Question 1 The courts would likely determine that Walter is the legal owner of the house, and Rowena has a moderately strong basis to take legal proceedings to be reinstated as the registered proprietor of the house. The Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) (‘RPA’) provides for the existence of the Torrens system as the organising system of titles and for a corresponding register. Chief Justice Barwick’s judgement in Breskvar v Wall stipulates that the Torrens system “is not a system of registration of title but a system of title by registration”. On the facts it is Walter who is listed as the registered proprietor of the house, who given the Torrens system’s structure is therefore the legal owner of the property. It is moderately likely that Rowena …show more content…
If fraud can be established in Mateo’s acquisition of the property, then the RPA provides that if Walter acquired the title as a volunteer, which is defined as a non-bon fide transferee without “valuable consideration”, then the title is defeasible. Cassegrain v Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd established that $1 as consideration for the transfer of a dairy farm was not “valuable consideration” and the transferee was therefore a volunteer. While the court described the $1 as “nominal consideration” it is ambiguous whether the courts would regard the $10,000 that the property was exchanged as amounting to valuable consideration when the property had a known market value of $1.8-$2.2 million. Thus, while Walter is the legal property owner, the degree of ambiguity regarding Walter volunteers status means that it is moderately likely that Rowena has a strong basis to take legal proceedings to be reinstated as the registered proprietor of the …show more content…
The Limitations Act provides that in cases of adverse possession through discontinuance, 12 years must elapse between the adverse possession beginning and the documentary owner to bring an action to recover that land. Adverse possession would likely be established starting in September 2009 with Edwina’s grazing, which means the clock would run out in September 2021. However, pursuant to s 11(3)(b)(ii), Roger’s detention qualifies as a disability which suspends the clock and would leave Roger with 7 months once he leaves jail before the clock runs out. s 52(1)(e)(ii) provides that if upon the end of a disability less than 3 years remain the clock will reset to 3 years remaining which in this case would mean that Roger has until November 2026 before he can no longer reclaim the land. Given the clock has not run out and the necessary time has not elapsed, Roger remains and will remain the legal owner until November 2026. Roger’s erecting of a sign stating that Wattlevale is his property is likely to demonstrate a retaking of possession. Roger, therefore, can pursue court proceedings such as litigation regarding the tort of trespass to obtain a court-ordered injunction to have Edwina and her cows removed. In conclusion, Roger should be advised that he still owns the property and that he can therefore take legal action in the form of litigation to
Norris- the plaintiff had worked decedent's farm, worked the soil, and harvested and marketed the produce. Plaintiff, working primarily without the decedent's aid, and drove the produce to various markets. She handled all finances and deposited them in the couple's joint banking account. Finally, the evidence showed that the decedent, an alcoholic, depended almost entirely on plaintiff's work in the produce business and as well her care of him while he was ill.
Gummow and Bell JJ concluded that clause 1 of the Deed signed Rural’s debts and its interests under the loan agreements to Equuscorp. Their Honours observed that the phrase “other remedies for these matters” located in clause 2 assigned a claim in restitution for money had and received . Heydon J agreed with this decision on similar grounds .
Answer: Judgment for Alfalfa. Alfalfa was in trouble when he was climbing and Darla rescued him from an almost certain serious injury or death. It was a legally sufficient value since Darla did not have to perform such an act, but she did. Afterwards, Alfalfa promised her a check of $1,000, which qualifies for a bargained-for exchange. However, this promise was made in the event when the action already took place. Therefore, there is a past consideration and does not need to be enforced.
McLaughlin v. Heikkila is a case that involves Wilbert Heikklia and David Mc Laughlin who entered into an agreement involving eight parcels to be sold to Mr. Mc Laughlin by Mr. Heikklia. According to Cheeseman (2013), the facts of the case indicate that Mr. Mc Laughlin submitted offers to Mr. Heikklia for the purchase of three parcels and afterwards, McLaughlin submitted earnest-money checks and three printed purchase agreements to Heikklia. According to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, McLaughlin himself never signed any of the agreements. However, his wife did sign two of the agreements and she initiated the third agreement on September 14, 2003. Then, two days later on September 16, 2003 Heikklia made changes to two of the agreements by increasing the cost of the parcels, and he changed the closing dates on all three agreements, including add a reservation of mineral rights to all three (Minnesota Court of Appeals, 2005).
Case name: Peter K. Dementas v The Estate of Jack Tallas, 764 P.2d 628 (1988)
Jones was party to the contract and mortgage together with Mrs Jones as surety for her husband, even though Mrs Jones was the actual owner of the property. This produced a legal consequence as it affected the appellants with a conduct on the part of the husband in relation to his wife which raised equities in her favour against the indication of a mortgage. The husband exercised undue influence on Mrs Jones to procure her signature to the mortgage which consisted of no consideration. The plaintiff brought proceedings against the defendant upon a contract to pay interest and principal contained in the mortgage over the property at Walkerville owned by Mrs Jones. It was understood that Mrs Jones executed the mortgage without understanding the effect of the contract and presumed various false misrepresentations. She argued that the mortgage which she s...
The defendant (Dorris Reed) bought a house from the plaintiff (Robert King) and the house was the place of a murder that happened 10 years before. Reed nor the real-estate agent had no knowledge of this murder and Reed discovered the facts of the murder from a neighbor after the sale happened. King was well aware of the murder and recognized that it would impact the home’s market value when it was up for sale. Reed gave $76,000 for the home, although it was worth $65,000 due to the murder. Reed sued King along with the real estate for rescission and damages.
Additionally, registration papers were not to be released until Herring paid in full. These provisions gave the Bowmans the ability to recover the horse in case of default on the payments. Thus providing a security interest for the seller until there was no risk of loss. Even though Herring was not in full possession of the horse, the provisions established that Herring owned the horse.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment in this case is one of much controversy that we will analyse in this essay. The principle laid down by Lord Browne-Wilkinson for the need for causative links between the breach of trust and the loss suffered was then applied in AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors where the solicitor had similarly breached the trust. Pro-Target Target had given a sum of money to Redfern (solicitors) to hold on bare trust until Crowngate had completed the purchase of a property and executed the mortgage. However, Redfern had instead, breached the trust and gave the money to another company, Mirage, by writing to Target to falsely inform them that the purchase had gone through and the mortgage had been executed.
...useless car to a junk yard to recover some loss, but the difference of the re-sale of the junk-car would be a significant loss. Though there were no adequate assurances to the contract, anticipatory repudiation is the only probable remedy for Jack. However, the outcome would weigh on the predominant factor test, which is met because Tom is covered as a merchant because he is operating in his usual daily business, and Jack is the buyer. The sole purpose of the contract was for Tom to sell Jack a car, and for Jack to buy a car from Tom. The UCC, though less stringent than the statute of frauds, does effectively regulate commercial transfers allowing the free market to operate without diminishing the integrity of trade.
The decision of the House of Lords in City of London Building Society v Flegg marks a key stage in how the balance is drawn between occupiers and creditors in priority disputes; the seeds of which were originally planted in the Law of Property Act 1925. It posed a serious challenge to the conventional understanding of overreaching and the machinery of conveyancing.Ref ?
Does the introduction of a system of registration of title remove the need for the law to recognise possessory or equitable interests in land? Why? Why not?
The principles of constitution of trusts are derived from the case of Milroy v Lord (1862 where turner L.J. stated that the complete constitution of a trust requires the actual transfer of property from the person making the gift to the beneficiary, a transfer of the intended gift to the trustees to be held in trust for the beneficiaries or the self-declaration of a trustee. The principle in this case is that a gift can only be enforced in equity if it satisfies one of the three requirements. Where the trust does not meet any of the three requirements the trust is considered an imperfect on incompletely constitutes trust. If the donor fails to complete all the formalities required by common law, then equity will not assist the intended beneficiary and thus the gift will be imperfect. The equitable maxim applicable is that equity will not complete an imperfect gift.
Given that it lies within the domain of equity, the case law indicates a great flexibility in its application, both in the substantive requirements of proof demanded by the courts and in the manner in which the courts will satisfy the equity. It is the first of these aspects of the doctrine that I will examine in this essay. I will look at the shift in the evidentiary requirements and what a representation (or an assurance of rights), a reliance (a change of position on the basis of that assurance) and a detriment (or unconscionable disadvantage) - the three pre-requisites for a successful claim - have come to mean with regard to case law and in particular the judgement of Judge Robert Walker in the Court of Appeal in Gillett v. Holt[1], in which the plaintiff had been given repeated assurances over many decades that he would inherit the defendant's estate, and remained in service to him at least p... ... middle of paper ... ... operty, 16th Ed, Butterworths K. Gray & S.F Gray - Land Law, 2nd Ed, Butterworths Professor Cedric D Bell - Land: The Law of Real Property, 3rd Ed, Old
Everyone at some point in their lives lies even when they know that they should be telling the truth. Deception is a key element in William Shakespeare’s play, Romeo and Juliet. Romeo and Juliet are both deceptive to their parents when they do not tell them about their marriage. They then continue to lie, Juliet telling her parents she would marry Paris when she secretly arranged to fake her death and Romeo deceiving Friar Laurence by going back to Verona. All of the deceiving in the play leads to conflicts, which eventually ends in death of both Romeo and Juliet. By showing how Romeo and Juliet being deceptive to their parents and role models led to pain and conflict, Shakespeare shows that you should always be honest if you want to maintain