Why Kennedy Won The 1960s Essay

Essay 1
John Fitzgerald Kennedy had won the 1961 election due in large part to his positions on the Cold War and anti-Communist speech. Conflict in Vietnam had initially calmed, but then escalated toward the end of Eisenhower’s presidency. The new administration faced tough decisions concerning U.S. involvement in Indochina.
Year one was a tenuous year for the new president. Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev publicly announced support for liberation wars throughout the colonial world and among oppressed peoples. “In April 1961, Cuban exiles organized by the Central Intelligence Agency were defeated in their attempt to overthrow the communist-leaning regime of Fidel Castro” (Lawrence 71). Laos was in a similar state as their neighbor to the east, but Kennedy conciliated in 1962 to “neutralizing” the country by limiting foreign involvement and setting up a temporary government. Losing Vietnam could have severe ramifications on Washington as well as the Democratic party in general. Cold

War initiatives needed to be formulated and acted upon. Containing communist spread in Indochina became an integral part of his administration. Kennedy immediately got to work.
In 1961, the American presence in Vietnam consisted of 800 military advisers; by 1963, that number grew to 16,000. The president never desired a violent conflict in Vietnam, at least not in the form of full-fledged war. Fighting could take place, but American troops were to lay back as Diem’s ARVN confronted their own internal problems; the U.S. military was there to help and provide guidance. It was a fundamental belief of Kennedy’s (as well as other prominent leaders at the time) that South Vietnam had to win the popular support of the people to come away victorious. For this reason, billions of dollars flowed into Saigon to build up the Diem regime.
Ngo Dinh Diem was a western-style leader with strict Catholic background. America sought to elevate him and wield their influence through him. To what degree Diem would be supported was leveraged by Kennedy’s top advisors. General Maxwell Taylor was a military aid in the early 60’s. He and Deputy National Security Advisor Rostow sought for increased American aid in South Vietnam. Although U.S. ground troops were also advised, Kennedy balked at the idea, and instead moved forward with “Project Beefup,” an effort to further increase the aid given to Diem and Saigon. Out of Project Beefup was developed the MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam). This new group, along with the ARVN, began combating small guerrilla units in the countryside.
Other advisors included Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

Their positions in Vietnam are clearly stated in a 1961 recommendation to the president: “The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism. The basic means for accomplishing this objective must be to put the Government of South Viet-Nam into a position to win its own war against the guerrillas…. We should be prepared to introduce United States combat forces if that should become necessary for success” (Hunt 47). Kennedy agreed with building up the Diem regime, but the notion to send troops into combat he did not readily accept. The president viewed the conflict taking place in Vietnam as a political struggle. In retrospect, the Korean War was much more of a direct threat stemming from communistic activity. He replied to his advisors in November 1961 that “The conflict in Viet Nam is more obscure and less flagrant” (Hunt

48).
Kennedy’s approach to Vietnam changed throughout his time in office. By 1963, President Diem was relying less and less on American advice and listening more and more to his inner circle of trust, namely his brother and sister-in-law, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Madame Nhu. With Washington losing grips on their mandarin ally, Kennedy turned to more drastic measures of intervention. Diem was an ineffective leader. It became clear that a new head of state would have to be installed in South Vietnam. The question was how to make make that happen.
Henry Cabot Lodge was the current U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam. Writing to Secretary of State Rusk in August 1963, Lodge stated, “We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: The overthrow of the Diem government…. I realize that this course involves a very substantial risk of losing Vietnam. It also involves some additional risk to American lives. I would never propose it if I felt there was a reasonable chance of holding Vietnam with Diem” (Hunt 54). Revolt was brewing in Saigon; the people wanted changed. The predominantly Buddhist population was tired of unequal treatment. Monks were burning themselves to death in radical demonstrations of protest. Stress was building up in the West over the turmoil in Indochina.
After nine years of volatile rule, Ngo Dinh Diem would be ousted from office. Furthermore, a coup d'etat seemed the most logical course of action (one led by Vietnam but backed by the United States). Kennedy never formally approved or disapproved of such an overthrow. However, he did express a couple months later (as the situation worsened), “While we do not wish to stimulate a coup, we also do not wish to leave impression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness…” (Hunt 55). The decision would ultimately be left to Ambassador Lodge.

Essay 2
The situation was bleak in Saigon throughout 1963. President Diem’s bright start was quickly entering a somber demise. Outside of a select few, nearly all of Southern Vietnam was dissatisfied with their devout Catholic president. Even the United States, the ally most favorable to the Diem regime, was suspiciously doubting his capabilities. Matters didn’t help much as the year progressed.
All of South Vietnam was predominantly Buddhist. Not all were close adherents to the ancient religion, but they followed it nominally. Liberals and conservatives alike understood the cultural and traditional significance it had on their society. The exception to this general rule was the elite, upper-class Catholics, of which Ngo Dinh Diem was from. Catholics accounted for an overwhelmingly small percentage of the population; at the same time, the see had a lot of sway in the Diem regime. He even had family members that served in the church, one brother of which was an archbishop. “Diem… used his religion to prop up his weak administration. Favoritism and abuses inevitably resulted; members of the faith became village leaders, and soon most district and province chiefs were Catholics - often in a province whose population was completely Buddhist” (Halberstam 119). Needless to say, he expressed favoritism among the Catholics, a habit that instigated and frustrated the Buddhist monks in the land, as well as the Buddhist peasantry in the countryside.
Ire had been building since the geopolitical divide in 1954, but the first major clash occurred at Hue in 1963. In celebration of his brother’s twenty-fifth anniversary as a Catholic archbishop, Diem permitted both Viet and Vatican flags to be flown in his honor. According to the law, no foreign flag was to be publicly raised in the land, but Diem permitted it. Ironically, Nho Dinh Thuc’s memorable day occurred just a week before the recognized birthday of Buddha. When the monks sought to fly their flag in honor him, they were denied. Thus began a rebellion. After a mass protest in the city-center of Hue, army leaders used militant means to extinguish the uprising. Without warning, shots were fired into the thick of the crowd. Nine people were killed as a result. The Diem government attempted to cover up the realities of the massacre, alleging that the Vietcong was responsible for it. But a revolt had begun.
The second wave of Buddhist oppression came later in the Summer. On the night of August 20, the police made their march to Xa Loi, a district of Saigon. Fomented by the new Vietnamese Buddhist movement, the Government opted to utilize its force to a greater degree. Once at Xa Loi, they would march on the pagoda and ransack the Buddhist temple. Officials exercised the same force in Hue and other major cities around Vietnam. Well over thirty priests and students lost their lives as a result of the raids, with many more arrested. This deplorable act, which was purportedly organized by Ngo Dinh Nhu, proved to be the last straw. “The implications were becoming clear. It meant the death of a [Diem] policy; it was the end of trying to fool ourselves about our conciliatory effect on Deim, for now the Government would be even more under the influence of the Nhus” (Halberstam 147). What was Kennedy’s reaction to the attack? “The crackdown on the pagodas enraged the President personally. He and other Washington officials considered it not only the end of a policy, but a betrayal by an ally as well” (Halberstam 156). The mandarin’s days were coming to an abrupt end.
Not only were the Buddhists ignored, but the Americans and the Vietnam Army itself were largely alienated by late Summer 1963. It was at this juncture that the Vietnamese generals began planning a coup on Diem. The generals primarily involved were Minh, Kim, and Don. These three conspirators tactfully recruited a fourth, Ton That Dinh, an arrogant general that played a large role in the successful raid on the pagodas. Dinh was loyal to the Ngo family, but was soon to change sides. What led to this betrayal? “The people were tired of the listless, ineffectual Cabinet of Ngo Dinh Diem” (Halberstam 182).
It appears certain that a leadership transition needed to take place. Kennedy recognized it. Lodge recognized it. The Vietnamese military recognized it. The reason Diem and Nhu were ultimately assassinated was due the generals’ unbelief in the Ngo family and the Americans. Fear that a Diem-led coalition government would rise also stoked doubts among the generals. But the coup and consequent assassination left issues unresolved. There was still the question of who would succeed Diem as the leader of the South. Saigon was jubilant when the regime fell, but the countryside still faced woes as the Vietcong continued to spread throughout the Mekong Delta and rural villages. Diem was an enemy, but so was Ho Chi Minh and the communist North. It seemed as though the future of Vietnam hung in a delicate balance.