy, control, and domestic comfort.
He then defines the following. A proposition is part of an enunciation. If it’s dialectical, it assumes the part indifferently, if it’s demonstrative, it lays down one part and definitely excludes the other. Enunciation denotes either part of a contradiction. A contradiction is an opposition that contains an affirmation and a negation. An immediate basic truth of syllogism is a thesis. Something a student must know to know anything else is an axiom. If a thesis asserts, it’s a hypothesis, otherwise it’s a definition.
The relationship between law and morality has been argued over by legal theorists for centuries. The debate is constantly be readdressed with new cases raising important moral and legal questions. This essay will explain the nature of law and morality and how they are linked.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus evolved as a continuation of and reaction to Bertrand Russell and G Frege’s conceptions of logic, which Russell has left unexplained. Wittgenstein developed a theory of language that was designed to explain the nature of logical necessity. For Wittgenstein, a factual proposition is true or false with no third alternative. He endorses a ‘picture’ theory of meaning: propositions are meaningful insofar as they ‘picture’ facts or states of affairs: if their structure mirrors the structure of the world. The book addresses the central problems of philosophy which deals with the world, language and thought, and proposes a solution to these problems which is grounded in logic and in the nature of representation. Language, thought and reality share a common logical structure, so understanding the structure of the language allows u...
Chomsky, N. (2000). Knowledge of language: Its mature, origin and use. In R. J. Stainton (Ed.), Perspectives in the philosophy of language: A concise anthology (pp. 3-44). Peterborough: Broadview Press.
6. Behavior under Negation: Since conventional implicatures are independent from at-issue meaning, and are (almost) always ‘speaker oriented’, they normally survive under negation, in if-clauses,