Summary Of Nozick's Experience Machine

Nozick’s thought experiment of the Experience Machine challenges hedonism and utilitarianism by suggesting pleasure is not our only priority. He argues this on the premises that if pleasure, or more specifically the experience of pleasure, is the only thing of importance then we will always choose the more pleasure inducing option. Thus he presents the experience machine, which would grant more pleasure than the outside world, and notes that the initial reaction of many to not want to plug in suggests the conclusion as outlined above. It will be shown that the limited ability Nozick has to counter the objection that doing and being are forms of experiencing, in contrast to his claim that we would rather act than experience, as well as the assumptions he makes in his arguments lead to his conclusion not necessarily being supported by his arguments.
A fundamental aspect of Nozick’s argument is that experience is not enough and we desire to actually take action and be who we are of our own volition and under our own power. However, I would argue that both acting and being are in themselves

experiences. Being a studious person and the act of writing an essay are also the experiences of being a studious person and writing an essay. The causes for being and acting, the satisfaction of finishing the essay and receiving a good grade, this way are also experiences. Furthermore, the recollection of these experiences are themselves the reward for many and in fact are worth even more than a mere reward to some such as John Locke who see these recollections as our very identities. If it is true that acting and being are experiences, then it is not wrong to enter the machine but is actually the best possible course of action as the machine will ensure that we may act and be whatever we desire including the work required to act and be those ways if it were reality.
Nozick would take the matter differently, whilst he might concede to the idea that doing and being are forms of experiencing he would not find this to be a total undermining of his argument.

How Nozick would react to the theory of recollection being identity is unknown, but he would very likely suggest that the recollections provided by the machine cannot be a part of who we are as they are deliberately false memories. The machine keeps one trapped within themselves, entirely isolated, and you cannot connect to others while inside of it. He finds these connections to be important to who we are, forming a view of identity that relies upon the true and outside world to some extent. The desire for a true experience as well as those moments of distress that take place outside of the machine in-between the experiences is indicative of desiring something more than the machine

provide.
The conclusions to be drawn are that doing and being are forms of experiencing, and that Nozick would argue that experiences must be real to matter which suggests that there is more of value than merely the pleasurable experience. Nozick’s conclusion should not necessarily be discarded as there is legitimacy to his idea that pleasure is not the only thing of value, however his way of presenting this is problematic at best. He makes a number of assumptions in his work that, once questioned, undermine the entirety of his argument. He assumes that there is a reality beyond just ourselves that we must be connected to in order to live a good and satisfying life without giving any justification for this idea.
As well as this he assumes that we have personal identity. It should not be overlooked that he is to the Utilitarians and Hedonists who make similar assumptions, however the issue lies with his usage of this assumption. The insistence that there is an “I” informs the assumption that there is an external world we must connect to, and that we want to interact with others, forms the idea that pleasure cannot be the only thing of value as we would be cut off from them in the experience machine. The Utilitarians and Hedonists may assume that there is an “I” but it is not a main method of justifying their argument, unlike Nozick.
He also gives himself the advantage by stating that the machine might only be able to provide experiences that the person within the machine could have had in the outside world which differs from the earlier suggestion that the machine had a full library of experiences. There is no contradiction here as this was a new suggestion about how the machine may work, but it clearly places the outcome in his favour considering this is a far lesser machine in comparison to the first. This being only one of many objections shows that whilst Nozick’s work offers an interesting idea his arguments are not satisfying enough to accept his conclusion.