United States Cyber Command is less than four years old. The merger and stand down of the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) and the Joint task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) formed the bulk of the new organization. 9 This new construct integrated offensive and defensive cyber capabilities in one organization resulting in efficient and effective planning and execution of cyberspace operations. United States Cyber Command is tasked with operations to defend DOD information networks and to conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations across all domains. 10 United States Cyber Command is also tasked with ensuring US freedom of action in cyberspace and denying freedom of actions to our adversaries. This freedom of action requires a clear relationships to reach full potential. In a GAO report to congress on July, 2011 we find the following: DoD has assigned authorities and responsibilities for implementing cyber operations among combatant commands and military services; however, the supporting relationships necessary to achieve command and control of cyber operations remain unclear. According to the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, we can achieve cyberspace superiority only if command and control relationships are clearly defined. 11 The goal of reaching full potential in cyberspace operations starts with building close relationships between the cyber service components and finding the best way to support the GCCs. This process underway and is constantly reevaluated. The formation of USCYBERCOM was important. It elevates cyberspace in the mind of the warrior and in the consideration of the planner. If the desire is to operationalize cyber it needs to m... ... middle of paper ... ...of how much improvement the next evolution will bring. Works Cited 11 United States Government Accountability Office: Report to Congressional Requesters, “Defense Department Cyber Efforts: DoD Faces Challenges in Its Cyber Activities”, US Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, May 2011, page 6, http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321818.pdf 12 Andrew Fecikert, “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress”. Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, www.crs.gov, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf, page 15 13 Joint Publication 3-05, “Special Operations”, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, April 18, 2011, page III-2 14 Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “U.S. Regional Commanders get New Cyber Muscle”, Defensenews.com, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120609/DEFREG02/306090001/, June 9, 2012
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-1.
This document will outline the policies and practices to be used and implemented in compliance with DoD specifications and standards for the contract of services to be provided to them. This report will consist of creating security controls based on auditing frameworks within the seven domains. Also to develop information assurance (IA) plan, a list of the requirements for each of the seven domains.
The first failure experienced during the operations was that US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was an incomplete geographic combatant command (GCC). AFRICOM was established in 2008 as a new kind of geographic combatant command (GCC), one foc...
The complexities inherent to Command and Control (C2) of a large homogeneous armed force can be overwhelming even to the most experienced. Adding other countries’ leadership, experience, requirements, training and tactics to a combined and multi-lateral endeavor adds even more complexity to unity of command and control, not to mention all other functional requirements. This essay will evaluate the deficiencies associated with the joint functions during Operation Husky using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, understanding, and mutual trust. It will also evaluate two additional joint functions, intelligence and movement and maneuver, for an Allied force that was created to deliver an Axis defeat
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
USCYBERCOM unifies the command of the cyberspace efforts and units of the United States military. The United States Department of Defense also has outlined the principles that form its cyber defense strategy, building and maintaining ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations, defend the DoD information network, secure DoD data, and mitigate risks to DoD missions. Be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital interests from disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of significant consequence. Build and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use those options to control conflict escalation and to shape the conflict environments at all stages. Build and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter shared threats and increase international security and stability. The five pillars of cyber security, confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, and authentication. Protecting information from disclosure to unauthorized individuals, systems or entities, Protect information, systems, and services from unauthorized modification or destruction, Timely, reliable access to data and information services by authorized users, the ability to correlate a recorded action with its originating individual or entity, and the ability to verify the identity of an individual or entity
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mission Command White Paper (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 April 2012),pg 3
President Obama has realized the seriousness of the upcoming threats and turned the government focus more toward defending the information and communications infrastructure and In May 2009, he issued a request from top to bottom review of the current situation. The report titled the Cyberspace Policy Review includes strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in cyberspace. According the white house’s cybersecurity foreign policy, the Cyberspace Policy Review highlighted two objectives and ten near-term actions to support the cybersecurity strategy.
The U.S. Government authorized USAFRICOM to plan kinetic operations with the involvement of multinational coalition forces across Africa. With the unrest and protests across Northern Africa, the U.S. Government authorized USAFRICOM to stand up its Joint Task Forces; these task forces would conduct offensive and defensive operations while protecting American and Allied nation civilians. Some of the offensive and defensive operations would consist of air and maritime actions. These task forces would also aid USAFRICOM in the transition of other nation’s leadership to operate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
It is unrealistic to imagine that the copious amount of departments responsible for cybersecurity are able to adequately protect the country; therefore, the government needs to form one department that can be responsible for all cybersecurity problems and cyberattacks. When forming this new department, resources from other groups that currently share responsibility can be moved in order to decrease the amount of resources needed for the new group. But, it is also unfathomable for the government to be responsible for all cybersecurity as “... the reality is that while the lion’s share of the cybersecurity expertise lies in the federal government, more than 90 percent of the physical infrastructure of the Web is owned by private industry” (McConnell 4). Therefore the government must collaborate with the private sector. This cooperation can be utilized to help form the new government group as “there is also an opportunity for the new agency to be formed in a more deliberate way, drawing on leadership from the private economy to promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness” (Cohen 2). By working with the private sector, the new agency can reduce costs of personnel and equipment, increase performance, and maintain diverse cybersecurity plans. Once a
United States Executive Office of the President. (2009). Cyber space policy review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure. (pp. 1-38). Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf
The Defense Department made an admission of the first major cyber attack upon its systems in August 2010. It was revealed that the attack actually took place in 2008 and was accomplished byplacing a malicious code into the flash drive of a U.S. military laptop. “The code spread undetected on both classified and unclassified systems, establishing what amounted to a digital breachhead.” (2) This quote , attributed to then Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III , is just part of the shocking revelations that were disclosed in his speech made on July 14, 2011. Lynn said that...
It is asserted in an article the battlefield of cyber space: the inevitable new military branch-the cyber force by Natasha Solce. In this article she has analyzed cyberspace as future battlefield she stressed on the need of plans which include amendments in constitution, establishing a cyber-force and strictked security measures to tackle cyber terrorism. She points out different events which held only because of the mismanagement by security institutions. She investigated that 8th US Air force was designed as the most modern operational force against the cyber terrorist. She concludes that terrorist may instigate more vulnerable attacks in future if they are not dealt with priority (Solce, 2008).
Today the U.S. military operates a Joint C2 structure, divided into geographical areas as G...