The Free-Will Determinism Problem in Greek Philosophy: Aristotle

The Free-Will Determinism Problem in Greek Philosophy: Aristotle

Although the tradition of western philosophy was once famously called a series of 'footnotes to Plato' (A.N. Whitehead), there seems to be at least one major philosophical debate that owes it s heritage neither to Plato nor to any of his ancient compatriots. The problem of free will and determinism seems not to have been a major issue directly exercising the minds of philosophers of the ancient world. There are probably two main reasons for this. First, 'the prevailing view of the universe in their day did not presuppose an omnipotent deity. The Olympians were certainly magnificently superhuman but they fell far short of total power. Even Zeus, the greatest of the gods, did not have everything his own way as many a myth testifies. However, once the Judaeo-Christian notion of the Almighty came to dominate the thinking of Europe, then doubts emerged about the scope of human freedom. For, if God is the omnipotent creator of all, then his created beings may well enquire whether they are his totally passive automata or endowed with independent choice and responsibility. Second, the Greeks lacked a deep-seated belief in scientific determinism. Scientists and non-scientists alike, we children of the modem world cannot escape strong conditioning into the belief that all physical events have physical causes, that we live in a universe governed by inexorable laws of nature. Once we apply this general principle to human behaviour we are bound to ask whether our actions are the expression of our free will or simply mechanistic reactions to stimuli. In this essay I intend to examine a central doctrine of Aristotle and in the course of this examination show that, although Ar...

... middle of paper ...

...ill which I find implicit in Aristotle. For if the traits of my character are inherited from my forebears, then clearly I am no more responsible for them than I am for the colour of my eyes or my inability to waggle my ear lobes.

In conclusion, I suspect that in Aristotle, though he is not addressing the problem of free will and determinism directly, he has recognised a social need to distinguish between actions for which men are or are not responsible. Blame and praise are crucial to the community's well-being; the identification of their rightful place is a legitimate task for the philosopher — hence the distinction between voluntary and involuntary action with its implication of free will. Elsewhere, however, he presents a doctrine which describes human action as derived from character shaping environmental causes. Clearly the two positions are inconsistent.