William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy, Robert J. Maddox closely examines the famed senator from Idaho by placing the senator's words in the context of his actions. Maddox argues that Borah possessed a sense of fatalism that affected his entire outlook. The thesis also forwards the notion that Borah's objectives never changed throughout his career, meaning that the Borah of 1917 was the same Borah of 1939. According to the author, Borah used whatever tactics were available to pursue his often unclear goals. Finally, Maddox concludes that this ends-justifies-the-means approach created the perception of inconsistency where inconsistency did not exist.
The format of the book follows the senator's major interests, specifically the fight over the League of Nations, the peace plans in the 1920's, U.S. recognition of Russia (Soviet Union), and neutrality in the 1930's. Borah's demonstrated his canniness by his advocacy of a naval conference and disarmament resolution in 1920, which he used as a tactical weapon to draw attention from the League of Nations issue. On this point, the author states that the senator's rhetoric and work toward convening naval conference was not an act of constructive foreign policy-making, because he knew that it was unlikely the conference would convene or could even succeed.
In contrast to Borah's previous isolationist stands was his belief that the United States should act honorably in its relations with other nations. More specifically, Borah advocated the treatment of other nations as equals, regardless of size or strength. He was also disdainful of the use of marine detachments and gunboat diplomacy, tools of an earlier time. An additional point to this contrast was Borah's work toward bringing about Soviet recognition. He questioned the rationale behind the continued isolation of the Soviet Union and thought it perilous to ignore one of the largest and potentially most powerful countries in the world.
Maddox concludes his book with the picture of William E. Borah, the "lion from Idaho", as a largely forgotten and marginalized figure in his time. His isolationist tendencies were no longer in step with the mood of the country and he held a largely misinformed and inaccurate grasp of the international stage. In illustration of this point is the example of when Borah reported that his "sources" had informed him of the unlikelihood of America's entry into World War II, a report that he delivered two months before the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
What were the major impacts on American foreign policy during the H.W. Bush & Clinton Administrations? How did Bush & Clinton define the post-Cold War world for the United States?
In the book, America’s Great War: World War I and the American Experience, Robert H. Zieger discusses the events between 1914 through 1920 forever defined the United States in the Twentieth Century. When conflict broke out in Europe in 1914, the President, Woodrow Wilson, along with the American people wished to remain neutral. In the beginning of the Twentieth Century United States politics was still based on the “isolationism” ideals of the previous century. The United States did not wish to be involved in European politics or world matters. The U.S. goal was to expand trade and commerce throughout the world and protect the borders of North America.
3. Context: What does Novikov claim the United States planned during the Second World War?
The author of this essay is Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He was the president of the United States at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. The purpose of this speech was to inform the entire United States about what had happened the day before at Pearl Harbor. The nation was to be warned that the United States was going to declare war against Japan. The intended audience is everyone in the United States. President Roosevelt ef...
Crockatt, Richard. The fifty years war : the United States and the Soviet Union in world politics, 1941-1991. London; New York; Routledge, 1995.
Between 1895 and 1920, the years in which William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, William Taft, and Woodrow Wilson reigned in the presidents, the United States struggled for not only justice at home but abroad as well. During this period policies such as Roosevelt’s Big Stick diplomacy, William Taft’s Dollar diplomacy, and Woodrow Wilson’s Moral diplomacy were all used in foreign affairs in hopes of benefit for all involved. However, it would be appropriate to say that self-interest was the most important driving factor for American policy and can be exemplified through economic, social, and political relations.
Therefore, establishing anti-Bolshevism in the United States was Robert F. Kelley’s mission. Kelley an Irish Catholic trained by Russian refugees ran the Eastern European Affairs division in the State Department (Leffler, The Specter of Communism, 19). Kelley’s intense dislike for the Bolsheviks demands that his aides join actively in his views. One of his service officers is George F. Kennan who joins in the close observation of Bolshevik destabilizing and expansionist activities that cause unrest in Mexico, Nicaragua, Cuba, Spain and Greece (Leffler, The Specter of Communism, 19). Was Kennan’s containment strategy thinking set off with Kelley’s training? Was Kennan’s awareness of the ongoing Russian Communist activities the basis for his ideas? History proves that George Kennan’s ideas on containment were the basis of NSC-68 and...
158-59. 8 Hamilton Fish, p. 139. 9 Bruce R. Bartlett, Cover-up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, (New York: Arlington House, 1978), pp. 56-87. 10 Arthur Meier Schlesinger, p. 54.
“Was Truman Responsible for the Cold War”, well, according to author Arnold A. Offner, his simplistic answer is an obvious “yes.” “Taking Sides” is a controversial aspect of the author’s interpretation for justifying his position and perception of “Truman’s” actions. This political approach is situated around the “Cold War” era in which the author scrutinizes, delineates, and ridicules his opponents by claiming “I have an ace in the hole and one showing” (SoRelle 313). Both authors provide the readers with intuitive perceptions for their argumentative approaches in justifying whether or not “Truman” contributed to the onset of the “Cold War.” Thus far, it would be hard-pressed to blame one single individual, President or not, for the “Cold War” initiation/s. Information presented shows the implications centered on the issues leading up to the Cold War”, presents different ideologies of two Presidents involving policy making, and a national relationship strained by uncooperative governments.
Over the course of the history of the United States, specific foreign policies have affected the methods in which the U.S. involves itself around the globe. Specifically, certain policies have affected U.S. involvement in Latin America.
Vidyalankar, Indira. "Pearl Harbor : Why Surprise ?" The Indian Journal of Political Science 41.4 (1980): 847-69. Web. 12 Feb. 2014. .
Offner, Arnold. “‘Another Such Victory’: President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War.” Taking Sides: Clashing Views On Controversial Issues in United States History. Ed. Larry Madaras and James M. SoRelle. 14th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011. 291-301.
Richard Neustadt today is a professor of politics and has written many books on subjects pertaining to government and the inter workings of governments. He has many years of personal experience working with the government along with the knowledge of what makes a president powerful. He has worked under President Truman, Kennedy and Johnson. His credibility of politics has enhanced his respect in the field of politics. His works are studied in many Universities and he is considered well versed in his opinions of many different presidents. It is true that he seems to use Truman and Eisenhower as the main examples in this book and does show the reader the mistakes he believes were made along the way in achieving power.
Congress and the nation: 1945-1964 A review of government and politics in the postwar years.
Taubman, William. Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War. New York: Norton, 1982. Print.