The Failure Of The Texian Army

Many Mexican officials attempted to collect taxes by force from the colonists despite the previous agreement that they would be exempt . As tensions increases, Texas created an army of 1,100 men split into two groups, regulars and volunteers in October of 1835. Houston was made the leader of the regular group of soldiers on paper . Although the commander on paper, The Texian army did not recognize Sam Houston as their commander when he finally joined them, seeing him as not having earned the right because he was not there at the initial skirmishes of Gonzales, Concepcion, the Grass fight, and the storming of Bexar . The nature of the Texian Army was not of unity but of individualism and the problem would present itself to General Houston often

throughout the campaign. Santa Anna finally decided to invade Texas to destroy the rebellion when his brother General Cos was defeated late in 1835 by an outnumbered militia of Texians . General Santa Anna crossed the Rio Grande in February, 1836 with a force of 6,000 men with the determination to crush Texian rebellion like he had crushed the other rebellions in Mexico in recent years . In response the Texian government declared independence on 2 March, 1836 while at their temporary location at Washington-on-the-Brazos .
The operational level of war is the employment of forces to meet the strategic objectives.

For the Texas revolution the operational level of war started when General Santa Anna achieved the element of surprise in February of 1836. General Santa Anna’s army crossed the Rio Grande during the winter in February. The Texian leadership did not believe General Santa Anna would cross the Rio Grande before April to the extent that the provisional government was not active and most permeant Texians in the army were home with their family . General Santa Anna would not wait that long because he was low on capital and did not want to fight in the summer months . Impressive as this mid-winter crossing was, it did not come without its consequences. By mid-February the Mexican forces were spread out across 300 miles. Starvation, dehydration, and disease were serious issues due to the very short sighted planning and unusually severe winter and following hot spring . These problems would only be exacerbated as General Santa Anna spread his army into four different formations and stretched their supply lines further and further northeast in unfamiliar

territory.
At the operational level the Texian Army was not prepared for combat.

The Texian Army planned for six different contingents in their total forces. The regular force, a regularly enlisted volunteer force, an auxiliary volunteer force, a reserve army, a militia and the Texas rangers would all have different commanders that were not subordinate to each other. The regular volunteers could leave when they wanted and would choose leadership by popular vote. The Regulars were not trained unless they served in the United States Army and for the most part not much different than the volunteers in attitudes. The auxiliary volunteer force were additional volunteer forces under their own command also. The other three contingents did not build their forces up before the war ended . At its peak the Texian Army totaled 1900 soldiers that were concentrated in six locations as well as spread out and enroute from the United States

frontier.
On 23 February, 1836, General Santa Anna arrived at San Antonio and quickly surrounded the Alamo. For two weeks every effort was made to defend the Alamo. On March 6, 1836, the Mexican Army finally breached the walls and executed any survivors. This same pattern of defeat and execution ordered by General Santa Anna would be repeated at Goliad, the Matamoros expedition and other locations. In total the Texian army lost 700 men by 26 March, 1836 due to the lack of central control and obedience . General Houston began multiple withdraws from the town of Gonzales with a force numbering about 1,100 soldiers. He withdrew across the rivers, the Colorado and then the Brazos. Each withdrawal brought new command problems for the Texian Army in the form of disobedience and desertion. Junior commanders who saw General Sam Houston as being a coward for retreating would desert or sew discontent within the army. The worst cases were from the company commanders Baker and Martin. At one point, they forced General Houston into ignoring their disobedience and allowed them to stay and guard a river even though their forces were far outnumbers and could easily be flanked . General Houston’s force would burn the towns as they retreated. The army finally found itself on 30 March, 1836 at Groce’s farm to train the undisciplined force until 12 April, 1836 . The rebellious Texian Army was held together by the very thin glue of revenge. After the Texian Army was on the march toward the Sabine River from Groce’s Farm, General Santa Anna gambles to end the war quickly. He split his forces and personally led 800 men to try and quickly capture the provisional government’s leadership at Harrisburg . He narrowly misses them at Harrisburg and then again to the west at New Washington. General Sam Houston’s scouts had captured letters of the Mexican Army movements. Houston’s Army decides to quickly move to beat the Mexican Army to the field of San Jacinto so as to block their access to Lynch’s ferry . The Mexican Army was hours behind the Texian Army. The two armies of roughly 800 men were camped ¾ miles apart with the Texians in the better position