Was Japanese Internment Justified

The horrors of racial segregation during World War II have always seemed to be distant to many Canadians and looked down upon, yet Canada was home to several xenophobic laws and acts that were a violation of many rights and freedoms. One of the cruelest instances was the Japanese Canadian Internment. At the time, the government justified the internment by claiming the Japanese Canadians were a threat to their national security, but the evidence today suggests that it had nothing to do with safety. The government made illogical decisions in response to the mass panic and agitation in British Columbia. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King reacted passively to these decisions to increase his political popularity. Racial prejudice against

the Japanese had been around in B.C. for over 50 years and was at its peak. The internment of the Japanese Canadians was not a reaction to the security threat they posed since the wartime hysteria influenced the government to made irrational decisions, there was poor political leadership by King, and the racial discrimination against Japanese Canadians was at an all time high.
During WWII, when Japanese forces invaded Pearl Harbour and Hong Kong, the British Columbian government, along with all its restless citizens, convinced the federal government to intern all persons of Japanese heritage due to the security threats that they posed (Quinlan, 134). Under the War Measures Act, their citizenship and right to vote was taken away from them. The children and women were sent to livestock barns in the interior of B.C. while the men were forced to work in labour camps. The Japanese had to endure harsh conditions; there was no electricity, healthcare was inadequate, and the children were deprived of their education (“History of Japanese Canadians”). In addition, they were not protected by the Geneva Conventions, meaning that they had to pay for their own internment. This forced the government to sell their property to fund the internment (“The War Years”). They were finally released in 1946, but had to move east or be repatriated to war-torn Japan (Hickman, 94). It would not be until 1949 that the government lifted its restrictions on Japanese Canadians, allowing them to vote and return to the west coast.
The wartime hysteria was an influential force that resulted in turmoil in B.C.

and led the federal government to make irrational decisions. After the attack on Pearl Harbour, the threat of a Japanese invasion on Canadian soil became frightening to many individuals, especially British Columbians (“Japanese Internment”). This eventually led to various attacks on the Japanese population, which included riots in Japantown and biased newspapers (Figure 1). The political cartoon published by the Vancouver Sun plays on the fears of British Columbians by suggesting that all Japanese Canadians are hiding their loyalty to Imperial Japan by pretending to assimilate into society. Several of other newspapers published similar articles and cartoons, which ultimately induced fear into the population. This fear eventually transformed into violence as stores and homes of the Japanese were vandalized during the midst of protests (Yancey, 68; Sahara, 6). Under the circumstances, Ian Mackenzie, a federal cabinet minister from B.C., pressured the government to intern the Japanese by using the violence to his advantage rather than physical evidence of espionage (Bailey; Elander). He knew that the government had to agree to his request or the entire province would be submerged in chaos. The government eventually succumbed to the pressure and allowed for the internment of all Japanese Canadians. However, this was an irrational decision as there was proof of no Japanese spies or disloyalty. The

RCMP had spies within the Japanese community and stated that there was no evidence of espionage (“Japanese Internment”; King). In addition, Mackenzie did not only request for enemy aliens to be interned; he wanted every single person of Japanese heritage to be interned as he stated in a speech, “Let our slogan for British Columbia be: No Japs from Rockies to seas” (Hickman, 80; Bangarth, 28). As a result, many Nisei (second-generation Japanese) were interned, despite the fact that they have never been to Japan. They saw themselves as Canadian before Japanese and were even willing to enlist in the army to prove their loyalty. However, the turmoil in B.C. prevailed and the government interned them due to the social unrest rather than the security threat they posed. Ironically, the internment was actually harmful for the security of Canada. Hugh Keenleyside, a diplomat, was frightful about Mackenzie’s request, telling him that any racist policy directed to all Japanese Canadians, rather than suspects of espionage, would be reflected by the propaganda in Japan (encouraging war with U.S. and Canada) and the treatment of allied prisoners (encouraging harsh punishment) (Sunahara; Robinson, 97).
There was poor political leadership in Canada at a time when important decisions had to be made.

The Prime Minister during WWII, William Mackenzie King, faced extreme pressures from those who opposed and supported the internment of the Japanese Canadians. He clearly disliked the idea of an internment as his top military generals advised against it, but the uproar in B.C. made him reconsider implementing the internment. He quickly realized that the internment would help him politically and disregarded the injustices that he would be committing. During the federal election in 1940, the Liberal Party dominated across Canada, winning 178 of the 245 available seats (“19th Parliament”). However, the party struggled in the west, particularly in B.C. where many of the ridings were won by a small margin (Figure #3). Even though the Liberals lost the riding in Yukon, the popular vote there was higher than the one in B.C. making it the province with the lowest Liberal popular vote. With a popular vote of only 37.4% in B.C. (compared to the 51.4% average), King saw the opportunity to increase his popularity and decided to allow the internment of the Japanese Canadians (Hickman, 81). The internment would also solve all of King’s problems in B.C. with the least amount of repercussions, as there were more people for internment than against it. As Fredrick Mead, the assistant minister of the RCMP, highlighted in a report to the federal government, most of the problems will come from

agitated citizens rather than the Japanese themselves (Roy, 97; Thornton). Knowing that the Japanese Canadians were not a threat, King could have protected them from racial prejudice, but decided to take the “path of least resistance” in fear of damaging his political career. When Japan surrendered in 1945, King had to decide on the fate of the Japanese Canadians. Ian Mackenzie suggested the idea of repatriating them back to Japan (despite the fact that most of them never been to Japan) so that they would no longer be a threat to society (Sahara; “Japanese Internment”). The final decision was to “test” the Japanese by having them answer a questionnaire that required them to choose between moving east and being deported to Japan. King was not oblivious of the injustice that was being committed, as he wrote in his diary, “It would be a crime to send back to Japan those who behaved well throughout the period of the war,” but he was, once again, able to put it aside in order to protect his political stature (King). Allowing the Japanese to return to B.C. would only result in more racial hostility in the region and be devastating for Liberal politicians. Even though King was not the direct cause of the Japanese internment, he did little to prevent it as he saw the opportunity to gain political support.
The racial discrimination in B.C. was the driving factor that ultimately resulted in the internment of the Japanese Canadians. Racial prejudice against Orientals has been around in B.C. since the 1850s when Chinese immigrants came to Canada to help on the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. A newspaper article described the Chinese as a “marvelous human machine, competent to perform the maximum of labour on the minimum of sustenance” (Adachi, 42). While they were beneficial for contractors, they posed a threat to the white population (Figure 3). The cartoon suggests that the low living standards of the Chinese allowed them to endure the harshest conditions, while being satisfied with the minimum wage. In contrast, the typical “white man” is portrayed as a civilized human being who cannot compete with the Chinese workers without sacrificing his dignity. As a result, when the Japanese started immigrating to Canada later on, the British Columbian population only saw them as another threat to their culture due to the similarities they share with the Chinese. However, the Japanese proved to be a larger threat than the Chinese as they were not affected by the Head Tax due to Great Britain’s alliance with Japan (Hickman, 33; Morton). In combination with Canada’s trade agreement with Japan and their fear of the Japanese military, the federal government could not stop Japanese immigration as easily. This resulted in a build up of racial hatred against the Japanese as British Columbians were forced to accept the immigrants. The attack on Pearl Harbour was simply an excuse that finally gave them a plausible reason to remove the Japanese from B.C. It allowed the people to release the anti-Japanese sentiment that they have been suppressing for years. Similarly, selling of Japanese property was another racist act that the government claimed to be necessary. The Custodian of Enemy Alien Property seized anything that was left behind by the Japanese and was responsible for taking charge of the properties until the Japanese return. In 1943, an order-in-council was approved and required all Japanese property to be sold. The government claimed that it was necessary for the war effort and to lower the security threat of a Japanese invasion (Sahara, 90; “The War Years”). However, the decision was solely based on the interests of British Columbian politicians who pressured Norman McLarty, the only person who could initiate the order-in-council. They believed that the forced sale of Japanese property would discourage the Japanese from returning to B.C. once the war was over, “We want all of their property sold...We donʼt want the Japanese to return here after the war. They are going to outbreed the whites and eventually outnumber us” (Buscombe). In contrast, the Americans, who had a good reason to be more cautious of the Japanese, did not sell their property since it would not lower the threat of a Japanese invasion. Once Canadians finally heard of the forced sale of the property, some were skeptical of the government’s motives. For example, the government justified the selling of Japanese fishing boats by stating that they could be used by Japan to organize an attack, yet all the Japanese Canadians were relocated inland (Moore). The Japanese Canadian internment was also distinctive from the other internments that took place in Canada and America. Although the Canadian government falsely accused many Italians and Germans of espionage during the war, they were interned based on their involvement with fascist groups rather than ethnic background (Figure 4). The large amount of Japanese internees in comparison to German and Italian internees revealed how racism played a major role in the decision to intern all Japanese Canadians. If the Japanese were given the same trial that the Germans and Italians were given, they would make up less than 2% of all the internees (“Internment”). There is also a stark contrast between the Japanese internment in Canada and America. Japanese Americans who were born in America had many rights guaranteed to them by the Bill of Rights, while Japanese Canadians were disfranchised (Yancey, 32; Bangarth). In addition, the property of the Japanese Americans was not sold and they were allowed to return to the east coast immediately after the war instead of being forced to move west. Ironically, the Japanese Americans in Hawaii, the place most vulnerable to an attack, were given fairer trials. The Hawaiians were more racially tolerant and had evidence that they had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbour (Robinson, 109; Yancey, 59).