Scarpelli Case Summary

In July 1965, Gerald Scarpelli pleaded guilty to the charge of armed robbery in the state of Wisconsin. As a result, Scarpelli was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment by a trial judge which later overturned the conviction. Scarpelli was placed on seven years-probation by the Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare. He acknowledged an agreement specifying the terms of his probation, which allowed him to reside in Illinois. This agreement was contracted on behalf of supervision and an interstate compact. On August 5, 1965, Scarpelli was granted probation by the Adult Probation Department of Cook County, Illinois. On August 6, 1975, he was apprehended by Illinois police who surprised him and Fred Kleckner, Jr., in the act of burglarizing a residence.

After being explained his constitutional rights, Scarpelli confessed that he and Kleckner had broken into the residence for the purpose of stealing merchandise or money. Later, he recanted his statement claiming that the admission was made under duress and was falsified. On September 1, Scarpelli’s probation was revoked without a hearing and without being represented by counsel by the Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare.

This was a denial of his due process right as a United States citizen. In the case of a parolee, Morrissey versus Brewer confirmed that due process mandates preliminary and final revocation hearings. On September 4, 1965, Scarpelli was confined to the Wisconsin State Reformatory at Green Bay to begin serving the 15 years to which he had been sentenced by the trial judge. At no time was he afforded a hearing and counselor. On December 16, 1968, three years later, Scarpelli filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He concluded that revocation of probation without a hearing and without counsel was a denial of his due process right. After the petition had been filed, but before it had been acted upon, the Department placed Scarpelli on parole. The District Court found that his status as a parolee was sufficient custody to confer jurisdiction on the court and that the petition was not moot because the revocation carried collateral consequences, presumably including the restraints imposed by his parole. On the merits, the District Court held that revocation without a hearing and counsel was a denial of due

process. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and the District Court concluded that revocation of probation without a hearing and without counsel was a denial of due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the probationer was entitled to a hearing, but the State is not constitutionally required to appoint an attorney to indigent defendants at parole and probation revocation hearings. The Supreme Court concluded that there is no justification for creating a new, inflexible rule requiring appointed counsel at all revocation hearings. The court also ruled that the probation period cannot be canceled without a proper trial, but simply on the basis of the defendant's allegations of his involvement in a repeat offense. According to the court, this violates the constitutional provision on the right of every person to an objective hearing. Moreover, the court ruled that such cases require the mandatory participation of a lawyer. Such cases are now resolved in two stages. At the first hearing, the guilt of a person in a repeat offense is clarified. If to the second hearing his guilt is proved, then the original sentence which was replaced by the probation period comes into force. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency should also consider, essentially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every case in which request for counsel is refused, the grounds for such refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.