Problems about Scientific Explanation
Have you ever thought about the way your car works? The inner works of the engine, how does the fuel make it work, how does combustion lead to movement and is then passed to the wheels? If you have, what are you going to answer an 8-year-old kid when he asks: 'Why does the car move?'; Are you going to start explaining high school physics, mechanics, chemistry of combustion and the concept of friction? Or are you just going to say: 'Well, the car eats up gas, and that makes the engine move the wheels.'; Granted, the latter doesn't explain much about what a car is. But it answers the question by the kid's understanding, doesn't it? The question is answered, the kid is happy, and you did not have to spend a few weeks introducing what you just said. Some may argue that this is misleading, but despite the fact that when viewed generally, the simple answer might seem false or incomplete, in the context of the situation, it is quite adequate. That is what van Fraassen is trying to say with regard to scientific explanation.
According to him, there are two problems about scientific explanation. Both are very easily seen in our example. The first is, when is something explained? Some argue that we should not explain a phenomenon unless we have the full, unifying, true-to-the-last-miniscule-detail explanation, which will also cover all the cases which correspond to our case, cases similar to our case, or distant variants of our case. In short, what they want is a theory of everything, which in itself is a noble goal, but is hardy achievable. Let's face it, everything in our universe is connected in one way or another, or through one another, to everything else in it. A man bears definite connection to, for instance, 'gas giant'; type of planets. A reason for that could be, for example, that both share some mutual chemical elements. Does that mean that same theory should apply to prediction of man's movement as to a gas giant movement? As ridiculous as it sounds, this type of proposition often arises in science, though not as grotesque, but nevertheless as distant, for example, Theory of Relativity and the Quantum Theory. If a child would have been told to expect the same behavior from and ant and from and elephant, he would be quite confused. How do we then expect gigantic objects to obey the same rules as microscopic ones? W...
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...yone would go into the chemical components causing the green color of the apple's skin, unless asked about it. Demonstrations, however, are proofs, and while also answering 'why'; questions, relate the causes to the essence of the phenomena, otherwise the proof is incomplete. A good example of this distinction would be the application of a simple logic rule (also known as De Morgan law), that (~A and ~B) is ~(A or B) and vice versa. We can say that ~(P and ~Q) is (~P or Q) because of De Morgan law, and that is sufficient for an explanation. Yet, if we were to rigorously demonstrate this without any initial assumptions, we would have to prove De Morgan law while at it, or our proof would be incomplete.
To conclude, Van Fraassen's idea of explanation is that which has no place in purely theoretical science, as he rejects the truth of theories as well ass their appeal to essence. An explanation's domain, according to him, is to be adequate in the context chosen by pragmatic factors, which are derived from the 'why'; question the explanation is called to answer. Surely, van Fraassen would not doubt for a second what to answer the kid who asked what is the reason his car moves.
However, David Hume, succeeds in objecting this argument by claiming that the experience is a necessary factor for understanding the creation of the universe. Lastly, I argued that Paley’s argument was not sufficient for proving God’s existence with the argument by design because we cannot assume the world will comply and work the way we wish
We don’t have to explain about how do the objects works because we know the purpose of the objects are designed like that. For example, we know the purpose of the hair dryer which it is use to blow dry our hair. Therefore you do not need any physics principle to explain to use it, in fact you just have to press the start button to use the hair dryer.
Popper asserts that "it is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory--if we look for confirmations." Kuhn illustrates (page 6), in his discussion of cosmologies, that man needs a structure for his universe. Man needs to explain the physical relation between his personal habitat and nature in order to feel at home. Explaining this relation gives meaning to his actions.
The unificationist account of explanation and the notion of ad hoc-ness as posited by Popper are very similar concepts, but there is a nuance between the two that is worth explaining. Although both notions seem to show why we choose certain explanatory theories over others, they differ in that the model of unification shows us what type of theory we should accept, while Popper’s notion of ad hoc-ness shows us what type of theory to reject. Together, these concepts help us better understand the explanatory model of unification which leads us to a better understanding of why we are inclined to accept certain scientific theories over others. In this paper, I will attempt to show that falsifying theories based on Popper’s ad hoc-ness criteria strengthens the idea of unification by giving people a more specific way of eliminating competing scientific theories in search of the most unified one. First, I will briefly describe the unificationist account of explanation, then I will explain the idea of ad hoc-ness as laid out by Popper, and finally I will show how ad hoc-ness can be used to strengthen the account of unification by means of increasing its objectivity and by providing simpler explanations.
...e philosophical principles and method such as cause and effect, time and place, essence, substance, matter and form. The third part examines the nature of motion, both linear and circular, and includes an examination of the concepts of acceleration and of the geometrical properties of lines, angles, circles, etc. The fourth part is physics or the what is known as the phenomena of nature and deals with sense experience and memory which are the two sources of knowledge of fact. IN addition it included the pleasure and pain, which are the causes of animal movement, the motions of heavenly bodies, heat and cold, sound and light, and gravity. Many people at Oxford disagreed with his work because they believe that they were much better mathematicians than him.
Yin and Yang: the Nature of Scientific Explanation in a Culture. ABSTRACT: I explore the nature of scientific explanation in a culture centering on the doctrine of yin and yang combined with that of five phrases, wu-hsing (YYFP). I note how YYFP functions as an alternative to the causal way of thinking, as well as the meaning of scientific explanation in a culture.
In a present day conference on whether physics can provide valuable, genuine knowledge of the world, two people sit, listening attentively. Both people are deep in thought about their own theories on the subject. One, David Hume, shakes his head in outright denial. While most those in the conference are in agreement that physics can, indeed, provide genuine knowledge, he contends that physics and mathematics provide nothing at all. In fact, he thinks to himself, only things that can be divvied up into various sensory impressions provide genuine knowledge and, since mathematics and sciences cannot (particularly because they rely on causal relationships) they are essentially a waste of time.
In the essay “Studies In the Logic of Explanation”, Carl Hempel attempts to break down scientific explanation into its fundamental components in pursuit of defining what it means to explain a phenomenon scientifically. In doing so, he proposes a set of rigorous criteria that he believes constitute a true explanation. He starts by separating an explanation “into two major constituents, the explanandum and the explanans” (136). The explanandum is the phenomenon that is to be explained, while the explanans represent a series of statements which “account for the phenomenon” (137). According to Hempel, the explanans can be further subdivided into particular antecedent conditions and certain general laws which can be combined in such a way to
For instance, his view is strong in the way that utilizes empiricism to provide a skeptical insight on causality. It is refreshing to see an alternative perspective such as empiricism after reading Descartes and Leibniz. Yet, his use of empiricism may be his downfall as well, since even he states “simple ideas are not always…derived from the correspondent impressions.” Also, his argument that thought is bounded senses and experiences do not take into account metaphysical concepts like malleability.
In summary he remarks that the ground of knowledge is a demonstrative syllogism and the ground of that syllogism is premises so we must know (be convinced of) the primary premises better than the conclusion. Nothing can be better known to a man who seeks knowledge through demonstration than the basic truths.
“Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism” is Bas van Fraassen’s attack on the positive construction of science. He starts by defining scientific realism as the goal of science to provide a “literally true story of what the world is like;” and the “acceptance of a scientific theory” necessitates the “belief that it is true”. This definition contains two important attributes. The first attribute describes scientific realism as practical. The aim of science is to reach an exact truth of the world. The second attribute is that scientific realism is epistemic. To accept a theory one must believe that it is true. Van Fraassen acknowledges that a “literally true account” divides anti-realists into two camps. The first camp holds the belief that science’s aim is to give proper descriptions of what the world is like. On the other hand, the second camp believes that a proper description of the world must be given, but acceptance of corresponding theories as true is not necessary.
The Deductive-Nomological (D-N) Model gives an account of explanation through its basic form, the Covering Law Model. The D-N Model asks the basic question “What is a scientific explanation?” The aim of this paper is to answer that question and further develop the definition of an explanation by problematizing the D-N Model’s account of explanation, providing a solution to one of those problems, and then further problematizing that solution. By examining the details of an example that the D-N Model explains well, we can see why this model was popular in the first place before describing two of its major problems. Then, by looking at Wesley Salmon’s account of scientific explanation, we can see just how problematic the flaws in the D-N Model
‘… To obtain something resembling a scientific handle on the concept of information we need to begin with a clear picture of what we are observing. Physics is concerned with physical bodies of all kinds, their properties and their behaviour. We do not have to define the concept of a body in so many words because we can show a person so many concrete examples that he can learn to use the word ‘body’ as competently as we do ourselves. Similarly, we can start our exploration of information by using the concept of a sign. We might tell someone that a sign is any physical object, event, or property of an object or event which can stand for something else. But we do not leave it at that. We show them hundreds of diverse examples until they know what a sign is by ostensive definition (that is, by demonstration). In this way we escape the tyranny of a verbal regression into the domain of practical, concrete action.
Question No. 5 “No knowledge can be produced by a single way of knowing.” Discuss.