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Separate legal personality cases
Consequences of a separate legal personality
Lifting of corporate veil
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QUESTION: In the recent decision of Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom discussed circumstances when a court can pierce the corporate veil. What does the case tell us about the nature of the separate legal entity doctrine? How useful do you think this case will be in Australia? The doctrine of separate legal personality is central to corporate law and the functioning of companies in the modern world. This doctrine allows for a company, separate from its shareholders and members, to own its own property, have its own rights and responsibilities, and sue and be sued as its own entity. This means that the rights enjoyed by the company are not necessarily enjoyed by its members, and that members of a company are not necessarily liable for the actions of the company. In the recent case Prest v Petrodel, the doctrine of separate legal personality and the instances in which a court may pierce the corporate veil were discussed. Piercing the corporate veil refers to putting aside the separate personality of the company to hold a person who owns and controls a company as responsible for the actions of the company as if it were their own. In the case of Prest this concept is discussed in detail, to reflect the instances in which courts have pierced the corporate veil, and the extent of applicability of this doctrine. As reflected in Prest, the separate legal personality doctrine is a strong doctrine in corporate law that is only pierced in exceptional circumstances. However, it is also clear that the principle of piercing the corporate veil is an important one, as it allows for the court to hold responsible those in control of a company in instances where it is necessary to achieve an equitable and logi... ... middle of paper ... ...the corporate veil, which is reflected in the current Australian approach. While it is clear Prest is not binding on Australian courts, this case will be useful in Australia to provide further insight into the many cases in which the piercing principle has been relevant, and may provide a clearer doctrine as to when the corporate veil may be pierced. It has been suggested that if legislation was enacted to pierce the corporate veil this would overcome the current vagueness of the veil piercing doctrine in Australia. However, as cautioned in Prest, the clarity gained may only serve to narrow the courts ability to use the piercing principle to combat abuse of the separate legal entity doctrine, in ways that the law cannot otherwise remedy. As such it appears to be as necessary a part of corporate law, as it goes hand in hand with the separate legal entity doctrine.
In Laduzinski v. Alvarez & Marsal Taxand LLC, plaintiff was looking for a job with defendant, Alvarez & Marsal Taxand LLC. Plaintiff, Laduzinski, claimed that he was lured away from his job under false pretenses since defendants hired him to get access to his contacts. Nine months later, after plaintiff had given all his contacts, the manager of the Alvarez companies fired him because there was no work for him. Laduzinski brought a claim to recover damages for fraud in the inducement. The lower court dismissed plaintiff’s claims because plaintiff was an “at will” employee. After Laduzinski appealed, the issues were whether the complaint stated a cause of action for fraudulent inducement, despite that Laduzinski was an at-will employee; and whether the alleged misrepresentations were actionable statements of present fact or non-actionable future promises.
There is one appellant and three respondents involved in these proceedings. Equuscorp Pty Ltd (referred to as “Equuscorp”) is the appellant. Ian Haxton, Robert Bassat and Cunningham’s Warehouse Sales Pty Ltd (referred to as “the respondents”) are the respondents. This matter was heard in the High Court of Australia in front of Chief Justice French and Judges Gummow, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell.
In Reyes v. Missouri Pac. R. CO., the appellant, Joel Reyes, sought rehabilitation from the defendant, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, after being run over by one of the defendants trains while lying on the tracks. The appellant claims the defendant was negligent due to its inability to see the plaintiff in time to stop the train. The defendant refutes the plaintiffs claim by blaming the plaintiff for contributory negligence because the plaintiff was believed to be drunk on the night in question based off of pass arrest records . In a motion in limine Reyes ask for the exclusion of the evidence presented by the defense. The trial court, however denied the plaintiff’s request and ruled in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff, Reyes,
Case name: Peter K. Dementas v The Estate of Jack Tallas, 764 P.2d 628 (1988)
The size of the company has a fluctuating impact on the ramifications of the law administering the inconvenience of risk on companies. The thought of forcing the liability is unique in relation to the worry of distinguishing the tenet, which will be connected to the case. In specific cases, it might be an improper law to carry out cases, which lacks the foundation of criminal liability of the company involved within the case. Big companies have a convoluted chain of command, which has multilevel frameworks inside the
On February 11, 1983 Robert Augustus Harper, Jr., filed Amicus Curiae on the case of Joyce Bernice Hawthorne v. State of Florida, 740 So.2d. 770. This was the third appearance of Hawthorne in the First District Court of Appeal of Florida for First degree murder, second degree murder and now manslaughter.
According to the facts in this case, Walkovszky was hit by a cab four years ago in New York and the cab was negligently operated by defendant Marches. The defendant Carlton, who is being sued, owned and ran the cab company in which he set up ten corporations, including Seon. Each of the corporations had two cabs registered in its name. The minimum automobile liability insurance required by the law was $10,000. According to the opinion of the court the plaintiff asserted that he is also ?entitled to hold their stock holder personally liable for damages, because multiple corporate structures constitutes an unlawful attempt to defraud the general member of the public.?
According to Corporation Act 2001 s124(1), it illustrates that ‘’A company has the legal capacity and powers of an individual both in and outside the jurisdiction” . As it were, company as a legal individual must be freely with all its capital contribution shall embrace liability for its legal actions and obligations of the company’s shareholders is limited to its investment to the company. This ‘separate legal entity’ principle was established in the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1987] as company was held to have conducted the business as a legal person and separate from its members. It demonstrated that the debt of company is belonged to the company but not to the shareholders. Shareholders have only right to participate in managing but not in sharing the company property. Besides ,the Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] demonstrates that the distinction between the shareholders and company assets. It means that even Mr Macaura owned almost all the shares in the company, he had no insurable interest in the company’s asset. The other recent case is the Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] which illustrates that the distinct legal entities between employee ad director allows Mr.Lee function in dual capacities. It resulted that the corporation can contract with the controlling member of the corporation.
Piercing the Corporate Veil Since the establishment in Salomon v Salomon, the separate legal personality has been long recognised in English law for centuries, that is to say, a limited liability company has its own legal identity distinct from its shareholders or directors. However, in certain circumstances the courts may be prepared to look behind the company at the actions of the directors and shareholders. This is known as "piercing the corporate veil". There are numerous cases concerning the "piercing the corporate veil", among which, Jones v Lipman[1] was a typical case. Lipman sold land to Jones by a written contract but refused to complete the sale because of another good deal, instead he offered damages for breach of contract.
Hilary Delany (2009) – Is there a future for proprietary estoppel as we know it? Dublin University Law Journal
Current English land law on the co-ownership of interests of land has developed quite a contentious history pertaining to the relationship between the acquisition of rights and the quantification of the shares. In terms of co-ownership, there are huge variances and legal consequences when legal ownership is in one person’s name compared to two. These differences can be seen in various landmark cases which have created precedent and developed refined principles such as Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset and the Stack v Dowden. For the courts, it has often been relatively complex to distinguish between constructive and resulting trusts and to decide on the procedure to be used for the quantification of equitable entitlement once the decision to impute has been established. The quantification of resulting trusts is carefully considered in both, Midland Bank v Cooke and Stack v Snowden. In many co-ownership cases dealing with the acquisition of rights and the quantification of shares, the outcomes aren’t always proportionate. Reasons can include the ambiguities in the identification and changes of common intention and contributions types. In speaking to this issue, Baroness Hale stated in Stack v Dowden that “each case will turn on its own facts” and furthermore elaborated on the conditions for a common intention construct arising. It is furthermore important to critically discuss the repercussions these cases have for the future of co-ownership law to reconcile existing sources of confusion.
This essay will examine the main cause of the demise of the derivative claim which is the possibility of pursuing a corporate relief and even costs via an unfair prejudice petition, a relief and order that was initially only available via derivative action. Further this essay will discuss as to how the boundaries between the statutory derivative action and the unfair prejudice should be drawn and what restrictions should be added to the unfair prejudice remedy under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 so that the significance of the statutory derivative action can be reinstated.
As a consequence of the separate legal entity and limited liability doctrines within the UK’s unitary based system, company law had to develop responses to the ‘agency costs’ that arose. The central response is directors’ duties; these are owed by the directors to the company and operate as a counterbalance to the vast scope of powers given to the board. The benefit of the unitary board system is reflected in the efficiency gains it brings, however the disadvantage is clear, the directors may act to further their own interests to the detriment of the company. It is evident within executive remuneration that directors are placed in a stark conflict of interest position in that they may disproportionately reward themselves. The counterbalance to this concern is S175 Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) this acts to prevent certain conflicts arising and punishes directors who find themselves in this position. Furthermore, there are specific provisions within the CA 2006 that empower third parties such as shareholders to influence directors’ remuneration.
The Principle of Separate Corporate Personality The principle of separate corporate personality has been firmly established in the common law since the decision in the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd[1], whereby a corporation has a separate legal personality, rights and obligations totally distinct from those of its shareholders. Legislation and courts nevertheless sometimes "pierce the corporate veil" so as to hold the shareholders personally liable for the liabilities of the corporation. Courts may also "lift the corporate veil", in the conflict of laws in order to determine who actually controls the corporation, and thus to ascertain the corporation's true contacts, and closest and most real connection. Throughout the course of this assignment I will begin by explaining the concept of legal personality and describe the veil of incorporation. I will give examples of when the veil of incorporation can be lifted by the courts and statuary provisions such as s.24 CA 1985 and incorporate the varying views of judges as to when the veil can be lifted.
The Lotus case garners attention due to the fact that it was among the first cases dealing with whether jurisdiction was assumed in accordance with principles of international law. While the Lotus case was heard in the context of criminal jurisdiction over a collision in the high seas, the Lotus principle has been applied in a variety of other cases in varying contexts. For this reason, the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice is critiqued for specifically answering only the question in the special agreement as the continued application of the Lotus Principle as a general principle in other contexts such as anti-trust regulations may lead to ambiguous results.