Truong Nhu Tang Vietnam War Summary

The Vietnam war was a long, costly armed conflict with the communist regime of North Vietnam and its Southern allies known as the Viet Cong, against South Vietnam and its principle ally the United States. The divisive war, which was increasingly unpopular at home, ended with the withdrawal of U.S forces in 1973 and the unification of Vietnam under Communist control two years later. Truong Nhu Tang provides invaluable insights into the opposing side in the Vietnam War. Tang is a dedicated nationalist who was never a communist but was willing to work with the communist to achieve national independence – the kind of Vietnamese the French and the Americans never sufficiently understood.

The Americans losing the war can be due to several reasons, right from the beginning when they entered the war they were already tainted with a stench of colonialism with their support of the French military activities. The U.S government’s decision to support Diem was

another mistake. “Diem had an instinct for isolation and autocratic control and that he could only hope to make this approach to government work through brute force” (Tang, Page 39). Diem created policies that alienated the peasants and other political agents.
Diems inability to conceive of himself as a popular leader meant that he would have to put his regime in permanent thrall to American aid and protection. On contrast Ho Chi Mihn the leader of the North was seen as a national hero, someone who tried to unify the country. Ho Chi Mihn was the leader that they looked up to creating the Vietmin, Vietnamese Independence that ought the French and the Chinese in 1941. He was described as frail but had projected strength on ever occasion.
The Diem administrations failures also include the Agroville project, a strategic hamlet movement which was essentially a counter insurgency program by separating the guerillas from the population. Trying to deny the enemy the support. This was run by Albert, who ran relocation of peasants to secure people. Forced labor on 20,000 peasants to build homes for 6000 people. Forced to abandon crops, work without any form of payment and away from their own lands to make the govt more secure and not the peasants. After a year or so the peasants were so outraged by this that the govt were forced to abandon the project. None of the objectives were achieved but a great many people were alienated ( Tang, Pg 47).
The military in the north were committed and risked their lives for the cause.

They were trained with the three “withs” : eat with, live with and work with peasants. Used great deal of self discipline, respect to values of village, and that earned them respect of the people they tried to win over. They were trained politically and were painted in nationalistic glow and earned the respect of the people. Even when they used violence and coercion, they were successful rationalizing and explaining violence to the peasants. The South in contrast, the unrestrained irresponsibility and incompetence of the generals had led to apathy and disgust among people at every level. “South Vietnam was a society without leadership and without direction – and these essentials the Americans couldn’t provide”. (Tang pg. 53). The southern troops were mere mercenaries as South had trouble recruiting troops. Even the troops that they could get a hold of would bribe the commanders to leave, there were lots of troops on book but not in

reality.
The Americans view of themselves were also another factor that lead to the outcome of the war. They saw other nations as having interests but themselves as having responsibilities superior to the others. They underestimated the Easterners which therefore affected decision making, as by seeing them as weaker, led to errors. The North were careful and strategic, the U.S had truly underestimated them and moved forward with the war without proper conduct. “Undermining Diem’s, and gather allies internationally – not forgetting the American people themselves. This three pronged strategy was to characterize our approach throughout the war. Every military clash, every demonstration, every propaganda appeal was seen as part of an integrated whole; each had consequences far beyond its immediately apparent results. It was a framework that allowed us to view battles as psychological events and to undertake negotiations in order to strengthen our military position. The Americans seemed never to appreciate fully this strategic perspective, which among ourselves we most often simple called Dahn va dam, dam va dahn (“fighting and talking, talking and fighting”). It was, after all, a traditional Vietnamese approach to warfare, a techinique refined over centuries of confrontation with invaders more powerful than ourselves” (Tang Pg. 87).
As the U.S continued to increase its combat troop numbers and bombing campaigns, the North retaliated with a strong sense of unity and determination for their homeland in which they would give their own lives. Both sides in the war had openly admitted that whoever won the battle for hearts and minds would eventually win the war. The South and the U.S had no chance in this battle, where as the North took time and effort that won the hearts of the Vietnamese people.