Unconventional Warfare Case Study

I agree with Mr. Maxwell on his assessment about Unconventional Warfare (UW) activities providing support to other Special Operations Core Tasks. Special Operation has nine Core Tasks of which I will focus on how it supports Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counter Insurgency (COIN), Counter Terrorism (CT), and Stability Operations (STABOPS).

Special Operations and Irregular Warfare have a symbiotic relationship, primarily because UW is one of the Special Operations Core Tasks; but what I find interesting are the similarities UW shares with FID, COIN, CT, and STABOPS. UW activities are carried out in a hostile territory and support insurgencies or resistance movements against a permanent nation-state. On the other hand, FID, COIN, CT, and STABOPS activities are carried out on a friendly territory to support a nation-state against insurgencies, resistance, or terrorists. It seems that the only difference between UW and the other SO Core Tasks is the end state.

Special Operation Forces (SOF) has the capability to organize, advise, train, assist and equip Host Nation (HN) forces, either a recognized legitimate government or a resistance movement.

Special Forces (SF) understands from training and education that UW has three components: Underground, Auxiliary, and Guerrilla Force. The underground provides the necessary intelligence, command, and control that support a Guerrilla Force in the execution of several types of operations like subversion, sabotage, and psychological operations. The Auxiliary supports the Underground and the Guerrilla Force with logistics and information and serving as a source of recruits. The structure of a resistance movement is similar to the structure of a legitimate government, and it is for this reason that the activities in UW support other SO Core

Activities.

As we look closer at a strategic level, we come across with the revelation that developments in Irregular Warfare are all geared towards specific campaign plans that are similar to each other in structure and design, but primarily in their efforts to achieve their stated objectives and desired end states. In either case, such similarity becomes evident because each campaign is in one way or another trying to coerce, disrupt, and overthrow the opposition. The opposition can be a governing force, as in the case of UW, or an insurgency or terrorist group, as in the case of FID, COIN, CT, and STABOPS. In conclusion, the performance tasks found in UW activities, like organize, train, advise, assist and evaluate an insurgency, support the execution of other Special Operations Core Tasks and the threat value analysis of the opposing force.