Two Marxist Objections to Exploitation

Two Marxist Objections to Exploitation

ABSTRACT: I argue that we can find in Marx two objections to exploitation: (i) an entitlement objection according to which it is wrongful because of the unjust distribution of benefits and burdens it generates; and (ii) an expressivist objection according to which it is objectionable because of the kind of social relation it is. The expressivist objection is predicated on a communitarian strand in Marx's thought, whereas the entitlement objection is grounded in a more liberal account of the wrongfulness of capitalist exploitation. I conclude by connecting my analysis to the current debate between proponents and critics of market socialism. While market socialism could be a vehicle for realizing the values associated with the entitlement objection, this is not true for the expressivist objection. Furthermore, because the entitlement objection does not depend on a thick conception of the human good, it is in accord with the liberal ideal of political neutrality whereas the expressivist objection is not.

In what follows I argue that we can find in Marx's work two objections to exploitation and that distinguishing these objections helps clarify current issues facing socialist political philosophy. The first is an entitlement objection according to which exploitation is wrongful because of the unjust distribution of benefits and burdens it generates. The second is an expressivist objection according to which exploitation is wrongful because of the kind of social relation it is, viz., one in which agents view the needs, vulnerabilities, and capacities of others primarily as a means to their own private gain. (1) The expressivist objection suggests a normatively thicker, communitarian strand in Marx's thought, whereas the entitlement objection relies on a thinner, more liberal normative account. I conclude by connecting my analysis to the current debate between proponents and critics of market socialism. While market socialism could be a vehicle for realizing the values associated with the entitlement objection, this is unlikely the case for the expressivist objection. Furthermore, because the entitlement objection does not depend on a thick conception of the human good it fits with the emphasis on political neutrality that is central to liberal thought.

Let me provide some context for my account by briefly describing the place of exploitation in Marx's theory of history, the connection between the normative and explanatory roles of exploitation, and the relevance of Marx's theory of exploitation for contemporary social philosophy. For Marx exploitation is a concept of historical generality, applying not only to capitalism, but to feudal and ancient modes of production.