Just War Theory as Applied to Operation Just Cause

Since its inception as a country in 1776 the United States has carried a tainted record in conducting just operations involving regime changes to achieve the goal of timely creating a minimally just political community. For example, on one hand the U.S. has been a part of one of the most just, successful, and commendable regime changes in history when they helped defeat and reconstruct Japan and Germany after World War II. On the other hand the U.S. has been a part of one of the worst and unjust operations conducted in history involving Cuba and the Bay of Pigs invasion. Between these two extremes there are many other operations which focused on the goal to change a regime where their rightness has been called into question based on one or more aspects of the just war theory. Just war theory is explained best by author, Brian Orend, and states that, “sometimes, it is at least morally permissible for a political community to go to war and features a goal to restrain both the incidence and destructiveness of war” (Orend, 31). One of these operations where the rightness of the invasion was called into question is Operation Just Cause.

Operation Just Cause was the invasion of Panama by the United States in December of 1989. The operation was spearheaded by President George H. W. Bush and its goal was to replace the current leader of Panama, General Noriega, with the rightfully elected new leader, Guillermo Endara. Manuel Noriega had close ties with the United States throughout the years by serving as an informant and asset to the U.S. against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. His efforts included sabotaging the Soviet supported governments in both El Salvador and Nicaragua, which helped reduce Soviet control in Central America (...

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... to war under jus ad bellum, the question must be answered as to whether the United States followed the principles of jus in bello, which is adhering to the right conduct in the midst of battle (Orend, 105). Jus in bello is divided into two types of rules—internal and external, and the responsibility of following these rules rests in the hands of a state’s armed forces, rather than its political leaders. Internal rules concern how a state during war should treat its own citizens, while external rules concern how a state should conduct itself in the midst of war regarding the enemy state and its civilians (Orend, 106). In assessing if the U.S. followed the principles of jus in bello, a focus will be placed on the external rules rather than the internal rules because the invasion was not a serious war and was ultimately limited to one day that was limited to Panama.