wickard v filburn

The Wagner Act was established in order to fix inequality issues in labor contracts, where people were not able to fully organize into labor unions, nor have the ability to fully bargain their wages. The Wagner Act, according to Cushman, was not revolutionary due to the fact that, the Wagner Act didn’t actually bring anything new, legislative wise, besides altering interpretations of previous court opinions on matters, such as the issues pertaining to the Railway Labor Act, nor did the act break the barriers of regulating what is not interstate commerce; making Wickard v Filburn so revolutionary, the regulation of what isn’t interstate commerce.
Cushman believes that the Wagner act was not revolutionary, because the act itself was nothing special, besides being similar to the Railway labor act, years before, and allowing people who aren’t in the railroad business to have the same power and bargaining just as the Railway labor act provides. In the chapter,” Doctrinal Synergies,” Cushman writes, justice Hughes’ opinion was formed from, basically, a earlier opinion he made in Texas & New Orleans and Virginian Railway, meaning the majority of the Wagner act was written in a way where almost everything was something Hughes had decided on years ago. Cushman also says that, though the predictable decision was in favor of upholding the act, the only real issue, was that the act had a due process clause, which some justices didn’t agree with entirely. Before Cushman dives into Hughes’ opinion, he writes “In the conflict between liberty of contract and freedom of association the Court had again awarded victory to the latter. Yet as it had in Texas & New Orleans and Virginian Railway, the court minimized the Act’s imposition on the employ...

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...d by the court, there was no idea on how to create a standard, for the division between substantial and non-substantial commerce would be so small, they might as well be the same thing. When he talks about the court being proper, he talks about the decision to say that Filburn’s wheat growing activity had a substantial effect on commerce and that they agreed with congress’ judgement. But if congress were to be challenged on their decision on whether that was substantial enough to justify regulation, thus why the Wickard decision was so revolutionary, for even if congress was challenged on their decision, the courts would be in such a shamble on what to do. The case was such a new thing, for the court had the commerce power, and the court wouldn’t do anything against congress, because congress has the first and last say on whether or not what they say is commerce.