Socratic Piety: The Role of Reason in Athenian Practices

This brings forward another treatment of Socratic pious praxis that is unique to the Memorabilia; the role reason plays in the schematics of this praxis, and the implications of this role on conventional Athenian piety. Consider, for example, how Xenophon claims that Socrates describes as “crazy” both those who think there is nothing divine about the outcome of a given choice, and those who consult divination in aspects of life in which the use of human reason/education is possible (1.1.7-1.1.9). Xenophon then disassociates Socrates from the sophists. He points to proof of this Socrates’ criticism of the sophists firstly on account of their inability to master the realm of human virtue/arts before studying the divine realm, secondly on account

of the unlikelihood that such a study will ever actually allow humans to possess a divine mastery over things like the weather, for example (1.1.11-1.13). He, thirdly, points to Socrates’ criticism of the sophists on account of their extreme positions and their pointless debates (1.1.15). Finally, Xenophon affirms that, unlike the sophists, Socrates only concerned himself with the human things; Socrates only “[examined] what is impious, what is noble, what is unjust…” (1.1.16).
In this passage, Xenophon seems to exonerate Socrates from a very specific kind of impiety; the kind of impiety upheld and practiced by the radical sophists and the radical diviners.

Piety comes to be understood as a kind of continuum, and Socrates uniquely represents the “sober mean” on this pious continuum (Strauss 52). In other words, Xenophon’s treatment of Socratic piety in the Memorabilia depends specifically upon highlighting the distinctiveness of Socratic pious praxis from extreme positions. Thus, although Xenophon exonerates Socrates he does so only to an extent that brings into focus the uniqueness of Socratic pious praxis. Moreover, Socrates’ sober view –as outlined by the Memorabilia - limits the power of the divine in two main ways. Firstly, it governs resort to piety through resort to reason; one who is truly pious limits his resort to the divine only to asking questions about unknown outcomes. Accordingly, one who is truly pious, will more readily rely on reason to resolve issues that deviate from this former qualification. This claim is in itself problematic because its implementation depends upon the belief in a formulation of the divine that is uniquely rational; it requires the worship of a divine that in itself acknowledges the full potential of human reason, and thereby understands the limited resort to divinity that would inevitably emerge as an outcome of this rationalistic pious praxis. Furthermore, it requires a very fragile distinction; one can ask

questions regarding the human things –justice, piety, nobility- whilst not concerning one’s self with bigger questions. It is quite perplexing that this distinction is associated with Socrates as Socrates himself, does not always seem to bear this aforementioned distinction in mind; after all, the implicit question posed by a later exchange between Aristodemus and Socrates is “what is a god?” (1.4.1-1.4.19).
Secondly, one must note how Socrates’ daimonion is hugely absent in this discussion; the question becomes weather or not the Socratic daimonion himself possesses this novel super-rationality is never directly addressed. If the answer to this question is affirmative, then the nature of this daimonion is quite distinct from the conventional gods of Athens; the daimonion is either a new divinity altogether or at the very least a mouthpiece to a novel rationalistic understanding of the divine. Hence, whilst Xenophon’s treatment of Socratic piety exonerates Socrates from specific notions of impiety, it does not deny the novelty of Socratic pious praxis; indeed, it implicitly brings into focus the kind of radical re-writing of Athenian divinity that would need to occur as a result of this praxis.
Conclusion:
This paper has shown the ways in which the treatment of Socratic piety in The Memorabilia builds upon some aspects of The Apology, in a manner that calls the reader’s attention to the ways and extent to which Socratic piety is quite distinct and possibly subversive to Athenian piety.