The Standard Oil Refining Monopoly

1352 Words3 Pages

In the 1870’s, J. D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company was established as a monopoly in the petroleum refining industry in the United States. How he managed to achieve this has always been an economic puzzle because the refining industry, at that time, had many small firms. Moreover, there were minimal barriers to entry into the industry. By 1879, Rockefeller was in control of more than 90 percent of the US’s refining capacity and “maintained a dominant share of refining, in spite of the fact that entry into refining remained easy” (Granitz and Klein 1996, p. 2). Over time, there have been many efforts to explain the Company’s growth; the most sophisticated economic discussion of the monopoly creation is by Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein in their 1996 article. In 2012, George Priest from Yale University offered an alternative theory for the success of Standard’s refining monopoly. This paper will provide a critical summary of the key issues raised in both the articles. Granitz and Klein, in their analysis of the case, explain Rockefeller’s success in monopolizing the petroleum industry through transportation rather than refining. In contrast to the refining industry, there were only three railroads that transported petrol in 1870. Entry into the transportation stage was difficult because of high fixed costs. Therefore, it was possible to establish a cartel by “collusively agreeing to stabilize individual railroad market shares and by shifting petroleum shipments between railroads to enforce the agreement” (Granitz and Klein 1996, p. 2). The railroads facilitated Standard’s refinery acquisitions and prevented entry by setting high rates to non-Standard refiners. Rockefeller, very shrewdly, cooperated with the railroads t... ... middle of paper ... ...ent was that it facilitating the horizontal conspiracy among the railroads and Standard. The Standard Oil case illustrates how a vertical relationship can create horizontal market power. Granitz and Klein argue that in such a case, the vertical relationship should not be the central aspect of concern for antitrust agencies. It was the explicit horizontal conspiracy by the railroads with the help of Standard that jointly fixed rail rates and railroad market shares. “Such horizontal collusive behavior is clearly anticompetitive, and would be anticompetitive even if there were no vertical connection between Standard and the railroads” (Granitz and Klein 1996, p. 45). They conclude their article by stating that their detailed analysis did not support any new antitrust policy that would condemn a vertical relationship in the absence of a horizontal conspiracy.

More about The Standard Oil Refining Monopoly

Open Document