The issue at stake on page 12 of Fred D’Agostino’s, “The Ethos of Games” is simply whether or not formalism, as interpreted through the dichotomization thesis, provides a satisfactory account of games. In this context, formalism means that a game can be defined solely by the formal rules of that specific game (D’Agostino, p. 7). At the same time, according to the dichotomization thesis, the rules of any game can be definitively separated into two categories, but never both (p. 11). One of those categories being regulative rules, which can be defined as any rule that invokes a penalty (p. 11). The other category, constitutive rules, are simply the set of rules that define a game (p. 11). Given these definitions, D’Agostino argues that through the dichotomization thesis, formalism does not provide a proper account of games (p. 12).
D’Agostino begins supporting his conclusion by making an assumption through the dichotomization thesis. The main premise in his argument is the way in which the dichotomization thesis dictates what defines a game. The author essentially assumes that since the dichotomization thesis only allows penalty invoking rules to be regulative, and not constitutive; those penalty invoking rules therefore cannot define a game (p. 12).
D’Agostino then provides the logic of his argument by connecting his main premise to his conclusion. He uses variables such as (G), a game that implements the regulative rule (r). Then (G’), which only differs from (G) due to it not implementing (r). He then refers back to his main premise of the argument, and says because (r) cannot define (G); and that (G) and (G’) are the same according to formalism (p. 12). D’Agostino states that in some cases this theory may be true...
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...er changing to rugby if a player could use their hands; basketball would in effect translate to football if contact was not disciplined. The identity that D’Agostino refers to when saying that these examples are likely to be radically at variance, is that of formalism (p. 12). Interpreting formalism through the dichotomization thesis allows one to say that soccer can be deemed the same game even if one was permitted to use their hands. Congruently, one could say that basketball is the same game even if any contact was permitted. This absurd deduction brings D’Agostino to his verdict.
D’Agostino concludes that formalism interpreted through the dichotomization thesis does not provide a satisfactory account of games (p. 12). These specific examples even further support this conclusion by identifying regulative rules that do in fact have a role in defining a game.
Based on McKenzie Wark’s game theory written in his article called “Agony (On the Cave)”. Games, like our society, have its own rules that everyone should follow without questioning. Everyone is treated equally and can’t escape from these rules’ controlling power. The relationship between rules and games is also revealing in the film Wreck-it Ralph. The film talks about the main character, Ralph, leaving his own game, escaping to the “Sugar Rush” game, fighting with Turbo, and finally solving a big threat to the whole game world. In this scene, Turbo, the antagonist, disturbs the “Road Blaster” game because he envies its taking over his place and ultimately moving out from the arcade. In this essay, I will use Wark’s theory as the lens to discuss
... a Moral Monstrosity.” In Dynamic Argument. Ed. Robert Lamm and Justin Everett. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007. 425-26.
The Exciting Game Without Any Rules (or “TEGWAR”), is the game by which Henry Wiggins and Bruce Pearson play in everyday life. As a card game, TEGWAR is an exercise of dominance. The only rule is that there are no rules, and until a player acknowledges that concept, he has no chance of winning.
In this paper I shall consider Spinoza’s argument offered in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, which argues for the impossibility of two substances sharing the same nature. I shall first begin by explaining, in detail, the two-step structure of the argument and proceed accordingly by offering a structured account of its relation to the main claim. Consequently I shall point out what I reasonably judge to be a mistake in Spinoza’s line of reasoning; that is, that the definition of a thing does not express a fixed number of individuals under that definition. By contrast, I hope to motivate the claim that a true definition of a thing does in fact express a fixed number of individuals that fall under that definition. I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken.
The game of poker is a card based game, which has developed into many various kinds, in terms of the number of cards dealt, how many cards are on the deck visible for all players, and what remains hidden, over the past few decades. Despite its differences, poker of any kind shares one major significance; the factor, that either sets one winning or losing, is based upon decisions made in the long run. The utmost degree of such decisions resemble economic components, since the most elementary acts, such as raising the bets and folding one’s cards, may be regarded as a case of supply and demand. And one of them, which is the topic of this essay, is Nash Equilibrium, commonly used in games with no more than two players involved which is also known as „Heads Up“. Nash Equilibrium sets two players, with the very same count of chips, against one another in a situation where each player can either bet, all of his or her stack only, or fold. After this particular match is finished, the players‘ stacks are equilibrated again and this whole process is being repeated for sake of the long run. This algorithm is also known as „Fictitious Play“ (Dudziak, 2006). Most importantly each of the players ought to take in consideration the opponent’s decision, based on which they reach a convenient consensus, meaning, in order to maintain Nash Equilibrium, they both must correctly presume the upcoming action (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). Thus it is foreseeable that one or the other side, oftenly, faces a difficulty while striving for an equilibrium.
The imaginative recreation of sport as play has become the world. There is not the slightest sign here of any other reality; even the existence of a creator external to the play-world may now only be inferred (Berman 219).
Also it is comparing the war to a game, which is a euphemism as well as a metaphor. It is a euphemism because war is a very serious, dangerous matter; whereas a game is something that people enjoy and never get seriously injured in. By using this euphemism, Jessie Pope - the poet – lessens the severity of war, and makes her readers’ think of it as enjoyable, and something that they want to do.
...pposition). To continue on in his own project Derrida must rigorously analyze something that is not an inherited assumption, but what seems to be inherent in human thought - the differential nature of the world. If one is really to discard structuralism, it seems imperative to find some way of proving that not only is binary opposition a faulty way of thinking, it is also not necessary to thought.
ABSTRACT: In opposition to the instrumental doctrine of rationality, I argue that the rationality of the end served by a strategy is a necessary condition of the rationality of the strategy itself: means to ends cannot be rational unless the ends are rational. First, I explore cases-involving ‘proximate’ ends (that is, ends whose achievement is instrumental to the pursuit of some more fundamental end) — where even instrumentalists must concede that the rationality of a strategy presupposes the rationality of the end it serves. Second, I draw attention to the counter-intuitive consequences — in cases involving ‘non-proximate’ ends — of substituting (allegedly more manageable) questions about de facto ends for questions about the rationality of ends. Third, I argue-against Nozick — that it is a mistake to suppose that the only question dividing instrumentalists from non-instrumentalists is whether the instrumental doctrine needs supplementation. Finally, I try to show that questions about the rationality of ends need not be viewed as impossibly daunting.
He only gives them a narrow scope of the Determinist argument in order for Lamont to more easily get his point across to the reader. In doing so, his counter argument becomes false because he is not attacking the Determinist argument, just his version of the “Illusion Argument.”
...niversity of Alabama who’s only contribution to the article is a statement about how he plays the game by eliminating all resistance (Bradley). The significance of this source is negligible because it only shows how one person chooses to play instead of how the game is meant to be played. Bradley’s report, however, does consider the reactions of the police force and the general public. An unnamed police officer tells Bradley that he worries that kids now have the “preconceived notions of ‘let’s kill an officer’.” This emotional appeal to the parents of children playing this game is almost a hit below the belt. The use of an officer of the law to further strengthen his argument that this game is the cause of the killings of other officers is a clever manipulation of the emotions that Bradley has crafted for the readers to feel up to this point in his article.
Dealing with the issue of sport and ethnology, three major factors come to mind; prejudice, racism, and discrimination. These factors span across gender, ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural groups. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss how these factors have played a part in the evolution of sport in our society. The first issue tackled in this paper will be racism in sports, followed by prejudice and discrimination.
The book makes a comparison between the logic of care and the logic of choice. The logic of care is the central topic of the book. While the other, the logic of choice, makes its point of contrast. The logic of choice is considered as something good in the Western philos...
Eitzen, D. Stanley. (1999). "Sport Is Fair, Sport Is Foul." Fir and Foul: Beyond the Myths and Paradoxes of Sport.
For our focal point of this assignment, intentional stances is where Daniel Dennett has assumed that objects are treated as an agents with beliefs and desires and given the rationality to do what it is supposed to do according to its beliefs and desires. In the article, Daniel Dennett said that in playing chess game with the computer, you have the prediction that it will move in a smarter way where it can beats you.