Stanley Karnow suggested in The Vietnam War: A History, that advisors to the president hold equal responsibility for the escalation of the war. The two most relevant presidents throughout this period were Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, this essay explores four prominent advisors of this period that were behind some of the most important decisions that led the U.S war efforts. Robert McNamara was Secretary of Defense under JFK’s administration, and is best known as one of the architects of the war. He urged Kennedy to support Ngo Dinh Diem both financially and militarily as the Viet Cong infiltrated South Vietnam, advising that this was in the best interest of both Diem’s regime and the U.S. In 1963 after Kennedy was assassinated, McNamara …show more content…
became directly involved in Vietnam under the Johnson administration, it was during this period that he shaped the war efforts tremendously. In terms of technology and military power, the U.S was superior than Vietnam and McNamara was always trying to take advantage of that.
He issued the famous Memo to the President in which he proposed LBJ with three options about how to proceed; (1) withdraw American troops, (2) continue military policy, (3) expand promptly and substantially U.S pressure. McNamara vigorously supported and pushed for the third option, calling for a boost in American firepower and a troop increase that totaled 200,000 soldiers. The memo resulted in LBK ordering the first U.S combat troops to protect South Vietnam in 1965, and it became an important piece of U.S foreign policy during that time. McNamara’s influence also led to the formation and implementation of Operation Rolling Thunder. President Johnson’s trust toward McNamara makes this advisor the most responsible for the escalation of Vietnam. His support in favor of an increase of troops is important because it was the amount of troops the U.S had in Vietnam at the moment which became one of the links that Baritz lays out in the chain of U.S …show more content…
involvement. Contemporarily, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State under both JFK was also retained by LBJ and became a most recognized advisor under the Johnson administration.
His guiding policy was to defend the U.S position in Vietnam. Rusk, supported McNamara’s recommendation for more U.S military involvement in the region, guided by his anti-communist sentiment. He was also an avid advocate of both the Truman Doctrine and Containment policy, which influenced his position that the U.S had a clear responsibility toward Vietnam under the SEATO agreement. Although Rusk supported U.S involvement in Vietnam, he was opposed to making concessions or negotiations with the leaders of North Vietnam, and unlike McNamara he did not trust the Diem government and had doubts about his ability to lead the country. Rusk’s belief about Diem turned out to be correct after Diem turned out to be a weak leader. Rusk’s term in office was dominated primarily by his cautious approach to the war. He felt that the war should not be escalated to the point that the Chinese might be compelled to intervene, but he also recoiled at the notion of standing idle and let communism spread. Rusk viewed this war as an opportunity to prevent Eisenhower’s domino theory and as a necessary war against communism. Unlike McNamara, Rusk cautioned the White House into sending more troops to Vietnam and instead suggested to exhaust all diplomatic options before committing to a military line of
action. In 1964 LBJ chose William Westmoreland, an American general, to lead U.S military assistance command in Vietnam. General Westmoreland urged direct involvement over a reliance on advisors and the ARNV. To his belief, American firepower and troop mobility would easily defeat both North Vietnam Army and Viet Cong. He is an influential figure because of his role in directing the U.S military strategy. Among these strategies is attrition, which aimed to inflict heavy losses in N.V and Viet Cong forces by using U.S firepower, but this strategy ultimately resulted in costly deadlock by 1967. General Westmoreland was also responsible for sending troops in “search and destroy” missions, one of the most famous tactics used by the U.S throughout the war. Additionally, the Tet Offensive, a series of surprise attacks staged by the North Vietnamese against five major cities in South Vietnam, served two purposes. First, it made the U.S military grew optimistic because the enemy had now stirred away from their regular guerrilla tactics. And secondly, the success of the U.S response was credited to Westmoreland and the outcome led to his promotion to Chief of Staff of the army. LBJ had previously refused to expand the ground efforts, but once Westmoreland’s attrition strategy proved to be effective, he agreed on approving a small increase of troops. The post-Tet situation was now seen as an opportunity for Americans to debilitate the enemy and stop any resurgence.
One of the key strengths of this book is the author's first-hand knowledge of the people, places, and events that he is writing about. He also supplemented this first-hand knowledge with extensive interviews. In one example, he elaborated on the "chain of command" in Vietnam, which began with General Paul Harkins (and William C. Westmoreland) to the CINCPAC (Admiral Harry Felt) and from CINCPAC to Washington. "Not once in their four years of mutual agony in Vietnam did Harkins's successor, General Westmoreland, pick up the telephone and call his commander-in-chief, President Lyndon B. Johnson. Westmoreland did not have the authority, he told me."(169) This information came directly from an interview with Westmoreland. There are other anecdotes similar to this with each contributing to the extensive nature of the book's detail.
The leadership styles, experience, personality, and temperament of Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy played a role in deepening the U.S. involvement and commitment to Vietnam. Both presidents vowed to stop the spread of communism, which was viewed as a direct assault to democracy, human rights, and capitalism. (Tucker, 1999) Both presidents also subscribed to the domino theory, or the belief that if one key country should fall to communism, then it would have a cascading effect on other countries turning to communism. (Divine, 1981) This theory was used by many presidents as the reason for ongoing support to the effort in Indochina.
The reports in this novel are prefaced with a quote by Robert Shaplen, which sums up the feelings of those Americans involved in the Vietnam conflict. He states, "Vietnam, Vietnam . . .. There are no sure answers." In this novel, the author gives a detailed historical account of the happenings in Vietnam between 1950 and 1975. He successfully reports the confusing nature, proximity to the present and the emotions that still surround the conflict in Vietnam. In his journey through the years that America was involved in the Vietnam conflict, Herring "seeks to integrate military, diplomatic, and political factors in such a way as to clarify America's involvement and ultimate failure in Vietnam."
i. Difficulties faced by soldiers due to the nature of fighting in the Vietnam War - Personnel had difficulties with transportation supplied with adapted vehicles back seat faced rear to provide additional fire power (Source A) – It appears as if the government didn't worry enough to supply men with safe and capable equipment - Threat of traps led to fear as vehicles had to be parked on street at night (Source A) o Check for traps each morning became a daily ritual particularly in fuel tanks (Source A) o A request for a locking fuel cap was denied because weren’t entitled to one” (Source A) • What circumstances would have needed to arise for them to be entitled to one? The Offensive full guard was set up (24hrs a day), personnel got no sleep and were constantly on alert (Source A) – How significant would this have been in the personnel’s mental frame of mind?
While Nixon was in office, he used the war to his benefit, helping him win another term in office. Nixon’s plan was to use “Vietnamization,” a process in which American soldiers would train South Vietnamese to fight for themselves and eventually drawing American troops out of the war (Vietnamization). At first, General WestPoint was in charge, raiding Vietcong bases and trying to eliminate them. The original plan was to use the body count to discourage any more NVA troops from fighting, but this strategy backfired because both Vietnamese and American troops had high body counts. General Abraham was appointed as commander and began the “Vietnamization” strategy, which only seemed to work in the public’s eyes. Nixon made a treaty with South Vietnamese President, to have a ceasefire to withdraw American troops and release American POWs while South Vietnam took over the war (The). Nixon planned to use this strategy to withdraw all American troops, however it was “worse, Nixon would leave North Vietnamese troops occupying and controlling much of the South, while withdrawing all remaining American ground forces (Hughes).” Nixon’s use of Vietnamization helped to further his political resolve. He “sacrificed the lives of American soldiers to further his electoral ends (Hughes).” The ...
The Korean War changed the face of American Cold War diplomacy forever. In the midst of all the political conflict and speculation worldwide, the nation had to choose between two proposed solutions, each one hoping to ensure that communism didn?t sweep across the globe and destroy American ideals of capitalism and democracy. General Douglas MacArthur takes the pro-active stance and says that, assuming it has the capability, the U.S. should attack communism everywhere. President Harry Truman, on the other hand, believed that containing the Soviet communists from Western Europe was the best and most important course of action, and that eliminating communism in Asia was not a priority.
President Eisenhower’s foreign policies when implemented would facilitate the goal of containing communism, and also prevent the over-exertion of armed forces, which would demonstrate a weak American force like the French forces before them. President Eisenhower was referring to the battle between French forces and the Vietminh (the communist led forces of North Vietnam), and in which he began explaining how economically and geographically important Vietnam was to the United States and Asia. This first step is the first step towards preventing what he called the “falling domino” principle. President Eisenhower went on to explain that if South Vietnam falls to communism, then Laos would be next; and after Laos then Thailand and straight to Burma and that would lead communists to India, at the time a very strong and important ally of the United States. Even Japan, President Eisenhower warned, could be in danger of toppling, another domino in that row of Asia.
In the early 1960s the U.S. began sending military advisors to South Vietnam beginning the Vietnam War, arguably the most controversial war in United States history. This incident followed Vietnam gaining its independence from the French Empire’s Indochina in 1954. The nation soon split, creating a communist North Vietnam, and a noncommunist South Vietnam. In fear of communism spreading the U.S. supported South Vietnam and sent troops. As the incident dragged on it caused a huge anti-war movement and a lot of political turmoil.The troops were withdrawn in 1973, the whole country fell to communism, and the U.S. failed. How did a superpower such as the U.S. take defeat from a small country like Vietnam? Many have wondered and continue to wonder
McNamara graduated Harvard with a master’s degree in business, served in the U.S. Army Air Corps, and was President of the Ford Motor Company. Given his background in analytics, President Kennedy asked McNamara to be his Secretary of Defense in 1960. The American military support of Southern Vietnamese forces gradually increased during Kennedy’s presidency. Early public opinion of the Vietnam wasn’t necessarily bad. The widespread American notion of the war was seen as a fight against communism. This paired with the preconceived idea of Northern Vietnam’s inferiority as a military power seemed like favorable odds for and easy American win given it’s reputation as a global hegemony. Because of this, Kennedy, with the advisement of McNamara, approached the conflict under the principles of limited war. However, the Kennedy administration did not anticipate was the unexpected tactic of guerrilla warfare paired with the unwavering dedication to the war effort. After President Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson took over the role of President. Before Kennedy’s death, there had been talks between him and McNamara about withdrawing troops from the war. This strategy was not shared by Johnson. His primary strategy was to escalade and “Americanize” the war.[2] FACTS ABOUT VIETNAM BOOK. McNamara’s actions match this accordingly as Johnson’s Secretary of Defense until McNamara’s resignation in 1978. However, by evaluating
JOHN F. KENNEDY IN VIETNAM There are many critical questions surrounding United States involvement in Vietnam. American entry to Vietnam was a series of many choices made by five successive presidents during the years of 1945-1975. The policies of John F. Kennedy during the years of 1961-1963 were ones of military action, diplomacy, and liberalism. Each of his decisions was on its merits at the time the decision was made. The belief that Vietnam was a test of the Americas ability to defeat communists in Vietnam lay at the center of Kennedys policy.
In the Early Years: 1961-1963, Kennedy administration and Vietnam take flight. Assumptions behind the administration's decisions to increase U.S involvement in Vietnam strains two very important aspects that would gainsay obligation; one, the fall of South Vietnam to Communist control and the U.S military role and support. Discussion of knowledgeable ties to Southeast Asia emerged. Lack of governmental experts created obstacles. When the Berlin crisis occurred in 1961and during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, President Kennedy was able to turn to senior people like Llewellyn Thompson, Charles Bohlen and George Keenan, who knew the Soviets intimately. There were no senior officials in the Pentagon or State Department with comparable knowledge of Southeast Asia. Ultimately, the administration failed to critically analyze their assumptions and the foundations of their decisions, which inevitable ended in disaster.
It is understandable that some Americans strongly opposed the United States getting involved in the Vietnam War. It had not been a long time since the end of World War II and simply put, most Americans were tired of fighting. Mark Atwood Lawrence is one of the people who opposed our involvement in the Vietnam War. In his essay, “Vietnam: A Mistake of Western Alliance”, Lawrence argues that the Vietnam War was unnecessary and that it went against our democratic policies, but that there were a lot of things that influenced our involvement.
The speech that I chose to analyze and critique is from John Forbes Kerry “Vietnam Veterans Against the War” to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In this speech he did not represent himself, he represented the group of 1000 veterans that feels the same way he does about the war.
This book would be an excellent source for anyone wanting to understand this period of the entrance into the Vietnam War. It is a great look into the character of each of the participants. It also would benefit those who are studying and learning how to develop strategy and policy for future wars that the United States may involve itself in. Works Cited McMaster, H. R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 1997.
Vietnam was a struggle which, in all honesty, the United States should never have been involved in. North Vietnam was battling for ownership of South Vietnam, so that they would be a unified communist nation. To prevent the domino effect and the further spread of communism, the U.S. held on to the Truman Doctrine and stood behind the South Vietnamese leader, Diem.